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1 Preface
The analysis of property rights provides a big amount of important insights on
one of the most important fundaments of social and economic life. While most
generally every form of economic activity can be interpreted as a exchange of
property rights, there are also more specific examples that underline its im-
portance for everyday life. For example, property rights build the fundament
to determine pollution rights in environmentalism while property rights also
affect the behaviour of individuals and motivate governments to engage in
highly costly activities. Inglorious and odd examples for such behaviour in-
clude the occupation of Hans-Island by the Canadian military in 2004 or the
planting of the Russian flag on the seabed below the North Pole. On account of
the general importance of property rights for social and economic life, it there-
fore seems appropriate to bring the research on property rights back to the
front row of economic analysis. Here it is especially the necessity - as Coase
(1960), Alchian (1965) and Demsetz (1967) have emphasised - to revive prop-
erty rights analysis by interpreting property rights as the outcome of different
economic and social processes rather than sticking to the interpretation of them
constituting exogenous factors in economic analysis. The latter view, which is
especially pronounced in neoclassical analysis, disregards the important fact
that institutional factors such as property rights are highly influenced by the
social and economic activity while they simulatenously constitute factors that
influence social and economic life. This form of “institutional reciprocity” cer-
tainly constitutes one of the basic foundations of this dissertation. Yet it is
important to note that this call for a more extensive analysis of property rights
has to be understood as an approval to start with a positive analysis of property
rights rather than continuing a normative approach that draws an existent prej-
udices. This holds especially true with respect to the evaluation of collective
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ownership forms, which have often been publicly condemned on account of
several wrongly presumed disadvantages. Here it is the implicitly accepted
believe of many economists that collective ownership forms will always lead
to less efficient outcomes that has to be reconsidered. This is because it appears
that it is the variety of different collective ownership forms that offer the most
promising approaches to deal with important problems such as global warm-
ing or the settlement of disputes on the exploitation of regions that are rich in
raw materials. However, this can only be achieved by approaching the prob-
lem of property rights formation and institutional change in an unbiased way.
Therefore, it is the basic aim of this dissertation to provide a more detailed and
unbiased analysis of the factors that influence the formation and change of
different property rights systems from an economic perspective. Further, as a
second aspect, the thesis seeks to identify the basic characteristics that stabilise
different ownership regimes, while simultaneously trying to interpret the re-
spective factors in the context of the economic, cultural and environmental
conditions they occur in. Finally, I also consider it important to account for the
likely consequences changes in a prevalent structure of property rights might
have on social life and how these changes in turn might become relevant from
an economic perspective. These aims also display themselves in the setup of
the thesis.
The first chapter, which is entitled “ The Survival of the Fittest: Efficiency,
Transaction Costs and the Bad Reputation of Collective Ownership” starts by
analysing the differences of private and collective ownership with respect to
the level of transaction costs and other economic variables and links the find-
ings to the concept of efficiency. Hereby I show that the popular misbelief of
private ownership arrangements always leading to more efficient outcomes
than collective ones does not withstand a more detailed analysis of the under-
lying economic aspects. In addition to this general finding, the first chapter
also seeks to identify the conditions that influence the efficiency of collective
and private ownership forms. Note that the view of how property rights in-
teract with human behaviour that is used in this chapter is very close to the
one in the new institutional economics. Accordingly, this section also sticks to
the basic premises of the property right paradigm and interprets institutional
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change to take place when more efficient institutional arrangements establish
themselves over less efficient ones. In contrast to the neoclassical understand-
ing of institutions as exogenous constraints, the employed view does not only
interpret property rights as constraints on utility maximisation. Rather, in the
first chapter, property rights and institutional arrangements in general are sub-
ject to the maximising behaviour of individuals themselves. It should not come
as a surprise that the first chapter of this thesis builds to a major extent on some
of the fundamental contributions of modern property rights analysis such as
Coase (1960), Alchian (1965), Demsetz (1967), North (1990) or Ostrom (1990).
In the course of the first chapter, these theoretical foundations will be used to
highlight several case studies from the Alpine region. In its last part, the chap-
ter returns to the wrongly presumed superiority of private ownership forms
by taking a more detailed look at some of the determinants that added to the
historically bad reputation of collective ownership forms in Bavaria.
The second chapter “ Between Justin and Bartholomew: Class Struggle, In-
terest Groups and Territorial Behaviour on the Seiser Alm” aims to identify
the determinants of property rights arrangements from a more applied per-
spective. The chapter uses the example of the hierarchical ownership structure
on the Seiser Alm in the Italian Alps, to interpret the emergence of property
rights from the perspective of the theory of the firm. Although chapter 2 also
acknowledges that efficiency concepts might be important to provide the ba-
sis for a comparison of different ownership arrangements, the basic approach
to explain the purpose of property rights is different to the one of chapter I.
This is because the respective analysis shows that persistent property rights
arrangements are not necessarily linked to the concept(s) of efficiency. Rather,
property rights and institutional arrangements in general can also serve other
tasks, such as the aim to stabilise the privileges of privileged groups. I show
that the interpretation of hierarchic property rights structures as a means of
“surplus extraction” provides useful insights into the setup of group processes
and how economic activity might be influenced by group membership. More
specifically, this chapter employs two different approaches to explain the ex-
istence of firms - the Marxist approach to capitalist firms provided by Gintis
(1976) and the perceptional theory of the firm that draws on Schlicht (2008) -
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while it is especially the contribution of Schlicht (1998) that has influenced the
analysis of property rights in this chapter. In addition to the insight that an
analysis of other than efficiency based explanations may offer a better way to
understand the influencing factors of economic behaviour under certain condi-
tions, there is also a second difference between the first and the second chapter
of the thesis. This is because in chapter 2 I hold the view that property rights
can also influence human behaviour and economic activity in a different than
the instrumental fashion that has been emphasised in chapter 1. I hereby ar-
gue that property rights influence social and economic interaction by shaping
custom. Different forms of self- and group perceptions directly influence be-
haviour in a way that cannot be explained usefully by referring to different
preferences, incentives and utility maximisation.
In contrast to the first two chapters, the third one “ The Hidden Frontier:
Property Rights and Minority Language Survival” appears - at least at first
glance - to march to a different drummer. This is because this chapter analy-
ses the factors that have influenced the members of the small scale linguistic
enclave in the Fersina valley to refuse linguistic assimilation and stick to a mi-
nority idiom although this imposed high costs on them. Yet the differences
between this chapter and the previous two vanish into thin air if one analy-
ses the provided explanation for minority language survival in more detail. In
chapter 3 I show that environmental factors have influenced the necessity to
maintain different ownership forms which in turn have influenced the neces-
sity to maintain group cohesion. This stabilised the use of the minority idiom
by influencing inheritance schemes and marital behaviour at the village level.
Note that the third chapter also merges some of the basic insights from the
previous two chapters. First, this is because the present explanation on minor-
ity language survival argues that a production efficient property rights system
led to an inefficient outcome at the community level. Hence the third chapter
- though only implicitly - also expresses its concerns regarding a purely effi-
cient based interpretation of property rights formation. Second however, the
third chapter also merges the two previously exposed explanations of how of
property rights influence economic behaviour. The employed argument in this
section accounts for the purely instrumental influence of property rights on hu-
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man behaviour, while it also displays how property rights influence individual
perception of belonging to a certain group or village community. Accordingly
it is the insight that property rights can constitute effective constraints on util-
ity maximisation while they also influence human behaviour through custom
that is employed in the final chapter of the dissertation. Third, it is the aspect
of institutional reciprocity, which shows that social and organisational struc-
tures as well as property rights interact closely with economic variables and
mutually shape each other.
It should further be noted that in addition to the theoretical considerations,
there are also other aspects that link the three chapters of the dissertation to
each other. First of all, each of the chapters seeks to explain the process of
property rights formation and institutional change from the perspective of
small scale communities in a pre-industrial setting. More specifically, all of
case studies that are provided in this dissertation are connected to the Alpine
region and there are several reasons for focusing on this specific geographic
area. First of all, such a focus offers the possibility to analyse many long-lasting
property rights structures in their original form. This is because in the Alps,
many ancient ownership systems had persisted up to the first half of the 20th
century for several hundred years, while some of them show their influence
on economic ans social activity up to the present day. Second, the analysis of
different property rights systems in the Alpine region also offered the chance
to analyse the close interaction between different bundles of property rights
or more specifically between private and collective ownership forms in close
detail. Since in the many village communities in the Alps the economic or-
ganisation was build on private ownership, collective ownership and several
hybrid forms, the close interaction between the different ownership forms can
be analysed in a convenient way. Finally, there is also a third aspect of choosing
the Alps that has proved to be beneficial for this dissertation. In spite of the fact
that the present study analyses property rights from an economic perspective,
I have also used insights from other disciplines in each of the three chapters.
Here, the vast amount of studies that highlight the anthropological, historical
or legal aspects of property rights formation in the Alps, provided very useful
support for the present analysis. In anthropology it is especially the works of
9
1 Preface
Viazzo (1989) and Cole and Wolf (1999) that offered useful insight, while the
chapters also benefited from the historical works of the Austrian legal scholars
Nikolaus Grass (Grass, 1948, 1990) and Herman Wopfner (Wopfner, 1995a,b,
1997). In addition to these contributions, it were the studies of Lütge (1949)
and Zückert (2003) which provided many important information on the over-
all setup of agricultural production in the circum-Alpine area in pre-industrial
settings. An additional advantage, final reason for the focus on the Alpine area
- which is however closely related to the second aspect - was the opportunity to
get more detailed information on-site. In addition to the fact that many of the
property rights arrangements depicted in this study affect human behaviour
up to the present day, the focus on the Alpine region allowed me to talk to and
correspond with people that were directly concerned with the issues I was in-
terested in. This provided me with a vast amount of information, I could not
have gained otherwise.
Yet, it should also be noted that inspite of the fact that the present approach
to analyse the formation of property rights offers the stated advantages, it also
brings some limitations with it. First of all, as the thesis aims to highlight the
economic aspects of property rights formation, one has to accept a trade-off
that is tied to the use of material from other disciplines. On the one hand,
a too extensive treatment of the political, historical or anthropological facts
and conditions would have rendered the economic arguments that are used to
explain the addressed problems incomprehensible. On the other hand I believe
that a pure focus on the economic aspects would have rendered the whole
analysis ahistorical. To deal withthis problem, I have tried to find the balance
between both extremes, hoping that the present compromise will satisfy both
necessities.
However, as a consequence, there are a few aspects that should be kept in
mind before advancing to the first chapter. First of all, the present focus on
the economic aspects of property rights analysis does not imply that I consider
political or historical explanations or the like unimportant for the present anal-
ysis. Here, it is rather the expression of my conviction that a cobbler should
stick to his last. As a second point, it should be kept in mind that I have anal-
ysed the formation and stabilisation of different property rights systems in
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the Alpine region mostly independent of many general historical and political
developments. Though I believe that many of the overall political and social
developments did not influence the property rights arrangements I am con-
cerned with to a major extent, the limitation of this approach with respect to
the generality of the findings is evident. Once again, I have tried to solve this
problem by focusing on the economic arguments in the main text and add the
information I consider most relevant for the analysis in the footnotes. Finally,
there is also a limitation that develops from the disposal of historical mate-
rial since this also implements some uncertainty into the analysis. This relates
mainly to the problem of collecting data, since these might be highly affected
by measurement errors or deliberate modification. Once again I have tried to
approach these aspects as thoroughly as possible and have added the relevant
information and limitations in the footnotes.
Finally, it should be noted that in spite of the fact that the dissertation is
designed in a way that allows for the chapters to be read independently from
each other, it will be useful to read the chapters in order. There are several
reasons for doing so. First of all, advancing in this way will allow the reader to
review the basic concepts of the new institutional property rights analysis on
which the major part of this dissertation is build. Second, reading the chapters
in order will also offer the chance to get a more detailed understanding of
the concepts that repeatedly occur in the different parts. Yet most important
consulting the dissertation as a book instead of a collection of independent
papers will provide a deeper understanding of the presented view of property
rights analysis. Due to the fact that the chapters supplement each other in
an implicit way, the reading of one part will only offer a reduced view of the
present arguments:
It appears that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
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2 The Survival of the Fittest:
Efficiency, Transaction Costs
and the Bad Reputation of
Collective Ownership
2.1 The Economics of Property Rights and
Institutional Change
The economic analysis of property rights is an integral part of new-
institutional economics. Within the economics profession, the analysis of
property rights - which had been largely neglected since the second half of the
19th century - came back to centre of scholarly attention on account of the con-
tribution of Coase (1960).1 In his famous article, Coase showed that only in the
unlikely case of transaction costs being zero and under the negligence of any
distributional consequences the allocation of ownership rights will not matter
for the final result of a bargain. Subsequently many scholars have picked
up the topic and made the analysis of different property rights arrangements
and institutional change the starting point for their contributions. In more
general terms, following North (1991, p.97) and the old institutionalist school
of Veblen and Commons, institutions can be understood as
1Other important contributions to revive the analysis of property rights in economics were
written by Calabresi (1960), Alchian (1965) and Demsetz (1964). For an excellent overview
of the theoretical literature up to the early 1970s, see Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), while
DeAlessi (1980) also subsumes the newer contributions up to 1980 and provides a recapit-
ulation of the empirical literature on property rights.
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“ [...] humanly devised constraints that structure political, eco-
nomic and social interaction.”
This chapter also emphasises this important role of property rights and it is
therefore its goal to review the major contributions of new institutional prop-
erty rights analysis and link them to several widely disregarded case studies
from the Alpine region. This also prearranges the basic structure of this chap-
ter, which is divided into four big parts. Section 1 starts with an introduc-
tion to the field of new institutional economics and provides an overview on
the basic concepts of the underlying idea of property rights analysis. Section
2 analyses the emergence and the characteristics of private ownership forms
and introduces the causes for the popular misconception that private prop-
erty rights will always lead to a more efficient and desirable outcome then
other ownership forms. Hereby, it will be shown that any such allegation
builds on wrongly specified assumptions and definitions so that that any pre-
sumption regarding a general superiority of private ownership rights has to
be refuted. This claim will be further confirmed with the help of a case study
from the Alpine region that depicts the negative aspects of a flexible private
ownership arrangement in detail. Section 3 continues by looking at the ba-
sic premises of collective ownership systems. Here, the necessity to distin-
guish between different collective ownership forms is emphasised. Following
Ostrom (1990), I will show that in the case of common-pool resources being
managed as common property regimes by small and homogeneous groups,
collective ownership will constitute a more efficient form of managing natu-
ral resources than a system of private ownership. This insight will further be
supported by analysing the advantages of internal organisations over markets
in small number exchanges and the positive aspects of coordinating produc-
tion by quantities instead of prices. Further, this section looks at the case of
the small Alpine community Montan and how it has managed the common-
pool resources in its territory. The third section of the first chapter closes by
highlighting the basic aspects which render collective ownership a more desir-
able form of resource management then private ownership. Finally, section 4
merges the findings from the previous sections and poses the question of what
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factors might have contributed to the bad reputation of collective ownership
systems in general. I will approach this topic by looking at the evolution of
legal norms in Bavaria. I show that the negative consequences of an outdated
agricultural production form and the negative incentive effects that emerged
out of the feudal system rather then the presumed negative characteristics of
collective ownership have contributed to the bad state of the Bavarian agri-
culture at the outcome of the 18th century. This offers the opportunity to in-
terpret the transfer of collective to private ownership forms in the line with
the property right theory rather thaqn relying on the presumption of collective
ownership being of lower efficiency in general. The last section concludes by
recapitulating the major findings of the chapter and highlighting some flaws
of the presented approach of property rights analysis.
On account of their omnipresence, these constraints influence social and eco-
nomic life in two different ways. On the one hand, they take the form of in-
formal constraints which arise out of implicitly or explicitly understood cus-
tomary agreements or traditions, while on the other hand formal constraints
influence behaviour directly through state-imposed regulations such as con-
stitutions or official laws.2 Hereby, property rights constitute a subset of insti-
tutional arrangements which shape - though admittedly in a widely unspec-
ified fashion - economic behaviour. Hence, one way to interpret institutions
in economic terms would be to think of them as limitations on utility or profit
maximisation, and this allows one to interpret them as constraints on the in-
dividual set of choices and liberties. Yet institutions do not only constrain
economic behaviour, rather, they are also subject to utility maximisation of
the individuals.3 This second aspect is in contrast to neoclassical economics,
which is mainly concerned with making predictions on the optimal behaviour
of firms and individuals under the assumption of zero transaction costs and a
rigid institutional structure.4 According to North, neoclassical economics can
2This apparently neglects that formal institutions can also anchor in other than governmental
regulations, such as the guidelines of financial regulators.
3The lack of specifying how property rights influence human behaviour appears to one of the
major flaws of the new-institutionalist property rights analysis. See Kubon-Gilke (1997) for
a more detailed description.
4Though the new institutionalist school is certainly right in arguing that property rights do
shape and influence incentives, it misses out on the role of property rights in shaping pref-
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therefore be criticised for not taking into account different institutional struc-
tures and the likely impact these structures will have on economic behaviour.
In institutional economics on the other hand, property rights are viewed as
an important part of the overall institutional structure within every society
and therefore they also constitute an integral part of economic analysis. This
is the case, since ownership rights may either formally or informally restrict
or empower individuals with respect to their set of choices concerning their
property.5
2.1.1 Institutions, Transaction Costs and Property Rights
In the “Economics of Welfare”, Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920) emphasised that the
divergence between private and social cost of economic activity required to ei-
ther make the originator of a harmful externality liable or to impose a tax on
him to regulate his activity (Coase, 1960, p.1). In his 1960 article, Ronald Coase
(1960) refuted this idea of Pigou (1920) and showed that under the given as-
sumptions the proposed interventions would not be necessary to reach an ef-
ficient outcome. Quite to the contrast of Pigou’s claim, Coase showed that the
bargaining between the involved parties would offer a superior way to reach
equilibrium. Yet in spite of the fact that Coase (1960) assumed transaction costs
to be zero to prove his statement, he clearly emphasised that this assumption,
which later became the foundation of Stigler’s formulation of a “Coase theo-
rem”, was very unrealistic.6 Hence, the world imagined by Coase is a world
erences of rational actors. For an extensive treatment of this topic see Schlicht (1998) and
Kubon-Gilke (1997).
5Though North views property rights as a part of the formal rules within a society, this does
not necessarily have to be the case. It may also be possible that a system of property rights
may be self-stabilising in the sense of not being backed up by formal rules. It may even
be the case that an ownership structure runs against the official regulations and draws on
informal, customary arrangements. For a detailed description of this topic see Ellickson
(1991).
6Note however that any glorifying description of the Coase theorem is rather problematic,
since Coasean bargaining may also be flawed in the case of zero transaction costs. This has
been noted by Aivazian and Callen (1981) who showed that the Coase theorem may not
hold in bargaining situations that involve more than two parties. Here, the problem of the
empty core describes that endless renegotiation between the involved parties my result, as
soon as one of the parties can block the agreement. In this context see also the contribu-
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where the theorem named after him does not hold and therefore Coase work
has to be understood as an appeal to account for different assignments of own-
ership rights in economic analysis. This is the starting point for the present
chapter.
2.1.1.1 Transaction Costs
To fully understand, which implications different property rights structures
might have on economic behaviour, it seems appropriate to give a more de-
tailed definition of the term “transaction costs”. More generally, transaction
costs can be understood as any costs that arise from running the economic sys-
tem and from perpetuating interaction between individuals. Further, transac-
tion costs do not only include the costs that are directly related to the interac-
tion on economic markets, but also comprise the costs to build and maintain
the foundations of any market process. Accordingly, transaction costs also
relate to the utilisation, maintenance, establishment and change of the insti-
tutional structure. More specifically, Furubotn and Richter (1998, pp.42-54)
distinguish between three forms of transaction costs.
First of all, “market transaction costs” relate to the expenses which arise in
the course of finding and identifying potential trading partners and to the costs
of informing these partners of the desired terms of a contract. In addition to
these search and information costs, market transaction costs may also arise
out of the necessity to bargain on agreements or out of the necessity to draw
up contracts (bargaining and decision costs). Further, this category also in-
cludes the expenses that relate to the costs of monitoring the compliance to all
dimensions of a contract (supervision and enforcement costs).
The second form of transaction costs emerges out of the relationship be-
tween firms and employees and they are therefore closely tied to the existence
tions of Coase (1981), DeBornier (1986), Telser (1994), and Aivazian and Callen (2003). A
second group of problems is related to the contributions of Farrell (1987), Schweizer (1988),
and Illing (1992) who show that the Coase mechanism might be flawed on account of in-
formation asymmetries. Finally, there is Schlicht (1996, 1997) who shows that “even with
full information and efficient bargaining [...]” (Schlicht, 1996, p.320), the allocation of prop-
erty rights might matter. Here, the so called extortion problem might lead to an inefficient
outcome that could have been prevented by a different allocation of property rights.
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of labour contracts. More specifically, these “managerial transaction costs”
deal with all issues that relate to the specific organisational form of a company.
Accordingly, they also include the costs of information and the costs of “phys-
ical transfer” that emerge on account of the necessity to operate a company on
a day to day basis.
Finally, the third group of transaction costs relates to the political process.
“Political transaction costs” arise out of the characteristics of both the political
system and the state. While the previous forms of transaction costs that relate
to the interactions in firms and markets are usually analysed against the back-
ground of a stable political system, institutional economists further accept that
the stability of political systems might be of temporary nature. Hence, polit-
ical transaction costs emerge out of the the necessity to change or maintain a
society’s formal or informal political organisation, such as the legal guidelines,
the judiciary or any other administrative organisation. Furthermore, political
transaction costs also relate to the search, information, monitoring, or enforce-
ment costs that characterise the running of a political system and also include
the costs that arise out of the aim of independent organisations that choose to
participate in the political process.
As distinct as the origins of these three classes of transaction costs may be,
their effects on the functioning of social and economic life are rather similar.
Most importantly, the presence of transaction costs leads to frictions within
the economic framework of every society and prevents - at least in the eyes
of neoclassical theory and some scholars working in the field of new insti-
tutional economics - market, firm or political interaction from automatically
taking place in an efficiency enhancing way. It may be easier to understand
this idea if we remind ourselves that most economic activities go hand in hand
with the creation of either positive or negative externalities. Whereas, under
the assumptions of the standard neoclassical theory, pecuniary externalities
will not play a role as long as they occur within the market system (since they
hereby constitute a part of the price system) this is not the case under positive
transaction costs. Here, both, the price and the market mechanism will not
automatically deal with the externalities and this will distort private and so-
cial costs of economic behaviour (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, p.61). If market
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allocation is flawed on account of positive transaction costs, then the exter-
nalities that stem from the incentives of the ownership structure can do harm.
Thinking of Coase (1960), it therefore seems straightforward to accept that as
a consequence of positive transaction costs, an analysis of property rights will
be important to the study of economics. For the rest of this dissertation, to
avoid both confusion and the use of a too narrow term, the transaction cost
definition of Goldberg (1985, p.399) will be applied and therefore it is possible
to state that
“[t]ransaction costs are those costs that are likely to differ under
alternative institutional arrangements.”
2.1.1.2 Property Rights
Having defined the nature and characteristics of transaction costs, it is further
useful to grasp a more detailed definition of the term “property rights”. Here
the new institutional view of property rights formation believes that property
or ownership to any object does not arise out of nature but develops from
social agreements. This view of property also has important implications for
the definition of property rights. In this context, Furubotn and Pejovich (1972,
p.1139) state this in almost the same manner:
“property rights do not refer to relations between men and things
but, rather, to the sanctioned behavioural relations among men that
arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use.”,
Hence, property rights can be described as
“[...] the set of economic and social relations defining the position
of each individual with respect to the utilisation of resources.”
Two insights arise out of this social acceptance based definition of property
rights.7 First of all, this implies that the value of any physical object is more
7Note that this standard definition of property rights is somewhat problematic, since it re-
duces property to a social construct and thereby ignores that ownership can also emerge
on account of a special connection between the owner and an object. In this context con-
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than the value of its physical attributes. This is the case since the value of any
piece of property will depend on the degree to which it can be utilised and
this will be reflected by the degree of property rights attached to the good or
resource. Second, as the value of ownership can be defined as the bundle of
rights that is attached to a piece of property, this also implies that any form
of economic exchange is to be viewed as the exchange of different bundles of
property rights. Eggertsson (1990, p.33), who refers to Alchian (1965), in this
context brings forward that a system of property rights is
“ [...] a method of assigning to particular individuals the ’authority’
to select, for specific goods, any use from an unprohibited class of
uses.”
More specifically, it is possible to distinguish between four different classes
of use or categories of property rights: First of all, there is the right to indi-
vidually use a resource or an object in an basically unconstrained way (usus).
Second, there is the right to earn income from an object or a resource (usus
fructus). Third, property rights may also include the right to change the de-
sign and composition of the asset (abusus), while the final characteristic in this
description of property rights relates to the right of transferring the good or
resource to a new proprietor (ius abutendi).8 Any combination of these four
aspects will constitute different bundles of property rights and will therefore
shape interaction, incentives, and behaviour in a different way.9 The most ex-
sider the case of Robinson on his island before the arrival of Friday. The alternative form of
ownership formation states that Robinson will consider himself the owner of a stick, just
because he is used to take this stick with him when he explores his island. Though the
ownership to his object is not stabilised by any social agreement, he will act accordingly
and can be assumed to defend the possession to his stick. Hume (2000) describes this in-
ner connection between the owner and the object by stating that ownership can arise from
“imagination”. I have emphasised this point in more detail in chapter 2 of this disserta-
tion, yet for a more detailed description I refer the reader to Schlicht (1998, Chapter 11).
Further note that property or ownership do not constitute exogenous concepts, but are en-
dogenous in the sense of being subject to social factors such as culture, custom or norms
(McCay, 1996, pp.122-124).
8Eggertsson (1990, pp.34-35) by contrast states that there are only three dimensions of prop-
erty rights, neglecting a separate category for abusus.
9One would also suggest that ownership might influence the preferences of individuals, yet
this view appears to be far-off the standard assumptions of new-institutional theory.
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tensive level of ownership to an object, will accordingly be established if all
four characteristics are assigned to some person or group.10
It is finally possible to relate the analysis of property rights to a more general
level.11
“ [...] In essence, economics is the study of property rights over
scarce resources [...]. The allocation of scarce resources in a society
is the assignment of rights to uses of resources [...] the question of
economics, or of how prices should be determined, is the question
of how property rights should be defined and exchanged, and on
what terms.”
As a consequence, any market transaction has to be considered under the as-
pect of being brought about by an exchange in property rights. Yet, the issue of
a property rights analysis is not to provide a mere description of the different
allocation of ownership rights. Rather it is its self-imposed task to make rele-
vant propositions on the various effects of different property rights systems on
human behaviour in an economic context. This task requires us to show that
the12
“content of property rights affects the allocation and use of re-
sources in specific and statistically predictable ways.”
2.1.1.3 Efficiency
Since the chapter has now developed a more detailed definition of the terms
transaction costs, property and property rights, it is possible to approach an-
other basic aspect of new institutional property rights analysis, which is the
problem of efficiency and the question of how this relates to the analysis of
10Note however that this does not preclude the possibility that property rights might be por-
tioned among different individuals. Hence, one person might hold the private right to
grow wheat on a land, while the second may have the right to fly an aeroplane over it.
This will apparently not impose any problems as long as transferability of rights is guar-
anteed and transaction costs are zero. For a more extensive treatment see Alchian (1965,
pp.132-134)
11Alchian (1967, pp.2-3).
12Furubotn and Pejovich (1972, p.1139)
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property rights. First of all one should note that the presence of positive trans-
action costs has implications for the definition of the efficiency concept, since
it imposes some limitations when it comes to making predictions on the fac-
tors influencing the efficiency of property rights in general. As Ellickson (1993,
pp.1325-1326) points out, the efficiency concept that is most commonly em-
ployed in the study of property rights relates to the minimisation of two joint
factors. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that economic activity under any
ownership regime can create dead-weight losses. These dead-weight losses
occur13
“whenever the costs [...][the activity] inflicts on others exceed the
individual’s benefits from the act.”
Such losses can however be reduced by the help of institutional arrangements
such as the enforcement, redefinition or transfer of property rights. Still, any
of these responses will give rise to the second cost factor by increasing trans-
action costs. This implies that an efficient property rights system can be iden-
tified as the system of ownership that minimises the sum of the costs to arise
out of dead-weight losses and transaction costs. Accordingly, it is possible to
state that efficiency will be defined as the state that maximises the overall level
of production or welfare by simultaneously taking into account the costs of
transaction.14 Furthermore, within the context of property rights analysis, effi-
ciency is often implicitly defined by applying the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Here,
a change in the ownership structure or some other institutional arrangement
is considered welfare and efficiency enhancing as long as the people to benefit
(or the total benefits) from the changes could theoretically compensate (or be
used to compensate) the losers (the total losses) from the changes.15
Posner (1972, p.29) identifies three different aspects to determine the rela-
tive efficiency of a property rights arrangement. In his eyes, efficiency does
13Ellickson (1993, p.1326)
14It is therefore clear that any prediction or statement that relates to the efficiency of a property
rights system in the presence of positive transaction costs always relates to the relative
efficiency of the respective regime.
15However, as it is not required that compensation will indeed take place, the concept neglects
the distributional consequences of a change in ownership structure.
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not only depend on the extent of utilisation that is usually constituted by the
bundles of property rights attached to a good or resource. Rather, to determine
the efficiency of a property rights system it is equally important to look at the
“qualitative aspects” of property rights, which relate to the issues of how ex-
tensive property rights are defined, to which extent they are secured and how
alienable these rights are within a group or a society. Hence, there are three
postulations to the qualitative aspects of property rights which determine the
efficiency of an ownership structure by shaping market interaction. First of all,
Posner (1972, p.29) specifies that the universality of property rights requires
that
“ [...] all resources should be owned by someone, except resources
so plentiful that everybody can consume as much of them as he
wants without reducing consumption by anyone else [...]”.
Within this rather inconspicuous postulation of a universality of property
rights, a very important important function is addressed. When resources are
not big enough to prevent the negative impacts of individual behaviour on
the utility of other individuals, then unambiguously defined ownership rights
are needed to shape individual behaviour and provide a suitable structure of
incentives.16 Given that property rights are completely and universally as-
signed, then the likelihood of conflict within a group will also be reduced and
therefore universality guarantees that the manifold externalities, which are the
consequences of individual actions, are mitigated and internalised. Since uni-
versality also implies that no additional conflict on the ownership of a resource
or any other object will be created, market interaction will run as smoothly as
possible. Obviously, this has also consequences for the level of transaction
costs. This is because imprecisely defined property rights will prevent the es-
tablishment of ownership to its full extent and therefore conflicts on the utili-
sation or the ownership of some property may arise. These, in turn, will also
increase transaction costs since the respective ambiguities will likely lead to
hassle between the involved parties. It is straightforward to see that the costs
16As Demsetz (1967, p.348) points out, “[the] primary function of property rights is that of
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of externalities.”.
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of such quarrel will increase with the value of the good or resource.17
“Transferability”, as the second postulation for an efficient property rights
system, bears close similarities to the ius abutendi aspect of ownership. How-
ever, while the ius abutendi refers to the object itself, transferability relates to
the rights attached to a resource or a good. This condition allows for the ob-
tainment of a higher degree of efficiency, since through a reallocation of the
respective property right to the person with the highest willingness to pay, the
greatest value will be created.
Finally, the third postulation to reach efficiency relates to the exclusivity
of ownership rights. In this context, exclusivity refers to the ability of the
owner(s) to exclude other individuals from the utilisation of the resource and
this makes sure that every owner will be able to exclusively harvest the fruits
of his own effort. If and only if the protection of property rights is guaranteed,
will the utilisation of the resource be established in efficient terms. Hence,
without these three criteria, the allocation of resources to their
"highest valued, most productive uses"
cannot be guaranteed (Hrezo and Hrezo, 1984, p.1073).18 The importance of
the efficiency concept for institutional analysis will display itself in the next
section.
2.1.2 The Property Right Paradigm
In the presence of positive transaction costs, market transactions can be con-
strained in a way that prevents efficiency from being obtained. In this case,
both the externalities and the incentives that arise out of a property rights
structure start to have important consequences for economic interaction and
accordingly these factors have to be included into the analysis of economic
processes.
17This has led Posner (1973) and Ehrlich and Posner (1974) to conclude that property rights
will be defined more precisely when goods or resources become more valuable.
18This does not imply that conflict between holders of property rights on different objects will
also be eliminated.
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The theory of property rights promotes this idea by stating that the insti-
tutional structure and therefore the property rights system have to be consid-
ered as subject to individual utility maximisation. Furubotn and Richter (1998),
who presume a systematic relationship between human behaviour and the dis-
tribution of property rights, assert in this context that such an optimisation can
best be understood by interpreting institutional arrangements as different con-
straints in a model of rationally acting individuals who maximise their utility.
Given the case that agents take19
“[...] cognisance of changing constraints (including transaction
costs).”
and that the three conditions for the establishment of an efficient property
rights structure as imposed by Posner are fulfilled, it is possible to infer that
property rights will be chosen and altered in a way that enhances efficiency. If
this would not be the case, then a change in the property rights structure could
be implemented to produce a bigger “cake”, which could be used to compen-
sate the losers of such a change. This is the basic tenet of the theory of property
rights and this is why Furubotn and Pejovich (1972, p.1141) in this context state
that
“ [...] changes in property rights are triggered by man’s search for
greater utility.”
Hence, the property right paradigm optimistically predicts that economic
forces will always shape institutional structures in a way that allows for the
most efficient economic outcome that can possibly be reached under the exis-
tent constraints to develop.20
But what are the causes that might induce such a change in the property
rights structure?
According to the property right paradigm, changes in external factors often
correspond to changes in relative prices and, therefore, demand shocks, natu-
ral catastrophes, technological progress, changes in individual preferences or
19Furubotn and Richter (1998, p.73)
20Unfortunately, there are many contributions that do not explicitly define the state of effi-
ciency they are referring to. See Ogilvie (2007) for a more detailed description of this flaw
in the property right theory.
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similar phenomena can become relevant in economic terms.21 As changes in
relative prices give space to improve the institutional structure within a group,
the change from an inferior set of institutional arrangements to a superior one
will bring about gains in efficiency. Hence, according to the property right
paradigm, under these circumstances the new property rights structure will
increase the overall efficiency by theoretically allowing for a compensation of
those individuals who would otherwise do worse under the new institutional
system. Efficiency is enhanced in general economic terms, since a reduction
in the costs of transaction will lead to a greater internalisation of externalities
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). Accordingly, the property right paradigm pre-
dicts that the most efficient outcome will develop as an outcome of the market
process.
Often, this aspect of the property right paradigm has been analysed by
drawing a connection to evolutionary biology and Herbert Spencer’s idea of
“the survival of the fittest”. Institutional change can be interpreted as the out-
come of a selection process between institutional arrangements and, as a con-
sequence, persistent property rights structures can also be interpreted as the
institutional system that has been best adapted to the overall conditions.22
To understand the full implications of this theoretical approach, it may be
useful to take a closer look at the property right paradigm in action. One of
most popular examples in the context of changes in a property rights structure
emerging out of a change in both external factors and relative prices has been
21Demsetz (1967) similarly argues that changes become necessary when new technologies, ac-
tions or preferences influence production functions, aspiration levels and the market value
of goods and services. Yet it should also be noted that in its most basic version, the property
right paradigm shows its roots in neoclassical economics by assuming individual prefer-
ences to be stable.
22In the context of such a “environmental adaption by the economic system”, Eggertsson
(1990, p.55) refers to Alchian (1950) as the originator of the idea that evolutionary pro-
cesses can be systematically connected to the study of economics with a special focus on
contracts. Specifically this implies that changes in the environment are viewed to “[...]lead
to the selection of a new contractual form and the demise of previous arrangements” and
therefore, in competitive markets, unsuccessful organisational forms are expected to go
under. However, without disputing the significance of Alchian’s contribution, Eggertsson
(1990) clearly neglects that the same ideas have been stated in the works of Karl Marx,
Thomas Malthus, Alfred Marshall, Herbert Spencer, Thorstein Veblen or Josef Schumpeter.
For a more detailed description, see Hodgson (1994).
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described by Demsetz (1967). Demsetz argues that the change from commu-
nal to private land ownership, which occurred in Quebec in the 18th century,
emerged as a consequence of the intensified fur trade with the European states.
Before the establishment of commercial fur trade the main purpose of hunt-
ing for the native Canadian tribes was to satisfy the individual need for food
and clothing. Back then, the small amount of hunting activities in combina-
tion with abundant hunting grounds, permitted the existence of an ownership
form that granted no explicit ownership rights to the forests.
At the end of the 17th century however, the demand for fur started to in-
crease in the European kingdoms and this higher demand for fur led to the es-
tablishment of a commercial fur trade and to an increase in the relative prices
for fur. These changes rendered hunting activities more profitable and led to an
intensification of hunting activities by the Indians.23 This, in turn, disrupted
the maintenance of the traditional collective ownership of hunting grounds.
The problems occurred because in the collectively owned hunting grounds,
hunters did not take into account that an increase in their hunting activities
would affect the utility of the other hunters negatively. Hence, the divergence
between private and social costs of economic activity led to an inefficiently
high amount of hunting activities which greatly reduced the animal popula-
tion. Accordingly, to reduce the negative impact and to preserve the number
of fur-bearing animals, a change in the ownership structure became necessary
and this, according to Demsetz, led to the establishment of privately owned
hunting grounds by different tribes to guarantee an exclusion of other groups
or tribes. Such a change in the property rights system had been facilitated by
the relatively small costs of establishing private ownership.24 This had been
23While unregulated hunting activities did not cause a significant problem to the natural re-
sources and the population of fur-bearing animals in the times before the establishment
of the fur trade, the collective nature of ownership soon enough amplified the negative
externalities of individual hunting activities.
24Demsetz (1967) in this context points out that costs had been reduced due to the fact that
fur-bearing animals confine their territories in the woods. Since the animals do not migrate
between the different territories, the costs of establishing private ownership had been low.
This specific aspect of the cost structure may have also led to a delayed emergence of pri-
vate ownership rights in other regions. For example, the Indians of the southern plains
are said to have failed in establishing private property rights, since in their region, no ani-
mals of high commercial importance could be hunted and, further, the migration of bison
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efficient for the tribes in the sense of increasing the net wealth of the groups
(Eggertsson, 1990, p.251), since the limitation of uncontrolled hunting activi-
ties brought about a decrease in the negative externalities and allowed for an
alignment of the private and social costs of economic activity.25
Finally, as this section has identified the basic components for an analysis of
property rights, it is possible to analyse the implications of the property right
paradigm for the existence of different ownership structures.
2.2 Private Ownership, Transaction Costs and a
Lottery
The omnipresence of private ownership rights in industrialised societies led
many scholars to either implicitly or explicitly argue that private ownership
structures are always more efficient than a system of collective ownership. This
has also been noted by Dahlman (1980, p.5), who points out that:
“ [f]rom the standpoint of economic theory, the received doctrine
is very clear: communal ownership and decisionmaking are inher-
ently inefficient.”
In spite of the fact that the efficiency enhancing aspects of private property
cannot be denied, I will also propose that such a misconception of any property
rights system being generally superior to others is not true. Hence, in this
section I show that many of the presumed advantages of private over collective
ownership vanish if one takes a closer look at the characteristics of collective
ownership. This reinterpretation will help to show that private ownership to a
resource does not constitute a necessary condition for the persistence and the
efficiency of an ownership system.
made it costly to establish private land by keeping the animals from wandering. i.e.with
extensive fencing.
25Note that the explanation of Demsetz (1967) has been criticised and supplemented by Mc-
Manus (1972). Further, Anderson and Hill (1975) expanded the view of Demsetz by adding
the costs of establishing exclusion to their analysis of property rights structures.
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2.2.1 On the Characteristics of Private Ownership
Property rights define the degree of utilisation of a good or a resource. They
therefore can be regarded as:26
” [...] the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used,
whether that resource is owned by the government or by individu-
als”
Private property rights constitute a special form of ownership rights and ac-
cordingly they are commonly distinguished from collective ownership with
the help of two characteristics. The first distinctive feature is to the number of
owners of a right. Here, Ellickson (1993, p.1322) points out that
“Private property conventionally refers to a regime in which no
more than a small number of persons have access to a resource.
When more than a small number do, public [or collective] property
is present”
Though this definition of private property may seem rather simplified, it still
stresses an important aspect. First of all, as private property is defined by
referring to a small number of people, one can distinguish between two dif-
ferent forms of private ownership, which are individual and household own-
ership.27 Furthermore, the second distinctive feature of private property is
closely tied to the qualitative aspects of private ownership rights. In addition
to the rights of usus, abusus, usus-fructus and ius abutendi being concentrated in
one hand (or in the hands of a small number of people), private ownership is
often linked to the already addressed ideas of Posner (1972) and this has led
to private ownership often to be taken as a synonym for efficiency. The basic
causes of such an identification may become more obvious if one analyses the
presumed positive aspects of private ownership rights. In more detail, a cap-
italist economy which builds on a system of private property rights is often
assumed to constitute a situation where all resources or goods are owned by
26Alchian (2008, p.1)
27Ellickson (1993, p.1322) denotes household ownership as ownership by an entity of not more
than twelve individuals.
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someone. As this apparently satisfies Posner’s condition of universality, the
general level of transaction costs is also believed to be lower under a system
of private property rights in contrast to one that does not include private own-
ership. Furthermore, as private property rights usually includes the right of
transferability, this increases the efficiency of private property rights arrange-
ments by allowing for the reshuffling of property and property rights to the
highest valued use.28 Finally, the exclusion of other individuals or groups from
benefiting from the good or resource - believed to constitute the third distinc-
tive feature of private ownership - makes sure that the owner of the private
property will yield the fruits of his own effort and also that everyone will bear
the consequences of his actions.29 Hence, as according to Posner (1972), private
ownership arrangements are characterised by the minimisation of transaction
costs through universal assignment of rights, the transferability of rights and
resources and the possibility of exclusion, private ownership is often assumed
to always lead to an efficient outcome.30
Of course there are numerous variations in the specification and quality of
private property rights. Therefore it might be useful to define the most exten-
sive form of private property rights, which also help to understand the ideas
in this chapter to a better extent. Ellickson (1993, pp.1362-1363) describes the
most complete form of private property to land as “Blackstonian”, hereby re-
ferring to the concepts of the English legal scholar William Blackstone (1723-
28Alchian (1965, p.140) also emphasises the importance of transferability of private owner-
ship, but interprets its function somewhat differently by stating that this allows for “[the]
concentration of rewards and costs more directly on each person responsible for them, and
[...] comparative advantage effects of specialised applications of [...] knowledge in control
and [...] of risk bearing.”.
29Of course, externalities also exist under a system of private ownership. However, they are
believed to be either internalised or taken care of through the price mechanism.
30Accordingly, a system of private property rights either requires a self-sustaining enforce-
ment mechanism or an external authority to guarantee the exclusivity of the rights. Still,
this necessity to create exclusivity through enforcement often comes at the price of other
constraints. In modern societies, economic activity usually takes place within a well de-
fined (legal) framework that specifies the feasible alternatives among which the holder of a
private property rights can choose. However, though these external constraints often limit
the utilisation of a good or resource to a certain degree, they must be viewed as limitations
on private property rights.
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1780).31 Blackstonian property rights can be defined on account of the follow-
ing characteristics:
• ownership by a single individual (“that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims...”)
• in perpetuity
• of a territory demarcated horizontally by boundaries drawn upon the
land, and extending from there vertically downward to the depths of the
earth and upward to the heavens
• with absolute rights to exclude would-be entrants
• with absolute privileges to use and abuse the land, and
• with absolute powers to transfer the whole (or any part carved out by
use, space, or time) by sale, gift device, descent, or otherwise
Accordingly, as this definition of private property rights includes all of the
recently assumed positive features of private ownership and in spite of the
fact that some of these specifications, as Ellickson (1993, p.1363) puts it, are
“too draconian” for the present purposes, I will, unless stated otherwise, refer
to private ownership in the form of such a Blackstonian bundle of property
rights.32
2.2.2 The Misconception of a Superiority of Private
Ownership
In spite of the fact that in some cases the positive characteristics of private
ownership rights are rightly emphasised, it seems problematic to speak of a
31Ellickson (1993, p.1362) refers to Blackstone (2003, Book the Second : The Rights of Things,
Chapter the First : Of Property in General). See also http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/
blackstone.asp
32Note that although this section has depicted private ownership as the case of unconstrained
ownership, this is not completely true. Eggertsson (1990, p.38) hereby points out that prop-
erty rights will be unattenuated as long as there are no state imposed restrictions on “ [...]
individual rights to use, to earn income from, and to exchange assets [...]” are present.
However, this definition does not prevent the presence of a restriction to add physical
damage to the property of others.
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general superiority of private over collective ownership rights. It is therefore
interesting to analyse what factors may have contributed to the erroneous in-
terpretation of the property right paradigm: a misinterpretation which states
that under scarcity, private ownership rights will generally be more efficient
than collective property rights.33 In this section I review two different theoret-
ical approaches to study the efficiency of different ownership forms.
2.2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons and the Logic of Collective Action
The first class of theoretical arguments that is commonly believed to speak
for a general superiority of private over collective ownership forms relates to
the well-known problem of individuals being incapable of coordinating their
behaviour for the general benefit of their groups. It should therefore not come
as a surprise that the following arguments for a general superiority of private
property rights emphasise the negative aspects of owning a natural resource
collectively.
First of all, it appears useful to approach the topic of collective coordina-
tion failure by looking at the famous example of the tragedy of the commons.
The origin of the term “tragedy of the commons” is to be found in the article
by Garrett Hardin (1968), who analysed the problem of over-exploitation in
collectively owned resources and concluded that the inevitable destiny of any
such resource is its ruin.34 The ideas beyond these gloomy predictions can best
33This has also been noted by Dahlman (1980, p.74), who refers to Demsetz (1967) and Cheung
(1970) as two of the main contributors to the understanding of private ownership being su-
perior to collective ownership. One should also note that as Weitzman (1974b, pp.477-479)
points out that a similar opinion seems to exist with respect to the desirability of different
planning instruments. Among economists, as he claims, there often exists an unjustified
preference towards using indirect planning instruments (prices) over direct ones (quanti-
ties or quotas) to control resource extraction or other forms of economic activity.
34A similar reasoning can also be found in Alchian and Demsetz (1973, pp.19-20). It should
further be noted that though the term “tragedy of the commons” was initially introduced
by Hardin (1968), the basic idea that constitutes the heart of the article dates back to con-
tributions that are much older. Ostrom (1990) and Hardin himself highlight that the basic
thoughts that characterise Hardin’s argument can already be found in the works of Gordon
(1954) and Lloyd (1977). However, Güth and Kliemt (2009) point out that similar ideas can
be found in the works of Aristotle (Politics 1261b, 30-35/157). Further note that Hardin’s
article reads very much like a pamphlet for birth control and against overpopulation.
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be understood by referring to the following example.35
Consider a collectively owned pasture that is jointly utilised by a number
of farmers from the same village community for the grazing of cows. To the
community members, there are no external restrictions on the utilisation of the
meadow. Therefore, as every farmer is allowed to put as many cows on the
pasture as he wants, the only potential limitation to the farmers is the emer-
gence of fixed marginal costs c that result from the grazing. However, as the
capacity of the pasture is limited, the number of cows on the commons af-
fects the individual amount of milk to be produced by every cow. Hence, by
adding more cows to the commons, the amount of feed that is available for ev-
ery cow will be reduced and therefore the production of milk will also decline.
This shows itself in the properties of the production function: f (G) denotes the
amount of milk to be produced if G cows are grazed on the commons, whereas
the capacity constraint implies positive but decreasing returns to production,
so that ∂ f∂G > 0 and
∂ f
∂2G < 0. Hardin (1968) further continues by comparing
the number of cows every farmer will put on the pasture under a system of
private and of collective property rights. Under a private ownership regime
in the spirit of Blackstone, there is just one farmer who decides on the number
of cows to be grazed. Hence, the individual optimisation problem can be de-
picted by maximising individual profits as the difference between the amount
of milk produced by G cows and the costs the arise out of the grazing of G
cows. As profits can be depicted as P = f (G) − c ∗ G and the farmer will
choose the number of cows G to maximise his profits, the optimal quantity
of cows to be grazed on the commons, G∗ will arise at the point where the
marginal product ∂ f∂G equals marginal costs c.
Now consider a system of collective ownership, where there is not one but
a great number of different farmers. In this case, every farmer receives income
in form of the milk produced by his cows on the commons. As before this is
just f (G). Accordingly, the value of milk that is produced per cow is just the
average product f (G)G . But how many animals will be added to the commons in
35In spite of the fact that a description of the tragedy of the commons is a simple textbook ex-
ample, I still consider it important to apply it as a starting point in the present description.
The reason for this is that we can already find the true reasons for the misinterpretation of
a superiority of private ownership.
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this scenario? Once again, every farmer will maximise his income by deciding
on the number of cows to be put on the commons and therefore the farmers
will continue to add cows to the pasture as long as the profits in the form of
output produced are higher than individual costs. As before, the marginal
costs of grazing a cow on the pasture are c and hence the farmer will add cows
to the pasture as long as his revenues, or the average output of milk per cow
are higher than the costs of the cow. Therefore the profit maximising number
of cows on the commons G+ will be identified at the point where the marginal
costs of grazing c equal the average product f (Q)Q and as the marginal product
is decreasing in G, the number of cows on the commons will be higher under
a system of collective ownership in relation to a system of private ownership.
Of course, the reason for this result is to be found in the divergence between
the private and the social cost of economic activity. Under collective owner-
ship, adding more cows to the commons also creates an externality which takes
the form of a reduction in the output of milk through a reduction in feed on the
pasture. This will also reduce the value of production for the other farmers by
decreasing the output they will yield from their cows. Of course, the same ex-
ternality is also present under private ownership, yet in the case of collective
ownership it will not be internalised since there is no sole owner of the pas-
ture. The cause for the absence of any internalisation roots in the simple fact
that while the costs of producing another unit of milk are also absorbed by the
other proprietors, the benefits of any production will be obtained individually.
As every farmer is only interested in his individual profits, he will not include
the social costs of his actions in his calculus and therefore too many cows will
be added to the commons. This will destroy the plant surface and the com-
mons, leading to the tragedy of the commons. This is the first argument which
is believed to confirm the idea that private ownership will constitute a better
way to manage a natural resource than collective ownership.
Note that there is also a second way how to display the problems associated
with this form of collective ownership and this is displaying the problem in
the form of a simple prisoners’ dilemma.36 While the tragedy of the commons
36In the description I will follow Ostrom (1990, pp.3-5), although the classical reference on this
formalisation is Dawes (1973).
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 10,10 -1,11
Defect 11,-1 0,0
Table 2.1: The Tragedy of the Commons
has highlighted the basic problems of over-exploitation, the formalisation of
the problem as a prisoners dilemma offers the change to stress the aspects that
are responsible for the individual farmers not being able to coordinate their
behaviour for the benefit of their group. As before, consider a pasture that
is owned collectively by a group of peasants, but for the sake of simplicity,
imagine the situation as a simple two person game. As the capacity constraint
is still in place, there is an upper limit to the number of cows to be grazed and
fed well on the commons in every period. To account for this upper limit, the
optimal number of cows on the commons is depicted as G. Further, assume
that if both farmers would come to an agreement, they would decide that each
of them will add only the number of G2 cows to the commons.
Accordingly, in the present example each farmer has two choices. If he wants
to cooperate with his co-owner, the farmer will limit himself to adding only G2
cows to the pasture. However, there is also an alternative to cooperation; the
farmer can play the “defect” strategy, whereby he will add the number of cows
to the commons that maximises his individual welfare.37 Table 1 displays the
payoff matrix for this game.
Given the case that both farmers cooperate and limit the number of cows
to G2 , they will both yield an individual profit of 10, while if they both defect
from the agreement by putting more than G2 cows on the commons, both yield
zero profits. So far cooperation dominates the defect strategy. However, in
this setup of the classical prisoners dilemma, the problem arises in the case of
one farmer cooperating by sticking to G2 while the other one plays the defect
37To keep things simple, I will assume that this number will be higher than G2 .
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strategy and expands grazing beyond G2 . In this case, the defector can increase
his profits at the expense of the cooperator and hence he will yield a profit of
11 while the cooperator’s profits are driven down to -1. It is straightforward
to note that the dominant strategy in this setup is for every farmer to play the
defect strategy, leading to a Pareto inferior outcome, since both farmers would
initially prefer the Cooperate-Cooperate strategy.38
Once again one can relate this insight to the presumed general efficiency of
private ownership structures. While under private ownership of land, agents
do not have to negotiate on the number of cows to put on the commons and
since individual enrichment at the cost of others is also not possible, the opti-
mal number of cows G will be put on the commons. Once again, this is not the
case under the described regime of collective ownership. Here, utility max-
imisation using communal rights creates severe problems, since the costs of
individual behaviour are also shared by the co-owners of the resource, again
leading to the well-known free-rider problem. This has also been addressed
by Alchian and Demsetz (1973, p.21) who state that
“the communal right system raises transaction costs by creating a
free rider problem.”
Finally, a third interpretation of the basic problem can be displayed by refer-
ring to Alchian and Demsetz (1973, p.22) who state that
“[a]ll private owners have strong incentives to use their property
rights in the most valuable way”.
Of course this understanding is closely linked to the work of Olson (1965b).
Assume that in the described situation, there are not only costs that relate di-
rectly to the number of cows on the commons, but also the necessity to main-
tain the functioning of the pasture through the building of fences or the cutting
of trees. Olson though in a more general context emphasises that though there
38Remember that the setup of the prisoners’ dilemma as a non-cooperative game with com-
plete information prevents the possibility of both communication and binding agreements
between the farmers. Further, as this game takes place in an environment of perfect infor-
mation, it is presumed that every farmer knows both the full structure of the game and the
structure of the payoff matrix.
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might be a common aim to maintain the commons, this might not be enough
to motivate the farmers to contribute a sufficiently high amount of work or
money. As long as no one can be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a
collective resource, no farmer will have an incentive to contribute voluntarily
to the provision of the good or in the present case to the maintenance of the
pasture. In the present example, sticking to an upper level of resource extrac-
tion could also be interpreted as a form of investment in the state of the natural
resource. Once again if there is no way to exclude other farmers from exploit-
ing the resource, a farmer who decides to invest by sticking to the agreement
will know that the fruits of his saving efforts will not be exclusively obtained
by himself but also by the co-owning farmers.39 But if no exclusion will take
place, no farmer will have the incentive to save and invest in the maintenance
of the resource. Once again, as cooperation between the farmers cannot be
fostered, no agent can convincingly commit to cooperate and invest and there-
fore both farmers will play the defect strategy and realise a Pareto inferior
equilibrium. Hence, in this example the presumed nonexistence of exclusion
under collective ownership in contrast to the possibility to exclude under pri-
vate ownership, is believed to contribute to the general inferiority of collective
ownership types.
It is possible to recapitulate this first group of arguments on the superior-
ity of private ownership as follows and although all of the described prob-
lems centred around the free-rider problem that emerges out of the divergence
between private and social costs, its interpretations are slightly different. At
first, the analysed form of collective ownership has been associated with the
tragedy of the commons that emerges out of individual profit maximisation
and causes over-exploitation of a natural resource. Apparently, the basic cause
of this problem is the absence of a market for the externality. Second, the inter-
pretation of the problem as a prisoners dilemma has offered the chance to take
a closer look at the roots of coordination failure and this will lead to the realisa-
39This reasoning of course also relates to the prisoners’ dilemma depicted above. If one in-
terprets the capacity constraint in a way that grazing more then G2 cows on the commons
will destroy the plant surface or the fencing and therefore the maintenance of the natural
resource is in trouble. Hence, sticking to the agreement can be interpreted as a saving effort
of a farmer who wants to invest in the maintenance of the pasture in consecutive periods.
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tion of an equilibrium that is inferior to a private ownership solution. Finally,
the presumed nonexistence of any means to exclude farmers from the use of
the resource, has shed light on another negative aspect of collective ownership,
which relates to the incentives of maintaining the state of the natural resource.
2.2.2.2 Efficiency, Property Rights and Transaction Costs
Note that the second group of arguments that have claimed a superiority of
private over collective ownership justifies this presumption by comparing the
level of transaction costs under both ownership regimes.40 Within the prop-
erty rights theory several contributions, such as Demsetz (1967), Posner (1972)
orAlchian and Demsetz (1973) either explicitly or implicitly communicate the
view that transaction costs would in general be lower under private owner-
ship. Here, the statement of Alchian and Demsetz (1973, p.16) presents itself
as a good starting point for the following considerations:
“ [c]apitalism relies heavily on markets and private property rights
to resolve conflicts over the use of scarce resources.”
This second group of causes arguing for a general inferiority of collective own-
ership can be identified on account of the following considerations and once
again it is the assumed non-compliance of the features of collective owner-
ship with the conditions of Posner (1972) that builds the starting point for
the misconception. As collective ownership is often associated with the non-
exclusivity of a natural resource and with a situation where property rights
may not even be fully assigned, it should not come as surprise that collec-
tive ownership systems are believed to be accompanied by a higher level of
transaction costs. This conclusion has been tightened on account of several
considerations.
40Interestingly, Alchian (1967) seems to be more aware of the problem. Though he pre-
dicts that departures from private property induce “underpricing and excessive business-
connected activities”, he also notes that a pure focus on private ownership would limit the
applicability of economics to other social sciences. Though I believe the number of scholars
who emphasise the efficiency of collective ownership to be in the minority, it is beyond my
scope to answer the question if the assumption of a superiority of private ownership is a
major part of the property rights theory or not.
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First of all, a high level of transaction costs under collective ownership is be-
lieved to arise out of the amount of negotiations that have to take place to reach
and stabilise an agreement. Here, Demsetz (1967, p.355) argues that though it
might in principle be possible for the co-owners of a resource to agree on an
efficient degree of exploitation, the transaction costs of negotiating such an
agreement will - on account of the assumed higher number of participants - be
higher than under private ownership.
Second, given that an agreement between all parties had been negotiated,
transaction costs would be increased under collective ownership on account
of the necessity to monitor and control the compliance to the agreement. In
addition to this explanation, Ellickson (1993, pp.1327-1329) emphasises that
monitoring costs would be higher under collective ownership than under pri-
vate ownership, since it would be more costly to employ a multi-person mon-
itoring device in contrast to the self-control of a person that will be carried out
by his “own central nervous system”.41 This idea is also closely related to the
notion that costs under a Blackstonian ownership system would necessarily be
lower since it is usually easier to keep someone off a piece of land in contrast
to determining if someone is allowed to enter or not.
Third, even in those cases where an agreement between the current owners
of a collective resource had been reached and where monitoring could be car-
ried out costlessly, high transaction costs are believed to emerge under collec-
tive ownership. This is because it is assumed that under collective ownership
the utility of future generations is not taken into account. Accordingly these
generations are believed to renegotiate the agreement themselves in later peri-
ods. This will increase transaction costs (Demsetz, 1967, p.355).
The second group of arguments that have been brought forward to justify
a higher level of transaction costs under collective ownership systems centres
around a different group of problems. These problems are believed to emerge
out of the necessity to negotiate on the prevention of negative externalities. Con-
sider the case of two farmers who want to bargain on the prevention of an ex-
ternality that arises in the course of agricultural production. Under a system
41Apparently this statement relates to the situation where transaction costs are compared be-
tween situations of one private and multiple collective owner(s).
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of private ownership it is easy for two farmers to prevent the externality at
low levels of transaction costs. This is the case since both parties can sign a
contract that regulates the conditions under which the first farmer would stop
creating the harmful externality in exchange for monetary compensation from
the other. Yet under collective ownership, the situation is slightly more com-
plex. As soon as one of the negotiators holds collective ownership rights to a
pasture, transaction costs are presumed to increase. Though it would also be
possible to negotiate an agreement and close a contract under collective own-
ership, this would not guarantee that the externality is prevented. Here the
assumed non-exclusivity of collective property implies that the originator of
the externality can only waive his individual right to create it, while he is si-
multaneously unable to make sure that other appropriators of the resource do
the same. As a consequence, he cannot guarantee that the externality will not
be created by one of his fellows (Demsetz, 1967, pp.356-357). Therefore, if the
farmer concerned by the externality wants to definitely prevent it, he has to ne-
gotiate with every owner of the communal right. This will of course increase
the level of transaction costs.
Yet the present idea can also be applied to explain a higher level of trans-
action costs if applied the other way around. Assume that the externality is
produced by one person and this externality reduces the utility of all appro-
priators of the commons. Given that the joint holders of the collective resource
want to prevent the externality by negotiating with the originator, this situ-
ation is characterised by a comparatively high level of transaction costs. In
this context Demsetz (1967, pp.356-357) argues that transaction costs will be
high under collective ownership, while under private ownership this number
is reduced since:
“ [...] generally speaking, it will be necessary for only a few to reach
an agreement that takes these effects into account. The cost of ne-
gotiating an internalisation of these effects is thereby reduced con-
siderably.”
Hence, even in the case where the number of participants would be equally
high under both ownership forms, transaction costs are believed to be higher
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under collective ownership, since the number of affected and involved par-
ties would be lower. In this context, Demsetz (1967, p.356) argues that under
private property rights we can find
“exactly the same kind of externality that we encountered with
communal property rights, but it is present to a lesser degree.”
From these general considerations it is usually inferred that the costs of negoti-
ating an agreement among the contracting parties under a system of collective
ownership rights will be higher than in a case where the ownership structure
is completely private. This also manifests itself as one of the causes for the
believed general superiority of private ownership and is why Demsetz (1967,
p. 357) points out that42
“[t]his is the basic explanation, I believe, for the preponderance of
single rather than multiple owners of property. Indeed, an increase
in the number of owners is an increase in the communality of prop-
erty and leads, generally, to an increase in the cost of internalising.”
Finally, there is also a third, group of arguments that have been used to defend
the position of a superior functioning of private property rights. In addition
to the view that transaction costs will be increased on account of negotiations
and the number of parties involved, these arguments refer to both the minimi-
sation of transaction costs and the possibilities to enhance efficiency through
the transferability condition. Here it is the presumed lack of transferability
42To serve justice to Demsetz, whom I have depicted as predicting a superiority of primate
ownership in his 1967 article, I should add that in a revised version of his thoughts in 2002
he accepts that under several conditions collective ownership can be stabilised (Demsetz,
2002). Further, he also accepts that collective ownership does not necessarily have to take
on the characteristics it had in his earlier contributions. Finally, in this article, Demsetz
argues that even private ownership rights can have unfavourable consequences and col-
lective control can constitute an efficient coordination mechanism when the compactness of
the economising problem is high. Compactness is described as “ [...] the degree to which
[a] problem is largely confined to a group, whose members, per force of circumstances,
are “close” (Demsetz, 2002, p.661). Still, Demsetz is of the opinion that private ownership
rights will make their way within a capitalist economy, when population pressures, the
accumulation of knowledge or other external factors lift economic activity from interaction
between the members of a close community to the level of exchange between strangers.
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in collective ownership rights that is believed to reduce the efficiency of this
property rights form. Furubotn and Pejovich (1972, p.1141) state that
“[i]t can be shown [...] that privately owned resources will always
tend to be allocated to the highest valued uses.”.
They therefore argue that the possibility to transfer property in an uncon-
strained way under a system of private ownership rights will automatically
lead to an efficient outcome, while under collective ownership efficiency can-
not be fostered easily by a reshuffling of property and appropriation rights to
the resource. This has also been emphasised by Alchian (1965) who states that
the basic advantages of private over public ownership are rooted in the trans-
ferability of private property rights. According to this notion, this would add
to the advantage of this ownership type, since individuals will be able to shift
property rights in a way that makes them less dependent on the actions of their
co-owners. Furthermore, transferability is assumed to contribute to a higher
degree of efficiency, since this allows for the realisation of comparative advan-
tages in ownership. If holders of rights are endowed with different productive
abilities, then a reshuffling of property rights allows for a more complete spe-
cialisation in the highly productive tasks and therefore private ownership will
be efficiency - enhancing (Alchian, 1965, p.143).43
Finally, even in those cases where collective ownership is believed to be
helpful, Alchian and Demsetz (1973) find a fly in the ointment. Though they
acknowledge that under certain conditions it might be possible to prevent an
externality by switching from private to collective ownership, in their eyes this
would not be desirable since it would immediately bring about the develop-
ment of another negative consequence and hence lead to a situation44
“in which the behaviour of individuals is directly regulated by the
state or indirectly influenced by cultural indoctrination.”
43Note that in his contribution, Alchian (1965, p.136) is fully aware of the different implications
private and public ownership systems might have for the behaviour of individuals, given
the different cost schedules.
44Alchian and Demsetz (1973, p.23)
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Hence, collective ownership is perceived to have beneficial characteristics only
under the side-effect of constraining individual freedom through the interfer-
ence of the state authority.45 Hence, cultural indoctrination takes the same role
as religion does in the ideas of Karl Marx - to provide the opium for the people
to subjugate them to the burden of collective ownership. Alchian and Dem-
setz (1973, p.23) get to the point by expressing their ideas on the persistence of
collective ownership rights by stating that the previously described groups of
arguments
“[...] prompt men to convert their rights into the most valuable
form; they will convert the resources owned under communal ar-
rangements into resources owned privately [...]”.
2.2.2.3 Common-Pool, Common Property, Common Confusion - The
Inferiority of Collective Ownership Reconsidered
The presumption of a general superiority of private ownership rested on two
different assumptions. The first group of arguments stressed the problems
of free-riding, over-exploitation and coordination failure by emphasising the
in-exclusivity and the absence of effective regulations under collective owner-
ship, while the second justified its claims by referring to the overall level of
transaction costs.
Yet the first group of arguments can quite easily be invalidated if several
confusions about the nature of collective ownership will be resolved. Most
commonly, collective ownership is interpreted as the situation when property
rights to a good or resource are held by more than a handful of people, or to
stick with the definition of Ellickson (1993), of either more than 12 people or
of any other number of individuals that do not belong to the same household.
Yet, this “definition” does not offer any more detailed information on other im-
portant aspects of the ownership situation such as the setup of the respective
45So far I have only focused on the differences between group ownership and private owner-
ship of land, while we have not accounted for the possibility of state ownership. However,
as in my eyes the popular literature only views state ownership as another possibility to
reduce the negative aspects of collective ownership and since I am rather interested in the
way that small scale groups autonomously deal with their problems, I will not highlight
the role of the “leviathan” any further.
42
2 The Survival of the Fittest
group, the characteristics of the resource to which ownership is addressed, or
on the form the bundles of property rights have been assigned to the group
members. Hence the basic problem in the research on collective ownership
structures is that too often the generic term of “collective ownership” is em-
ployed to describe a large amount of different ownership regimes that may
vary with respect to the size of the user group, the type of the resource, or the
assigned bundles of property rights. But this implies that all property rights
arrangements with more than 12 owners are lumped together and this makes
it almost impossible to accomplish a more detailed analysis. Therefore, to cut
this Gordian knot, it will be necessary to carry out several classifications which
will also allow to refute the first group of arguments that emphasise the gen-
eral advantages of private ownership.
Hence, the first distinction to be made tries to resolve the confusion between
the characteristics of the natural resource and the characteristics of the prop-
erty rights system that has been chosen to administer it. Though the char-
acteristics of a natural resource, such as size, altitude or natural borders do
influence transaction costs and therefore relate to the choice of the ownership
regime, both issues are certainly not be be confused with each other.46 Hence,
as geographic features influence the choice of property rights arrangements
through the degree of transaction costs, it is straightforward to accept that a
collective ownership system that is used to administrate a big natural resource
such as the open seas will have a different shape than one that carries out the
same task for a natural resource of smaller size. In the following, I will focus on
small and medium sized natural resources and these will be called common-
pool resources. Relying on Ostrom and Schlager (1996, p.129), it is possible to
define them as:
“ [...] natural or human-made facilities or stocks that generate flows
of usable resource units over time.”.
Further, common-pool resources are, as a consequence of their “smaller” size
and in contrast to a public good, defined by rivalry in consumption and
46For a more detailed description of how external factors might influence the costs of control
and enforcement, see Barzel (1989).
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scarcity. This of course implies that under the common-pool, the extraction
of resource units by one individual also influences the utility of other potential
users. Yet it is important to note that in contrast to the previous understanding
of a collective resource, the geographical features of a common-pool resource
allow for the exclusion of individuals or groups from its utilisation, although
this might also impose costs on the group or person who want to carry out this
task (McKean, 1996, p.225). This leads to the second necessary distinction.
Most basically, the administration of a common-pool or any other resource
can be carried out by employing either a system of private or of collective
ownership.47 Further, there exist not one but many different forms of collec-
tive ownership that are contrasted from each other on account of the bundles
of rights and the way these rights can be enforced. So far, this chapter has not
distinguished between open access and other management forms to adminis-
ter collective ownership and this is one of the main aspects that make it pos-
sible to refute the first group of arguments on the superiority of private own-
ership. Note that those characteristics of collective ownership that constituted
the foundations of the misconception do only apply to open access ownership.
In these cases either there is no owner or the owner, independent of whether it
is a group or a single person, chooses to leave access to and withdrawal from
the resource unconstrained to all individuals or groups irrespective of their
origin. Hence, in this case neither universality, transferability nor the possibil-
ity of exclusion are given. But, taking into account that open access is not the
only form under which collective ownership can be carried out and given that
open access management would - at least under scarcity - without any doubt
create all of the mentioned negative aspects to a common-pool resource, there
is no plausible reason why a group that wants to conserve the resource would
not choose a different and more appropriate property rights regime to achieve
this task. Accordingly, if a group has the opportunity to influence and shape
norms and regulations, the group will be likely to do this in a way that achieve
the minimisation of transaction costs by also taking account of local conditions
and scarcities.
47This is exactly the essence of the first distinction, which states that the resource is not to be
confused with the ownership system.
44
2 The Survival of the Fittest
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised Authorised
User Entrant
Access x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x
Management x x x
Exclusion x x
Alienation x
Table 2.2: Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions (Adapted from Ostrom
and Schlager, 1996, p.133.)
This form of ownership which seeks to guarantee the successful manage-
ment of a common-pool resource is usually referred to by the term “common
property regime”.48 Under such a regime, the rights to the resource are held
“privately” by a group, while the resource itself is owned collectively. Note
that the owners of a resource under a common property regime jointly have
the possibility to establish strong regulations on virtually any aspect of utilisa-
tion and they further have the power to exclude non-owners from access to the
resource, or transfer the resource to someone else.49 This nonetheless implies
that common property regimes will be designed in a way that allow for the pre-
vention of those detrimental effects that have been associated with collective
ownership in the first group of arguments. Yet, though the tragedy of the com-
mons, the problem of coordination failure and free-riding in general constitute
omnipresent threats to every form of collective ownership, their harmful exis-
tence can be mitigated by guaranteeing exclusion from and regulation of the
resource.
48This distinction has been emphasised amongst others by Ostrom (1990) and Stevenson
(1991).
49Note however that all of these rights refer to the group as a whole and not to the individual
members of the group. Hence, under a common property regime, the group universally
assigns rights to the resource to its members, takes care of excluding strangers and further
decides on transferability of the rights or the resource.
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To understand the setup of a common property regime, consider table 2.2,
which distinguishes between the different rights to a resource and the different
positions associated with these rights. Basically, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the rights at the operational level and the rights at the collective choice
level. While the first group unites the instrumental rights that empower their
holder to access a resource or withdraw goods from it, the three rights at the
collective choice level offer its holders the opportunity to actively participate
in the management and administration of the resource. Each of the respective
rights fulfils a certain task to maintain and organise the utilisation of a natural
resource. First of all, by regulating both the access to and the withdrawal from
the resource, norms at the operational level can be applied to adjust the utili-
sation of a resource to the local conditions. Second, regulations may also apply
to the collective choice level. Here any right or decision making process that is
concerned with the management of the resource is defined. Further, the collec-
tive choice level also includes those rights that allow the owners to determine
who is to be excluded from a resource or if the resource will be transferred
or not. The combination of rights at the operational and the collective choice
level therefore defines the rights of an individual with respect to the resource.
Hence, while the authorised entrant is only allowed to enter the resource, the
authorised user holds the additional right withdraw certain goods from the
resource. Further, claimants, proprietors and owners have even more rights
i.e. those to participate in the management of the resource, to decide on the
exclusion from or the alienation of the resource.
Note that table 2.2, also offers the chance to grasp the difference between
open access management and a common property regime by taking a closer
look at the position of the owner. In the open access case either no collective
choice rights above the management level have been granted or the owner
and the proprietor have decided to leave the resource open to everybody. In
the case of a common property regime in contrast, the position of the owner is
usually assigned and the owner also makes use of his rights. In spite of the fact
that the assignment of the ownership position is not sufficient to guarantee the
successful establishment of a common property regime, the differentiation of
positions suggests that at least two of the three presumed negative character-
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istics of collective ownership forms do not hold. As - at least from a theoretical
point of view - property rights in a common property regime can be univer-
sally defined and the owner will be likely to establish exclusion, two of the
three disadvantages vanish and bring collective ownership closer to Posner’
state of efficiency. Still, one should note that the statement that the creation of
efficiency under a system of collective ownership is tied to the position of an
owner, is just a metaphor for the true condition viz. that a group will be capa-
ble of organising itself in a way that allows for regulations to be implemented
and enforced to reduce all of the detrimental forces that would otherwise oc-
cur under open access. This offers the chance to interpret a common property
regime as a form of “shared private property” in the sense of a group jointly
holding all of the different bundles of property rights to a resource.50
The differentiation between the different user forms of a collective resource
and especially the insight of private ownership rights being held by a group
also offer the possibility to analyse the second group of arguments that empha-
sise a general superiority of private ownership rights. First, I want to deal with
the argument that transaction costs under collective ownership will always
be higher than transaction costs under private ownership, since the number
of negotiating parties would be higher. There are three aspects which show
that this will not necessarily be the case. First of all, if the same number of
peasants that participate in the collective ownership arrangement will hold
parcels of land as private owners, then there is a priori no reason to assume
that the costs of negotiating agreements should be any different between the
two ownership forms even if one refers to the idea of monitoring being carried
out through the central nervous system. Second, even if the number of private
owners will be lower than the number of individuals holding collective shares,
there is another caveat that prohibits to make general statements on the level
of transaction costs under different ownership forms. This relates to the al-
ready addressed problem of the empty core. It is obvious that the argument of
negotiation costs always being lower when fewer negotiators are involved can
obviously not be generalised given the case that more than two parties par-
ticipate in the negotiations. If more than two parties participate then Coasean
50This is also in line with McKean (1996, p.227).
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bargaining between the parties involved in the negotiations might be flawed
and as a consequence, endless re-contracting will take place and hence nego-
tiation costs will go up independently of the number of participants.51 Third,
even in those cases where the number of affected parties is lower under private
ownership, it is not possible to make any explicit predictions on the amount
of transaction costs under the two regimes. This is because to do so, more de-
tailed information on the extent of the negotiations are required. Remember
that Demsetz (1967) had argued for transaction costs being lower if a piece of
land would be owned by a large number of private owners, since this would al-
low - in contrast to the same resource being jointly owned - for the unaffected
parties to be left out from the negotiations. This would decrease transaction
costs under private ownership, since all peasants would be required to nego-
tiate under collective ownership. However, while it is certainly true that in
the case of small events the parcelling of a collectively owned field into several
smaller private ones will be efficient if the negotiations concern only some of
the owners, this does not hold true if all of the owners are affected. While in
the first case negotiation costs would be decreased under private ownership
since not all owners would participate in the negotiations, the contrast holds
true if all members will be affected. Here, the collective ownership and organ-
isation will be able to take care of the problem implementing a smaller amount
of transaction costs.52 Hence, it appears that neither of the arguments that
tried to justify a lower degree of transaction costs under private ownership by
referring to the number of parties involved does hold true.
Yet, there were also two other arguments to justify the transaction cost state-
ment. Transaction costs have also been assumed to be higher under collec-
tive ownership on account of the costs of monitoring the compliance to the
agreement. Here, it has been assumed that collective owners would have to
constantly monitor if the members would comply to the agreement. Yet this
argument can only hold if - in the same fashion as Demsetz (1967) - one im-
51For a more detailed discussion see Aivazian and Callen (1981), Coase (1981) and Aivazian
and Callen (2003).
52This is the case since the established organisational framework will employ norms and reg-
ulations which will channel behaviour and reduce transaction costs in turn. The problem
has also been recognised by Demsetz (1967, pp.356-357).
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plicitly assumes that a well-established state system will protect private own-
ership structures. In this case enforcement costs would be close to zero under
private ownership. Hence, this argument misses out on the costs of exclusion
that may arise under private ownership and which will not be taken care of
by the state. If one takes into account that under private ownership there also
exists the necessity to keep strangers from the private property by setting up
fences, employing monitors or buying food for the watchdogs, then it is easy
to see this argument vanish. Finally, and probably most important, a higher
efficiency of private ownership was justified on account of the missing pos-
sibility to exclude others from utilising the resource and to stop them from
creating an externality. However, this argument can also be refuted quite eas-
ily if one keeps the setup of common property regimes in mind. Clearly, it
will be possible to negotiate between the representative of a group and some
other party at a low level of transaction costs. Further, the setup of a common
property regime also suggests that the group as a whole can commit to abstain
from creating a harmful externality. This also invalidates the second group of
arguments for a general superiority of private over other forms of ownership.
Hence, as a tentative conclusion I stick to Dahlman (1980), Ostrom (1990)
and also a few other scholars, who assign themselves to the property rights
theory and emphasize that collective ownership structures can yield equal or
even higher levels of efficiency than a system of private ownership. However,
before I proceed to look at the basic conditions for the efficiency of collective
ownership forms, I will emphasise one of the many differences in applying
collective in contrast to private ownership by displaying a special case study
from the Alpine region which identifies some of the causes that might lead a
system of private ownership to be inferior to a collective ownership solution.
2.2.3 Lotteries and the Allocation of Land
It is possible to refute the popular (mis-)interpretation of collective ownership
always being inferior to a system of private ownership not only by the help of
theoretical arguments but also by looking at a more applied example. I hereby
present the example of a lottery allocation of short-term usus-fructus rights to
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collective land and show that - in spite of the collective nature of ownership
- such a system will yield higher levels of efficiency than a system of private
ownership.
The employment of lotteries to distribute usus-fructus rights has been a com-
mon feature in rural societies.53 In the literature, there are several examples
of lotteries being employed to distribute appropriation rights in a collectively
owned resource, whereas the earliest account of distributing a good by lottery
might date back to Tacitus (2006, part 6-15; part 10-1; part 21-6 and part 26-3),
who describes the custom of the Germanic peoples to determine temporary
ownership of land or any other item by using the branches of a fructiferous
tree, marking them with specific signs. The distribution of land yielded by this
process would then, at least in the faith of the old tribes, mirror the will of their
gods. Further, in 1882, Engels (1973) also described the custom of transferring
farmland to private ownership by lot. More recently, Netting (1981) and Os-
trom (1990) documented the allocation of appropriation rights to mountain
pastures in the Swiss Alps, while Faris (1972) and Berkes (1986) picture the
employment of a lottery system to allocate fishing spots in Newfoundland and
Turkey.54 Further, in the community of Murnau in southern Germany, lotter-
ies had been employed to distribute the right to cut reed on communal land
up to the second half of the 20th century. In northern Bavaria, lotteries are
used to distribute communal land up to the present day. Here, the so called
Osing-Verlosung - which dates back to the early Middle Ages - is said to be the
last lottery allocation in the German language area. Every 10 years, pieces of
farmland are distributed among 162 entitled individuals from the four com-
munities Herbolzheim, Humprechtsau, Krautostheim and Rüdisbronn up to
the present day.55 Finally, Basu et al. (1987, p.16) hint at the custom of ’draw-
ing lots for strips of hay’ that was carried out in Yarnton Mead, Oxfordshire
every July up to the 1960s.
53In general, an usus-fructus right guarantees its owner the exclusive and basically uncon-
strained right to privately utilise a resource for a limited amount of time.
54In this contribution I will not deal with the differences in consequences of a short-term usus-
fructus arrangement to flow resources such as the open seas an fishing lakes or to stock
resources such as pasture land and meadows.
55See Hillermeier (1994) for a more detailed description.
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In this contribution I am especially interested in the cases the Austrian legal
scholar Nikolaus Grass (1948, pp.174-191) has described for the Alpine region.
Up to the first half of the 20th century, lotteries had been employed to dis-
tribute usus-fructus rights to communal land among the members of the same
village community. Here, the lots entitled their holders to produce hay on a
special piece of land for the duration of one year in a basically unconstrained
way. Though Grass (1948) describes lottery allocations with a variety of differ-
ent characteristics with respect to the number of lots, the quality of the plots
or the duration of the usus-fructus right, I am especially interested in those
cases where the usus-fructus right had been granted for a rather short period
or more precisely for the duration of a single year.56
2.2.3.1 Usus-Fructus and the Tragedy of the Commons
Before I start to scrutinise why the lottery allocation of a short term usus-
fructus right to communal land had been more efficient than a system of pri-
vate ownership, it is important to perceive a rather puzzling part of this sys-
tem. Note that the short term distribution of usus-fructus rights constitutes
a system of lower efficiency than a private ownership system when judged
against the considerations of Gordon (1954) or Hardin (1968) and hence - look-
ing at the situation from the viewpoint of the property right paradigm - such a
system should not be able to persist in the medium or the long run. There are
two factors which add to the relative inefficiency of the short term usus-fructus
lottery allocation.57
The first inefficiency of the system relates to the problem that lotteries usu-
ally do not allocate the goods or property rights to those individuals who have
the highest willingness to pay. Since the distribution of usus-fructus rights is
not consistent with the allocation that would arise from a strict ranking ac-
cording to the willingness to pay, the efficiency of this allocation could easily
56This had been the case in the two communities of Kals and Windisch-Matrei in East Tyrol
and in two communities in Vorarlberg in Austria. For a longer though incomplete descrip-
tion of other communities all over the Alps, see Grass (1948, pp.174-191).
57Furubotn and Richter (1998, pp.86-87) also describe the usus-fructus system, however they
do not address the lottery system or any other likely complications which may arise out of
this arrangement.
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be improved by permitting the free transferability of the usus-fructus rights.
Nevertheless, although the transferability of land or of the yield from the land
to members from outside the community had been interdicted in many Alpine
communities, this had not led to many problems, since it had in most cases
been allowed to transfer land and rights within the communities.58 However,
the second inefficiency of the system is more difficult to deal with, since it di-
rectly develops from the structure of the short-term usus-fructus system. To
understand this argument, one should keep in mind the basic process that has
been described within the tragedy of the commons, which showed the several
factors that encourage the over-exploitation of a resource. However, the same
observation holds true for those pieces of land to which a short-term usus-
fructus allocation had been granted.
The reason for this problem can be depicted as follows. Since in the cases ob-
served by Grass (1948), the duration of the usus-fructus right only lasts for one
year, every appropriator knows perfectly well that after this duration, his usus-
fructus right on the lottery plot will be terminated and the rights he had been
holding for twelve months will go back to collective ownership. Further, every
farmer knows that through the lottery he will receive the usus-fructus right to
another piece of land in exchange for the one he had in the previous period.
Hence, although it might theoretically be possible that one farmer would acci-
dentally receive the same plot of land through the lottery that he “owned” the
year before, the probability that every participant in the lottery would receive
the same plot in the next or the following periods is rather small.59 But as a
consequence, this means that no community member will have an incentive to
invest in the state of his resource, since after the usus-fructus to the plot has
been transferred to another member of the community, someone else would
benefit from the saving efforts of the individual. Hence, every rationally acting
farmer would have the incentive to increase his personal income by extracting
58Note that participation in the lottery had not been mandatory. Rather, every community
member had the choice to decide on his own if he wanted to participate or note, though a
participation also required that the usus-fructus right had to be exercised.
59This statement of course builds on the assumption that the number of lots is sufficiently
high.
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the maximum amount of hay from the resource.60 In addition one can also
assume him to do this without paying any attention to the potentially harmful
effects of his behaviour on both the sustainability of the plot and the expected
yield of the subsequent proprietors. This problem, though in a less applied
form, has also been described by Ellickson (1993, p.1332), who states that the
structure of incentives under the usus-fructus leads to a short-sightedness of
owners.61 Therefore the short term usus-fructus system will lead to a less effi-
cient outcome than a system of private ownership.62 This has also been noticed
by Trientl (1863) who - regarding the lottery allocation of cutting rights in the
Alpine region - also confirms this problem and describes the detrimental in-
fluences of individual action and the over-exploitation on the lottery plots as
follows (Trientl, 1863, p.9 my own translation):
“ The most severe plundering of resources takes place where the
fields are rented out, or, as I know from one community, where
they are allocated after several years by fortune. At the end of this
period, farmers do not even worry about ruining their scythes by
mowing. They not only want to bring in the last halm, but they also
try to cut the roots of the turf and hence do not worry about the fact
that hereby the growth of the grass will be severely affected for the
successor.”
Two possibilities arise out of the damage of the plant surface: in the better
of the two cases, the plant surface will regenerate in the long run. However,
60Apparently, the same problem also arises when the usus-fructus is granted for a longer
period, since the farmers will not have an incentive to invest in the state of the resource
towards the end of the utilisation period. For a description of this problem in the context
of the Osing-Verlosung see Hillermeier (1994, p.50).
61Several other empirical examples on the inefficiencies created by a usus-fructus system have
been described by DeAlessi (1980).
62According to Ellickson’s description, such an ownership structure can only be maintained
under specific conditions, which include the immunity of a resource to over-exploitation,
the abundance of land and the prevalence of illiteracy among the members of a preindus-
trial society. Only then an usus-fructus allocation can be sustainable. Illiteracy is hereby
believed to favour the survival of an inefficient system, since in such a society the tracking
of perpetual claims, which are needed to ensure the private ownership of land, might be
aggravated. A similar idea has also been proposed by Posner (1980).
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in the other case, soil erosion will add further damage by washing of the fer-
tile parts of soil from the surface in such a way that a recovery cannot take
place any more. However, the short-term consequences of such a system are
the same, since in both cases, the damages would lead to the plots not be-
ing included in the next lottery; therefore, the number of plots and hence the
overall yield would diminish.63 In other words, on account of the short dura-
tion of the usus-fructus right, the holder of the usus-fructus right is not likely
to take into account the future consequences of his actions and hence he can-
not be expected to find the optimal level of appropriation in every period of
time. In contrast, every private owner of such a meadow can be expected to
account for the future consequences of today’s actions and therefore a change
in the ownership structure would allow for the problem to vanish. Hence, the
example presented seems to confirm a presumed superiority of private over
collective ownership types. Nevertheless, given that the whole setup of the
system is indeed inefficient, how can one explain the puzzling fact that it had
been maintained although better alternatives had been present?
There is the choice between two possible conclusions: either the prediction
of the property rights theory that more efficient institutional arrangements will
win over less efficient ones is wrong, or our description of the lottery system
has neglected some important aspect within the process which ultimately de-
termines the efficiency of the usus-fructus allocation. Though, as the other
parts of this dissertation will show there are also some problems with the gen-
eral prediction of efficiency to be reached in the property right paradigm, I
stick to the second possibility in this case. Therefore I present an explanation
that is in line with the property rights theory and confirms the claim that col-
lective ownership can be more efficient then a system of private ownership.
63Looking at the consequences of such an ownership system, it is straightforward to note
that this specific problem could easily be circumvented by introducing a system of private
ownership instead of the assignment of usus-fructus rights to the meadows.
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2.2.3.2 On the Connection of Primitive Insurance and Landscape
Management
Although, from the view point of Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968), the short
term allocation of usus-fructus rights to private land is of lower efficiency than
a system of private ownership, this system has also been maintained for sev-
eral centuries. The reason for this may become more clear if one analyses the
characteristics of the whole setup in more detail. Hence, it will be possible
to explain the persistence of this ownership structure in the face of obvious
inefficiencies by looking at its importance to provide insurance for rural com-
munities in the absence of markets.
This argument will become easier to grasp, if one looks at the overall prop-
erty rights structure of a representative village community in the Alpine re-
gion.64 For a such a representative village, private ownership dominates with
respect to the land that is situated close to the village itself. This land is com-
monly employed for the production of different field crops. In contrast, col-
lective ownership dominates with respect to the commons within the village
and it is also the prevalent ownership form for those areas that are situated up
the mountain side and which are usually jointly employed as a pasture and
meadow to cut hay. Finally, as in the present case study, in some communities
this duality of ownership structures is supplemented by smaller pieces of land
to which some community members will receive the usus-fructus right. Still,
one should also note that - as Grass (1948, pp.174-191) and Wopfner (1995b)
have pointed out - the lottery plots differ from the normal fields not only with
respect to the property rights structure that has been chosen to administer it
but also with respect to the geographic features and the quality of hay to be
produced there.65 The reason for the geographic differences relates to the fact
that the plots had most commonly been situated high up the mountain side,
where the steepness of the hillside or some other geographical obstacle pre-
vented the land from being employed for the grazing of livestock and hence,
64For a comprehensive description of the setup of the Alpine economy and of the property
rights structure before the start of the industrialisation see Viazzo (1989).
65As Grass (1948) notes, the hay to be produced on the meadows that are allocated through
the lottery is of lower quality than the hay that can be produced on the common fields.
55
2 The Survival of the Fittest
the economic utilisation of this land was limited to the production of hay.66
The first key to the argument on the efficiency of collective ownership in
the form of the usus-fructus system develops from the simple observation
that wealth and private farmland had been distributed unequally within every
community.67 Here the amount of the privately owned farmland had consti-
tuted a major factor determining individual prosperity in both a direct and an
indirect way. Apparently, a higher amount of individually owned farmland
offered advantages in producing field crops and hay to feed the livestock and
this increased individual prosperity in a direct way. Yet individual prosper-
ity had also been increased indirectly since in some communities, communal
regulations tied the employment of all the common land to the amount of pri-
vately owned farmland and cattle (Grass, 1948, p.36). Hence more prosper-
ous farmers, who owned a relatively high amount of high-quality farmland,
had the opportunity to hibernate more cattle and sheep. This also privileged
this group with respect to the utilisation of the commons. In contrast, the less
prosperous inhabitants of the village communities usually did not possess suf-
ficient quantities of high-quality private farmland and therefore they did not
receive sufficient shares from the commons. However, the heterogeneity that
arises out of the different levels of individual prosperity also shows itself in
the economic activities of both groups.
While the richer members of society usually had the opportunity to make
a living out of the employment of the private farmland and the commons, it
had been the poorer members of society in every period which decided to look
for an additional form of income: the meadows that had been farmed out in
the lottery every year.68 Hereby, several factors contributed to the fact that
66It should further be noted that the geographic conditions not only affected the choice of
production but also increased the costs of production (Grass, 1948).
67Accordingly, environmental conditions had been constraining the life of all village members
to a different extent. As Grass (1990) notes, this unequal distribution affected both the size
and quality of private farmland, and had been a rather common feature in pre-industrial
rural communities. This heavily influenced economic production and the overall prosper-
ity within the community.
68The full argument reads as follows. Since the employment of the commons is positively
correlated with the individually owned quantity of land, for some farmers income from
these two sources was not sufficient to reach the minimum level of income to secure the
survival of their families. If the size of privately owned grain and vegetable fields is rather
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the more prosperous members within a community had only little incentive to
earn additional income through the utilisation of the usus-fructus right. First
of all, the presence of high production costs and the low quantity and quality of
hay to be produced on the fields reduced the economic incentives for the rich
to utilise the meadows. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that several
restrictions on the utilisation of the usus-fructus right, such as a prohibition to
sell the yield, were in place. These restrictions further limited the incentives
for earning income on the lottery plots, since the hay produced there could not
be sold and there would also have been no sense in storing the hay for more
than one period.69
To understand the argument on the efficiency of this obviously inefficient
ownership system, let me expand these basic observations by supposing that
some unexpected negative shock reduces the productivity on the privately
owned farmland and on the commons, while the productivity on the lottery
plots remains virtually unaffected. Such a shock could be interpreted as a re-
duction in the amount and the quality of hay to be produced on the commons
or snow forcing the livestock to return to the barn earlier than usual. In the ba-
sic framework I have depicted above, this would have two effects for the group
and for the utilisation of the lottery spots. First of all, since the productivity on
private farmland and on the commons declined, the poorer members of soci-
ety would be forced to rely to an even greater extent on the utilisation of the
usus-fructus right. Yet the second effect of the economic decline relates to the
economic activities of the more prosperous group. Since in the model the pros-
perous group is more dependent on the income from private farmland and the
commons, it is reasonable to suggest that on account of the shock their income
small and if the quantity of cows and sheep to be grazed on the pasture or the amount
of hay to be extracted from it is limited, then an additional source of income is needed to
provide winter fodder for the animals. Therefore, the poorer members of the communities
will look for additional ways to earn income, which is present in small plots of land which
on account of their geographical features impose high production costs.
69This was because the more prosperous group had the opportunity to produce a sufficient
amount of winter fodder on the private land and the commons and since the quality of hay
deteriorated with the length of storage, there had been no sense in storing hay for more
than a year. This of course greatly reduced the incentive to produce more hay than needed.
Only in more recent times have technological innovations allowed for the conservation of
hay for a longer period.
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will decline to a relatively greater extent than the income of the poorer group.
However, given that the productivity shock reduces the income of some of the
wealthier members of society below the subsistence level, one can conclude
that as a consequence, this group will also utilise the usus-fructus right by par-
ticipating in the lottery. While in good times, the more prosperous members
of the prototype village community exclusively survive on the income they
receive from the private plots and from the commons, this opportunity is de-
stroyed during a “recession”, since such an economic crisis also forces the rich
to focus more intensively on the usus-fructus right.
Still so far, the section has not addressed the question of why the distribution
of a short-term usus-fructus right should be a more efficient ownership form
than a system of private ownership, although several aspects of the tragedy
of the commons are present in the existing ownership system. Given that the
effects of the shock to individual productivity are unknown, one can deduct
that the lottery plots serve as insurance against an economic recession.70 Still,
this function can only be guaranteed if the meadows themselves are kept in
a condition that allows them to be employed for the production of hay; this
will become easier to understand if one accounts for the characteristics of the
lottery plots beyond the problems and conditions that have been described
by Hardin (1968). Damages to a natural resource such as an alpine meadow
do not exclusively develop due to over-exploitation, but may, as Trientl (1863)
and Wopfner (1997) have pointed out, also arise out of an underinvestment
in the maintenance of the resource. Under extreme environmental conditions,
most stock resources such as pastures or meadows are very fragile in ecological
terms, and therefore need extensive care to fulfil their role within the economic
structure of a community. Hence, in addition to the constraints put on the indi-
vidual to limit the exploitation of resources, there is also a lower bound of util-
isation which corresponds to the necessity to reduce the uncontrolled growth
of trees or scrub. If, the meadows or the pastures are not cleared in a more
or less regular fashion, the meadows will be taken back by nature and this
70While in prosperous times there is no need for the richer members of the community to
bother themselves with the costly work of producing hay on the lottery plots, during bad
times exactly this activity will be essential for a part of this group to secure the survival of
their livestock.
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means that they cannot be used to provide immediate insurance.71 Accord-
ingly, a regular utilisation greatly reduces the effort that is needed to maintain
the meadows. Hence, the yearly rotation of the usus-fructus rights among
the less prosperous members of society allowed for two problems to be taken
care of. First of all, the yearly rotation increased the probability of all lottery
plots being utilised and maintained by the poor members of the society in suf-
ficiently short intervals. Second, this arrangement also allowed the villagers
to deal with the negative consequences of over-exploitation. As outside of a
recession, only the poorer members of the community had been applying for
the usus-fructus right by participating in the lottery, this allowed for a recov-
ery of the most damaged meadows - as the number of participants had been
low and therefore a certain number of plots had not be included in the lottery
to allow for a recovery.72 Yet, in a recession enough plots would be available
to serve as a fall-back option for the richer members of a society and therefore
one could argue that outside a recession, the poorer community members con-
tributed an important share for both the conservation of the landscape and the
maintenance of the insurance mechanism.
Note that the depicted advantages of collective ownership also allow for an-
other variant of this argument. Baland and Francois (2005) show that in the
presence of incomplete markets, the privatisation of farmland can lead to an
outcome which is of lower efficiency than the outcome produced in a system
of collective ownership.73 Here, both authors draw their insights from anal-
71It can roughly be assumed that after 3 years of negligence, the growth of the forests has
advanced in such a way that the cutting of grass is effectively prevented and accordingly
high costs would have been needed to make the sides available for agricultural production
again.
72Of course, if this had not been done, during a recession less plots would have been left
idle and this would negatively affect the quality of the plots to be farmed out in the lot-
tery. However since the short-term effects between the destruction of the meadows either
through over-exploitation or through negligence are the same, the balancing of activity and
non-activity does seem appropriate to secure the existence of the meadows.
73Other accounts of the favourable role of collectively owned resources in providing insurance
have been brought forward, as Baland and Francois (2005, p.213) point out, by Bromley and
Chavas (1989), who refer to the beneficial role that non-exclusivity within collective own-
ership can play for the efficient pooling of risks. Further, Dasgupta and Maler (1995) point
out that common land is often the only source of income for the rural poor, which is inde-
pendent from their human assets. Hence, for landless people, the commons constitute an
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ysis in less developed countries and assume that exogenous shocks reduce
the productivity outside the agricultural production sector, while the individ-
ual productivity on the commons is not affected by the external shocks to the
economy. Accordingly, as the employment opportunities outside the agricul-
tural sector decline, the commons or any other form of land under a system of
collective ownership provide a fallback option74
“ in cases where labour cannot find profitable employ elsewhere.”
It is now possible to link this scenario to the short-term usus-fructus right de-
scribed above.
Consider the following hypothetical case. In a community, there exist two
opportunities of employment, agriculture and some other form of production,
such as mining. Both employment opportunities are not completely separated
from each other, meaning that miners will also earn a minor share from agricul-
tural activities while farmers also indirectly earn income from mining through
the consumption of the miners. If an exogenous shock, such as the one that led
to the slow demise of Tyrolean mining in the second half of the 16th century,
leads to a decline in the mining sector, miners will look for work in the agri-
cultural sector to secure their income. Accordingly, given the described setup
of private and collective ownership rights being used for different purposes, it
appears likely to suggest that the newly “unemployed” will react to the crisis
by using the high-cost production of hay on the lottery plots. This is likely to
take place as long as there is no outside opportunity for employment. In spite
of the different setup, the argument on the optimality of the lottery system
runs as above under the new circumstances. Once again it is the poorer part
of society which uses the commons or more specifically the lottery plots and
hereby maintains the functioning of the insurance mechanism.75
important insurance for the times when an economic crisis prevents the efficient utilisation
of human-capital or prevents the compensation as a factor of production.
74Baland and Francois (2005, p.212)
75However, as I neither have data nor any other empirical information on the correlation be-
tween the decline of mining activities in Tyrol and the subsequent appearance of the short
term usus-fructus lottery allocation, I have to regard this idea as a mere hypothesis and
will therefore advise the reader to view it as a supplementary note to the previously stated
ideas. Although the chapter cannot provide a general proof of the “mining explanation”,
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Finally and independent from the exact setup of the system, to prove the
present claim of collective ownership yielding a higher level of efficiency than
a system of private ownership it is necessary to scrutinise if any other prop-
erty rights arrangement could have achieved the same outcome or provided
the same level of insurance at equal or lower costs. Let us therefore check for
some purely hypothetical cases. First of all, there would have been the oppor-
tunity to leave the utilisation of the meadows open to everyone. Of course such
a system would, outside a recession, lead to the plots being utilised only by the
poor, while during the recession other farmers would also join to use them. Yet
such a system would not allow for a periodic utilisation of the meadows since
the meadows had been heterogeneous with respect to the quality of hay and
the costs of production. Hence, if utilisation would have been open to every-
one, only the better plots that offered less costly ways of production would
have been used for the cutting of hay.76 Further, the communities would have
had the chance to maintain this form of insurance, by raffling the yield from
the meadows and not the meadows themselves. However, this solution would
still not take care of the problem that the high-cost low-quality fields would
not be maintained. Finally, one can also compare the short term usus-fructus
allocation to a system of private ownership which would obviously have pre-
vented a tragedy of the commons. However, it is easy to see that it would be
a lot harder to guarantee the other benefits of the collective ownership solu-
tion. First, under a system of private ownership it would be almost impossible
to force the rich members of the community to bear the costs of maintaining
the meadows in good economic times. This is because it is very unlikely that
a prosperous farmer would take appropriate care of the meadows outside an
agricultural recession and therefore it is also unlikely that he would invest
I still consider it important to present this variant of the insurance argument, since this in
my eyes provides some important insights into the functioning of pre-industrial societies.
76Of course some might argue that there would have been other ways to circumvent this
problem by employing another allocation mechanism, yet in my eyes they would also have
created severe problems. First of all, a queueing or a first come-first served allocation
would have increased rent dissipation. Yet neither of the two allocation mechanisms would
have taken care of the initial problem, since the participants would have only competed
for the better spots. For a comprehensive description of the problems that may arise out of
different allocation mechanisms see Boyce (1994).
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in the maintenance of these meadows if there is a cheaper way to guarantee
the perpetuation of the insurance mechanism.77 More important however, a
system of private ownership would have induced the incentive to act oppor-
tunistically. As under such a system, every holder of a private ownership right
could have threatened to withdraw his fields from serving as a means of in-
surance and thereby bargain for a bigger share of the joint surplus, this would
have created severe problems.78 As every holder of such a plot would have the
incentive to do so, the level of ex-ante transaction costs would have increased
in a way that would have rendered the profits of providing insurance zero
and therefore the insurance system would not even have been established.79
Clearly, this would be an inferior solution to allocating temporary usus-fructus
rights by lottery.
After I have exposed that the short term usus-fructus system had been the
most efficient property rights system to insure against a decline in productiv-
ity during a recession, one still has to scrutinise whether in the cases observed
there had been a necessity to provide insurance through the property rights
system. This sort of argument has, though in the context of the open-field sys-
tem, been brought forward by Fenoaltea (1976) and Fenoaltea (1988). In both
77It is also possible to relate these findings to the conditions Ellickson (1993) has proposed
as determinants for the efficiency of the short term usus-fructus system. First of all, his
claim that this system cannot be maintained in the presence of scarcity in land should be
modified, since the system in our example may well be capable of dealing with scarcity that
only develops periodically. Further, the claim that usus-fructus rights are only employable
in a world where natural resources are not affected by over-exploitation is also incomplete.
As we have shown, the occurrence of other inefficiencies can justify the utilisation of short-
term usus-fructus rights and therefore also serve as a justification for a community to take
the loss of over-exploitation.
78This form of using threats as revenue generators has already been addressed in section
2.1.1. Hence, the present problem appears to be related to the extortion problem of Schlicht
(1996), which was mentioned in the course of describing the problems with Stigler’s ver-
sion of the Coase theorem.
79Note that this argument will also appear at another parts of this chapter, i.e. in section 2.3.2.
Further note that the example of allocating ownership rights by lotteries can also be inter-
preted as a means to replace the market system by a system of internal organisation which
in turn drops the price mechanism in favour of another means to coordinate economic ac-
tivity. As the introduction of private property rights would have caused severe problems
in the prevalent case, a system of collective ownership offered a more efficient way of pro-
viding insurance. This argument, which is basically a variant of the ideas of Williamson
(1975, 1985), will be analysed in more detail in section 2.3.1.3.
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contributions, Fenoaltea attacked the view of McCloskey (1972, 1975), who em-
phasised that the scattering of private farmland in the open-field system had
been an efficient means of insurance for the peasant population. Fenoaltea in
contrast argued that though scattering might be the most efficient property
rights arrangement to provide insurance, there existed more efficient means
of insurance - such as the storage of grain - that did not relate to the prop-
erty rights system.80 Of course the same objection must also be applied to
the present explanation of the usus-fructus system. It is therefore necessary to
determine whether there had been any other, more appropriate or less costly
way to insure against a productivity decline in an economic recession. Unfor-
tunately I can only speculate on this topic as I am not aware of any data on
the trade, the rate of interest or the prices of hay in the pre-industrial period.
Yet, since the technological opportunities to store hay for a longer period had
not existed up to the 20th century, I believe that in mountain communities that
had been characterised by the absence of insurance markets, the proposed ex-
planation might be a useful and coherent approach to show the efficiency of
collective ownership systems.
2.3 The Efficiency of Collective Ownership
Though the previous section has introduced the concept of common property
regimes as an efficient form of administering common-pool resources, the con-
ditions that lead to the successful establishment of a common property regime
have not been identified yet. I will start this section by analysing a case study
that displays the organisational setup of a successful common property regime
and the high level of different regulations that were used to channel resource
extraction and stabilise the agreement. Further I address the importance of the
social composition of small scale groups for the efficiency of collective owner-
ship arrangements. This approach, which to a major extent builds on the work
of Elinor Ostrom, implicitly assumes that members of small communities are
80Note that this discussion has inspired Komlos and Landes (1991a) and Komlos and Lan-
des (1991b) to question the neoclassical approach to solving problems in economic history
brought forward by McCloskey. In this context see also the reply of McCloskey (1991a).
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in the position to collectively shape and design regulations in a way that allows
for a reduction of transaction costs and an elimination of all those detrimental
effects that are usually believed to arise under collective ownership. The sec-
tion continues by drawing parallels between Ostrom’s work and the ideas of
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Weitzman (1974b) that relate to the efficiency of
other than market and price based forms of economic organisation. The sec-
tion closes by summarising the aspects that foster the desirability of collective
ownership and by identifying the factors that lead small scale groups to choose
collective over private ownership.81
2.3.1 Transaction Costs and the Composition of Small Scale
Groups
There are many examples of collective ownership arrangements that have suc-
cessfully managed to organise and administer their common-pool resources in
an efficient way. Yet as there is probably an equally big number of collectively
owned resources that did not manage to maintain their resources efficiently, it
seems to be appropriate to ask for the causes that affect the chances of survival
for a common-pool resource positively. On the following pages I will identify
the theoretical conditions that will lead to an efficient setup of a collective own-
ership regime and apply these conditions to the example of the guidelines that
were adopted to regulate collective ownership in the community of Montan in
the years 1628 - 1850.
2.3.1.1 The Management of a Common Property Regime
Though there exist a vast number of interesting examples that describe suc-
cessful common property regimes all over the world,82 I analyse the manage-
ment of common-pool resources in the community of Montan in Italy. The rea-
81For one of the most recent contributions on the change in the perception of collective own-
ership and the tragedy of the commons see Berkes (2009).
82For an good but of course incomplete overview see Ostrom (1990) and as nice examples the
work of Tang (1989) and Stevenson (1991). Further, consider the contribution of Bravo and
Marelli (2008),who describe the structure of high mountain irrigation systems in the Alpine
region.
64
2 The Survival of the Fittest
son for this does not lie in the fact that the processes to be described for Montan
and its three neighbouring communities Kalditsch, Pinzan and Glen, consti-
tuted outstanding examples of successful common property regimes. Rather,
it is the similarity of the present case study to hundreds of successful common
property regimes all over the Alpine region that offers the chance to receive a
detailed description of the conditions that stabilised collective ownership in so
many cases.83 This in turn offers the possibility to link the present case study
to more theoretical conditions on the nature of internal organisation.
Montan and its three neighbouring villages Kalditsch, Pinzon and Glen are
small communities in South Tyrol in Italy. They are situated close to the valley
of the river Etsch, approximately 20 kilometres south of the city of Bolzano.
As in most communities in that area the economic production had historically
consisted of growing crops, orcharding and animal husbandry. Further, the
setup of ownership rights in Montan and the other communities displays it-
self as a prime example for a quite common setup of ownership rights in pre-
industrial communities in the Alpine region. Yet, it might be useful to consider
this setup once again, although it was already introduced in in its basic aspects
in the case study of the lottery assignment of usus-fructus rights. Most com-
monly, private grounds in the communities had been utilised to grow crops
and vegetables, while the communal grounds in the settlements had been
utilised as pastures and forests, whereas the management of the collective re-
sources had been organised as a common property regime. As a consequence,
several regimentation had been applied to administer the collective land in
Montan and three smaller communities.84
83In this description I will rely to a great extend rely to the expositions of Stocker-Bassi (2003,
pp.436-439).
84Though historical accounts from this time are scarce, according to Stocker-Bassi (2003, p.
436), several indications point out that the guidelines had not been imposed by higher
state authorities, but had been developed independently in the course of the negotiations
between some of the inhabitants of the four villages. Note that in the 19th century the
higher administration in Bolzano, which had to decide on any changes in the ownership
structures, declined the request to divide the collectively owned pastures, meadows and
forests and transfer them into private ownership. The administration argued that those
forests in the community that had been owned privately, showed the worst signs of mis-
management. Since no reforestation had been carried out in the private forests, the private
ownership of the forests had never been more efficient than collective ownership.
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The respective regulations had, as Stocker-Bassi (2003) points out, been set
up quite autonomously without the influence of any external authority while
the setup and changing of the regulations followed a clearly specified political
process that can be described in the following fashion.
Every year, on the first Sunday in lent, the 51 owners of the common-pool
resources elected one member to serve as the Rigler in the community.85 The
85The number of the owners of the collective resource had been limited to 51 in the year 1595.
In the year 1775 this number was increased to 62.
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position of the Rigler, who served for a one year term, can best be interpreted
as a mayor who also had to carry out police duties. Immediately following
his election, the Rigler presented the community guidelines of the last year to
the present members of the assembly. Then the assembly discussed the local
scarcities and problems in the communities before they decided which regula-
tions were to be maintained and which were to be changed or abolished. After
the adjusted regulations had been recorded in the protocol of the Rigler, the
assembly closed with a ceremonial vow, which committed all members of the
community to stick to the regulations. From that point on the Rigler had been
responsible for the compliance of the community members to the regulations.
Further, in addition to his monitoring duties, the Rigler also had to enforce the
norms by collecting fines and to transfer the money to the community trea-
sury. During the year, most of the administrative work and the basic decisions
were not carried out by the full assembly of all farmers but by smaller commit-
tees. Since the middle of the 17th century, the respective committees - which
consisted either of 6 or 12 community members - decided on issues that oc-
curred during the course of the year.86 As the size of these committees had
been conditioned on the importance of the decision to be made, their introduc-
tion offered a fast an cost saving way of decision-making in those cases, where
the meeting of all members would have been not feasible. Yet, it is the con-
tent of the respective regulations which sheds light on the conditions for the
successful management and maintenance of a common property regime.
In the version of 1628, the guidelines included 23 paragraphs which reg-
ulated the use of the collectively owned land within the four communities.
While the first paragraphs of the official regulation regulate the official holi-
days in the communities by specifying the Christian duties of the community
members, 87 the subsequent paragraphs deal with the utilisation of all the col-
86In these downsized panels, the village of Montan always assigned 50% of the seats, while
the other three communities added one or two members from their village areas.
87Specifically, these paragraphs prescribed that on the day before Sundays and holidays, work
on the farmsteads and elsewhere had to be stopped by 4 pm to allow the workers to attend
services. Further, by dictating the dates for the mandatory pilgrimages to the churches
and chapels in the immediate environment of the four communities, the first article also
specified the duties of the 51 or, later, 62 owners to the resources.
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lective resources viz. the commons, the mountain pastures, the community
forests and the organisation of administrative issues in great detail. The regu-
lations can be classified into three groups that correspond to the regulations for
the use of the pastures and meadows, the utilisation of the communal forests
and the administrative problems.
The first group of rules refers the the cutting of trees in the villages and the
use of the communal forests. This starts with paragraph 2 which interdicts
the arbitrary cutting of oak trees on the community grounds. This prohibition
is justified by referring to the scarcity of these trees in the community area.
Further, this paragraph also constitutes that any cutting of the oaks is only to
be carried out by the community as a whole, which has the obligation to dis-
tribute the wood from the trees among the owners in a “honest” fashion. The
fourth paragraph regulates the cutting of timber even further and this is done
by prohibiting the cutting of any kind of fructiferous trees within the commu-
nity area by the payment of 2 Gulden. Finally, the regulations in paragraphs
11 - 15 also address the scarcity of forests and trees in the community by im-
posing several regulations on the cutting of timber: Here, a special prohibition
was put on the cutting of conifers and laburnum. Finally, the paragraphs spec-
ified a general ban on the sale of any firewood or other pieces of timber that
had been cut on the commons to people from outside the village sector.
The second group of rules regulates the use of the collective pasture and
meadow areas for the four communities. Paragraph 3 addresses the commu-
nal meadows and interdicts the mowing of bedding before the “next but one
day after the saints day of St.Andrew”. This keeps the peasants away from
the meadows until the 30th of November. In contrast, the paragraphs 5 - 9
regulate the utilisation of the pasture areas in the communities. First of all
these regulations determine that the grazing of sheep, cattle, goats and oxen
has to take place independently on different pasture areas. Further they also
specify the exact routes that have to be taken by the livestock to advance to
the commons. In addition to this, paragraph 5 also regulates the extent of the
Almzwang and the Hutzwang in Montan and the three smaller communities.88
88Note that Grass (1948, pp.11-34) points out that both Hutzwang and Almzwang constitute
popular communal compulsion rights in pre-industrial Alpine communities.
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In more detail, the Almzwang requires every community member to graze all
but two cows and the rest of his animals with the exception of the calves and
those animals that are required as an input to till the farmland on the high
mountain pastures or the commons. Furthermore, the Hutzwang forces every
community member to put his livestock under the custody of the communal
shepherd, who takes responsibility for the livestock until the day when the an-
imals return to the barn.89 Paragraph 6 can be regarded as a supplement to the
limitations in the fifth paragraph, since it regulates the keeping of a smaller
animals, such as sheep and swine, by specifying the respective pasture they
have to be kept on. Both paragraph 7 and 10 address the problem of negative
externalities to arise out of the pasturing of livestock in a very detailed fash-
ion. Though farmers were allowed to keep a limited number of livestock over
the summer only, it still had been necessary to prevent any damages to private
or communal grounds through this individual keeping of livestock. Hence
paragraph 7 established explicit liability rules which stated that any damage
to result out of the deliberate grazing of animals was to be punished by a fixed
amount of 1 Gulden for every piece of cattle and by the payment of 6 Kreuzer
for every piece of swine or sheep. Paragraph 10 regulates the keeping of swine
and keeps them away from the communal grounds, since these animals cause
severe damages to the ground. Finally, an important subset of the rules on the
use of the pastures is constituted by paragraph 8. This is because this para-
graph stated that the use of the common land for any but the direct personal
89Both the Hutzwang and the obligation to stick to a certain route to get to the pastures hint at
the problem of uncontrolled grazing, which had been likely to create negative externalities
to the fields and private property of the community members. Furthermore, note that ac-
cording to Stocker-Bassi (2003, p.437), the inhabitants of Kalditsch and Glen are discharged
from these obligations as long as they choose a pasture for their cattle and horses that is
situated further up the mountain side. Only in cases where they decided to use a pasture
situated below the level of altitude of their settlements, they had to stick to the regulations
of paragraph 5. However, even in this case there are several exceptions to the rule, since
farmers from Kalditsch are free to choose their way to the commons. Both of these exemp-
tions have economic reasons. First, since both villages are situated above the altitude of
Montan, the pastures further up the hillside can easily be employed by those communities
saving costs. However, since the number of inhabitants of both small communities is rather
low, there seems to be no necessity to prevent the pastures from excessive grazing. Further,
the right to choose a route on their own, also takes into account the geographical situation
of the communities. This is because it would clearly be inefficient to drive the cattle down
to Montan just to choose the “right way” up to the pastures.
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need of the community members was strongly interdicted. Here it is the aim
to prevent community members from enriching themselves at the expense of
the community. Furthermore, paragraph 8 prohibits the grazing of any live-
stock that did not belong to farmers from the communities. This prohibition is
further intensified on account of the rule that all of the livestock to be grazed
in the community was to be hibernated by its owner the year before it was put
on the commons.
Finally, the last group of regulations, the paragraphs 9 and 16 - 23 refer to ad-
ministrative issues viz. how to collect the fines from the community members,
how to distribute the money or the remuneration of the shepherds.90 Yet, more
importantly, it is the problem of provisioning communal work to maintain the
commons and other parts owned by the community which is addressed in
this last group of rules.91 As the owners of the community usually did not
contribute enough manpower to maintain the state of the commons, the para-
graphs 22 and 23 enforced that the communal offices had to be distributed
among a group of 16 farmsteads in every year and clearly regulated which
office had to be taken by which community.
2.3.1.2 The Composition and Governance of Peasant Communities
Apparently it is not the specific content of the community regulations such as
the prohibition to put pigs on the same pasture as cows but the information on
group composition and the interests of the community members that make it
worthwhile to analyse the rules.
Yet first of all, a more detailed analysis of the political process in Montan of-
fers the chance to see how the level of different forms of transaction costs had
been reduced in the four communities. First of all, monitoring and sanction-
ing related transaction costs had effectively been reduced since concentrating
power in the hand of the Rigler offered for a cheap and fast possibility to pun-
90Here, part of the money will be used to maintain the capital stock of the community, while
the rest of the money will be distributed among the community members.
91It seems that committing the community members to contribute to the maintenance of the
commons and ensuring that the public offices in the community remained occupied were
one of the most severe problems within the community of Montan. This seems close to the
problems that have been identified by Olson (1965b).
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ish community members in case of violating any of the regulations. Here, the
fixing of fees in the regulations also allowed for an effective way to enforce
norms without increasing the level of transaction costs.92 Furthermore, the es-
tablishment of community officials such as the Rigler or the shepherd also of-
fered a chance to reduce monitoring costs. However, probably more important
than this, it had been the comparatively small number of community members
that had been cohabiting in close vicinity to each other that reduced monitor-
ing costs through mutually observing each other.93 Furthermore, transaction
costs had also been reduced by the help of the downsized panels, since these al-
lowed for an effective way to reduce the number of the parties involved in the
negotiations on organisational problems. Finally, the freedom of action of an
political assembly that proceeded quite independently from external authori-
ties, reduced transaction costs by limiting problems with higher authorities.
As a second step, the analysis of the different regulations, offers the chance
to infer some further details on the general setup of the community. Here it
is once again the basic setup of the small community, which can be identified
to align the interests and the level of information within the social group. As
all of the owners of the common-pool resources in Montan stemmed from the
same geographical area, it is likely that the farmers shared equal level of in-
formation on the state of the collective resources or had been able to receive
information on the state of the resources at fairly low costs. This also reduced
information asymmetries since the close interaction in the villages aligned the
level of information; every farmer was aware of the effects special changes in
the regulations would have on the the state of the resources.
As a third aspect, a closer look at the regulations suggests that the mem-
bers of the assembly also shared similar long-term interests on the utilisation
of their resource, while they also managed to agree on the terms of utilisation.
Taking into account that several limitations on cutting conifers, laburnum or
fructiferous trees had been established in the community, this indicates that
92Though the Rigler had been responsible for the compliance to the norms, he could not act
independently, but had to give account of his actions at latest two months after his term
had been completed. This also allowed for an efficient monitoring of the monitor.
93In a somewhat different context this has also been noted by Posner (1980).
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the assembly accounted for local scarcities and this implies that a certain value
was placed on having a sufficiently high supply of trees in the future. This
form of flexibility and foresight also manifested itself in the evolution of the
guidelines. As any of the changes to the regulations had been codified in the
records of the Rigler, it is fairly easy to analyse how the communities dealt with
local scarcities. Once again it is not the specific content of the regulations but
the evolution of the norms that offers the interesting aspects.hence, the proto-
cols tell us that in 1680 the assembly abolished the prohibition to cut laburnum
on the community grounds; this suggests that the stock of these bushes had re-
covers in the community grounds and this made the perpetuation of the norm
dispensable.94
Finally, it is interesting to note that several regulations had been applied
to protect the whole community from the attempts of certain individuals to
enrich themselves at the cost of others. Remember that both the feeding of ex-
ternal livestock and the grazing of new livestock had been prohibited by the
community. Yet, if this would not have been the case, then every community
member would have had the incentive to add as many cattle to the commons
to increase its income at the cost of the others and therefore over-exploitation
would result. Further, the “hibernation constraint” helped to foreclose the pos-
sibility to buy cattle during the time of spring, feed them on the commons at
the cost of the community and then sell them at a higher price in fall had been
precluded to the community members.
These insights finally offer the opportunity to talk about the conditions that
allow a group to successfully establish a common property regime. Here it is
especially the composition of the respective social group that influences the
probability of successfully establishing a common property regime. This is
because the composition with respect to the number of members, the level
of information asymmetries or the interests of the group members affects the
level of transaction costs and the costs of establishing an organisation and the
94Note that these protocols can also be used as an indication of the discount rate of the com-
munity members. It seems that the members as a whole tried to secure the survival of their
resources in the long run.
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enforcement of property rights.95
Ostrom and Schlager (1996, pp.142-143) have identified several theoretical
conditions that link the level of internal governance costs to the composition
of a social group; this influences the likelihood of a group establishing a suc-
cessful common property regime by reducing the level of transaction costs.
Hence it should not come as a surprise that the identified conditions appear to
be very close to the considerations that have been inferred from the analysis of
the community guidelines in Montan. The respective conditions require that:
1. Accurate information about the condition of the resource and expected
flow of benefits and costs are available at low cost.
2. Participants are relatively homogeneous in regard to information and
preferences about the use of the resource.
3. Participants share a common understanding about the potential benefits
and risks associated with the continuance of the status quo as contrasted
with changes in norms and rules they could feasibly adopt.
4. Participants share generalised norms of reciprocity and trust that can be
used as initial social capital.
5. The group using the resource is relatively small and stable.
6. Participants do not discount the future at a high rate.
7. Participants have the autonomy to make many of their own operational
rules which if made legitimately, will not be interfered with, and even
potentially supported and enforced by, external (local, regional, and na-
tional) authorities.96
95Eggertsson (1990, p.265) refers to these costs as “internal governance costs”.
96This condition has also been emphasised by Eggertsson (1990, p.264). Yet, keeping in mind
the work of Ellickson (1991), who describes how arrangements can be stabilised although
they run in contrast to legislation, I believe that state opposition might not necessarily be
detrimental to the successful establishment of common property regimes.
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8. Participants use collective-choice rules that fall between the extremes of
unanimity or control by a few (or even bare majority) and thus avoid
high transaction or high deprivation costs.
9. Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and
sanctioning arrangements.
Apparently, all of the 9 conditions aim for a reduction of transaction costs, al-
though this is achieved by addressing different aspects of group cohesion. First
of all, conditions 1 and 2 reduce the likelihood of information problems and
while they further prevent the emergence of information asymmetries between
the participants, since this could lead to an increase in transaction costs.97 Con-
dition 3 also reduces the problem of information asymmetries by presuming
that the individual participants agree on the likely consequences of each of
their actions. Condition 4, similar to condition 2, addresses the homogene-
ity of the group by making sure that the cultural constraints that are faced by
all individuals are the same. This can also be understood as a condition that
reduces transaction costs by aligning non-formal institutional arrangements
such as cultural factors to each other: yet in combination with condition 5,
which postulates a small group size, this condition can be understood to re-
duce transaction costs arising out of both cultural differences and group size.
The sixth condition for an efficient establishment of a common property regime
makes sure that the participants have a sufficiently high incentive to maintain
their resources in the future, while the seventh condition allows for transaction
costs with higher authorities to be minimised through communal autonomy of
the group. Finally, the last two conditions directly address the issue of reduc-
ing negotiation costs at the collective choice level as well as the reduction of
transaction costs in establishing monitoring and enforcement of collective ar-
rangements.
The findings of this section suggest that the amount of transaction costs
within a village community can be effectively reduced by both appropriate
regulations and a special group composition; this will allow a group to estab-
97For a more detailed discussion of this topic in the context of the theory of the firm see
Williamson (1975, pp.20-41)
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lishing a common property regime. This is because the conditions imply that
both the objective function of the individuals and the overall constraints that
arise out of the cultural and environmental conditions will be alike.98 Further,
since the community members will also be better informed with respect to the
social and environmental constraints of their habitat this will, in addition to
the shared system of values and regulations and the long-term knowledge of
the resource, lead to the establishment of an efficient collective ownership sys-
tem by limiting coordination failure, reducing monitoring costs and easing the
opportunity to punish misbehaviour.99
2.3.1.3 Internal Organisation and Coordination by Quantities
So far, the chapter has approached the issue of common-pool resources
and successful common property regimes from a rather applied perspective.
Hence, in course of the last pages, the chapter has identified the conditions to
reduce the level of transaction costs in groups that aim to prevent the tragedy
of the commons. Yet it is also important to note that the work of Ostrom (1990)
and the identified conditions of Ostrom and Schlager (1996) can also be in-
terpreted by focusing on the replacement of a market mechanism by internal
organisation. Clearly, Ostrom’s idea of a successful common property regime
can be viewed from the perspective that private ownership and free market
exchange - which draw on the utilisation of the price mechanism - will lead to
undesirable and inefficient outcomes. This is because markets cannot function
well without a sufficiently high amount of competition and therefore its utili-
sation can cause severe problems in small groups. Hence it is exactly in such
cases of competition being flawed in small scale groups, where it becomes nec-
98Homogeneity in this context refers to the idea that the members of the groups will engage
in the same kind of profession, stem from the same are and have roughly the same level of
income and wealth.
99Note that these last explanations also have implications for the role of the state in our frame-
work. As theoretically, all tasks of the group could also be carried out by the state, condi-
tions 1- 9 imply that an external authority would most likely be less successful in establish-
ing a common-pool resource than a community. This is the case since on the community
level, asymmetric information will be reduced more quickly and also the enforcement of
regulations and the monitoring of the group members will on average be less costly, since
no external observers will be needed and more effective sanctions will be available.
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essary to replace the market exchange and the price mechanism by other co-
ordination forms to guarantee an efficient utilisation of a natural resource or
a common good. Though there apparently exist many different ways to ap-
proach this topic I will limit myself to the examination of the contributions of
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Weitzman (1974).
In his work, Williamson analyses the causes for the emergence of firms and
simultaneously seeks to explain why some transactions usually are carried out
over the market by the help of the price mechanism while others use means
of internal organisations that rely on hierarchies or authority to coordinate
economic activity.100 Williamson (1975, pp.20-40) hereby shows that the em-
ployment of markets in small number exchange situations will induce strate-
gic bargaining and opportunism of the parties participating in the exchange
or production process. The basic problem of the market mechanism in small
number exchanges presents itself as follows: As in such cases every partici-
pant of the exchange or the transaction could try to increase his own share of
the joint surplus by threatening to block the exchange through a withdrawal
from the agreement, several safeguards have to be installed to protect the func-
tioning of the market exchange under such conditions.101 This will increase the
amount of ex-ante transaction costs to reach the agreement and might eventu-
ally prevent the production of any production or exchange to take place.102 In
100Though Williamson is rather imprecise with respect to the way how coordination is carried
out in firms and other internal organisations, stating that internal coordination forms are
limited to the use of authority will certainly not do him justice. Rather, Williamson’s idea
also offers the opportunity to view behaviour in organisations to be coordinated directly by
job descriptions (Leibenstein, 1960), norms (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and custom (Schlicht,
1998, 2008). I will provide a more detailed analysis of the consequences to arise of these
coordination forms in the second part of this dissertation.
101The problem does occur in the case of small number situations, as rivalry among a large
number of market participants will render opportunistic behaviour ineffective. This is the
case since at the contract renewal interval, coalitions among the remaining market partici-
pants can be build to exclude the opportunist and arrange the more efficient way of market
transactions under competitive terms.
102Note that the characteristics of this sort of transaction costs are quite different from the “costs
of using the price mechanism” that have been identified in the seminal article of Coase
(1937, p.390). According to Williamson (1985, pp.20-21), ex-ante transaction costs “are the
costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement” while ex-post transaction
costs include “ the maladaption costs when transactions drift out of alignment [...]”, “the
haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments” and
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contrast, the utilisation of an internal organisation will yield a more efficient
outcome, since the employed form of internally coordinating transactions by
authority - implying that the participants have not the same liberty to with-
draw from an agreement as under a market system - can be expected to reduce
the bigger part of strategic behaviour and to economise on both ex-ante and
ex-post transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, p.29).103 Williamson offers three
different explanations regarding the advantages of internal organisation over
market coordination in constraining opportunistic behaviour. First, internal
organisation aggravates the formation of subgroups and therefore the oppor-
tunity to receive subgroup gains by behaving opportunistically will be lim-
ited. This will also reduce incentives to behave opportunistically.104 Second,
as behaviour in internal organisation can be monitored quite effectively, op-
portunistic behaviour will also be reduced.105 Third, there is also the possibil-
ity to settle disputes between the parties involved more effectively in internal
organisations.106
It is straightforward to see that these three advantages of internal organi-
sation can also be applied to interpret common property regimes as a form
of internal organisation, whose goal it is to protect a common-pool resource
from the harmful effects of opportunistic behaviour. Here, it is especially the
advantages of internal organisations in monitoring behaviour and in settling
disputes on account of the quasi-judicial functions of the organisation that can
be applied to Ostrom’s work. This is because one can easily imagine how the
low costs of monitoring and settling disputes will limit strategic behaviour
“ the setup and running costs associated with the governance structures. “.
103This view is also somewhat problematic, since it assumes economic behaviour in organi-
sations to be exogenous. Hence, it does not take into account that workers can also act
strategically in internal organisations and cause severe losses to firm profit. For a more
extensive critique see Gintis (1976) and - though in a different context - the efficiency wage
theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
104In addition, compensation schemes within business firms can be adjusted in a way to pro-
mote cooperation instead of opportunistic behaviour. This can easily be achieved by pre-
venting subgroups within business firms from keeping profits and tying compensation to
the profits of the whole company.
105According to Williamson (1975), this is because internal auditors will have more power to
investigate documents. They are therefore more likely to detect empty threads and other
forms of opportunistic behaviour than external auditors.
106This possibility emerges on account of the quasi-judicial functions of hierarchies.
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and reduce the costs of quarrels in a group of homogeneous farmers which
administer a common-pool resource. Here it is the political organisation of
the group which represents the quasi-judicial function and advantages of in-
ternal organisation. The description of the community assembly in Montan
and the respective regulations on the use of common-pool resources that were
described above can hereby serve as a prime example for the judicial power
of the organisation over its members. Furthermore, the advantage of internal
organisations in aggravating the attempts to bargain for individual subgroup
gains by threatening to withdraw from the collective organisation can also be
transferred to the case of common property regimes. Here, it is the collective
nature of ownership, which renders strategic bargaining ineffective.107 If a
person does not hold private ownership rights to a piece of land - this implies
that he has no right to transfer the land to alternative uses or other persons -
then any threat to withdraw from the agreement to bargain for a bigger share
of the joint surplus is not credible. In addition, it appears that the assumed
group homogeneity also contributes its share to reduce the problems of oppor-
tunistic behaviour in small number interactions; this reduces the likelihood of
subgroup formation in the beginning.
Note that as a second interpretation, it is also possible to link the manage-
ment of common property regimes and the choice between market activity and
internal organisation to the contribution of Weitzman (1974b). In this contribu-
tion, Weitzman analyses the question of what factors lead to the choice of im-
plementing the production of a desired commodity by the help of fixed quan-
tities and cost minimisation or by the help of prices and profit maximisation.
More specifically, Weitzman (1974b, p.477) formulates his research question in
the following fashion:
“For one particular isolated economic variable that needs to be reg-
ulated [...], what is the best way to implement control for the benefit
of the organisation as a whole? Is it better to directly administer the
activity under scrutiny [by setting quantities to be produced] or to
107Dahlman (1980) makes a similar argument, emphasising that strategic behaviour of farmers
in the open-field system had been eliminated by the help of collective ownership. I will
expound this argument in section 2.3.2.
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fix transfer prices and rely on self-interested profit or utility max-
imisation to achieve the same ends in decentralized fashion?”
Yet in this contribution it is especially the result that planners with either a
high degree of risk aversion or the aim of producing commodities that involve
many production steps and intermediary products108 are more likely to choose
quantities over prices as a coordination form under uncertainty and imper-
fect information. Regarding the management of the common-pool resources
in Montan, these findings offer the opportunity to interpret the quantity re-
strictions such as the setting of upper limits on the extraction of trees from
the community forests as an efficient way to secure the maintenance of frag-
ile natural resources. Furthermore, one would also suggest that the setting of
prices as a coordination form would have created severe problems in such a
situation. Since the utilisation of prices and profit maximisation to coordinate
resource extraction can cause severe variations from the desired or optimal
level of extraction in cases where the shape of the benefit- and cost function
of the commodity are not known, quantities appear as a more conservative
and secure means to maintain the state of a resource since they allow for the
avoidance of “bad planning mistakes” (Weitzman, 1974b, pp. 485-486).109
108Consider the following example: given that the production of pins falls short of pinheads,
then much more then the value of some pins is lost, if the pins constitute an important
intermediate good for tuxedo production. This suggests the importance of providing the
exact amount of intermediary products to the production process and this implies that
planners are more likely to set quantities to organise pinhead production in this specific
example. This paraphrases Weitzman (1974b, p.487).
109It is also interesting to note that Weitzman (1974b, p.487) - though in a slightly different con-
text - emphasises that the comparative advantage of the quantity mode does not apply for
agricultural products such as food crops. Though at first glance, such a statement contra-
dicts the idea that the coordination of agricultural activity by quantities within common
property regimes had been efficient. Yet, this problem also unravels if one keeps in mind
that food crops had often been produced on private grounds while the commons had been
used to produce hay and graze cows. Accordingly, as both the production of hay and the
grazing of cows can be viewed as intermediary goods to the production of milk, cheese, or
meat, Weitzman’s predictions seem to be perfectly in line with the ideas of Ostrom (1990).
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2.3.2 The Desirability of Collective Ownership - A Tentative
Conclusion
In the course of this chapter, many different aspects that underline the desir-
ability of collective ownership structures have been introduced. This section
subsumes the findings of the previous ones and seeks to give a more compre-
hensive account of those factors that motivate groups to stick to the collective
ownership of natural resources. While this section does not offer any new in-
sights on the optimality of collective ownership forms, it offers an interesting
conclusion on the factors that determine this outcome. Yet before I start to re-
capitulate the factors that lead to an optimality of collective owners, I take the
liberty to offer some minor notes on agricultural production in the open-field
system. There are two reasons for doing this. First, many of the contribu-
tions that looked upon the beneficial aspects of collective ownership emerged
in the context of the open-field system and therefore it seems appropriate to
give a short overlook. Second, as the open-field system has not only domi-
nated pre-industrial agricultural production but also academic writing on this
topic, I consider it important to mention its basic properties in this disserta-
tion. Hence, it is not my intention to explain the existence of the open-field
system and its variations, but to describe and explain the arguments that have
been proposed to explain the optimality of collective ownership in this context.
The open-field system can be regarded as the most prominent agricultural
production system of the pre-industrialised period. Up to the end of the 18th
century, it had dominated vast past of northern Europe, including France,
Germany and the British Isles, though its existence had also been proved for
Switzerland and other parts of Europe.110 Although the characteristics of the
open-field system varied extensively over the centuries and differences in the
setup had occurred even at the village level, the major characteristics of a “typ-
ical open-field system” can be described as follows.111 The whole farmland in
110See Egli (1988) for a description of the open-field system in Switzerland, Homans (1941)
description of the open-field system in England and Hopcroft (1994) for an overview of
open-field agriculture in pre-industrial Europe.
111I am aware of the problems that result from the aim of displaying a system as diverse as
the open-field system in a homogeneous way. However, as our ultimate goal is not to
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a prototype open-field settlement is divided into three big fields, which are
jointly used for the production of crops and the farming of livestock. Within
each of these three fields, private farmland is scattered into several little strips,
which are allotted all over the area without showing any obvious regularity.112
Apparently, this setup created several problems within the open-field commu-
nities, since the scattering amplified the negative externalities of agricultural
production.113 Hence - to reduce these externalities - a forced crop rotation was
installed within the communities. This meant that farmers were not allowed to
employ their fields at will and produce whatever they liked; rather, they had
to stick with the crop that had been predetermined by the community assem-
bly.114 In general, the crop rotation within the open-field system proceeded
as follows: on every field the production switched between the cultivation of
winter cereals such as wheat or rye, the cultivation of summer cereals such as
barley and a fallow period.115 Hence, within every community only 23 of the
farmland available was used for the production of crops, while the last 13 re-
mained fallow. However, though not being utilised for the production of grain,
the fallow fields served as a means of increasing production through the keep-
ing of livestock. In addition it should be noted that in most cases the keeping
of livestock was carried out collectively in three different ways. First, pastur-
ing took place on the commons.116 Secondly, the fallow field was applied, and
give an explanation of all the properties of the open-field system but to show the efficiency
enhancing aspects of collective ownership, I believe that the present approach is justified.
112This implies that - in addition to the private property of every farmer being scattered across
the three fields - the private property of every farmer is also scattered within each field.
Therefore privately owned farmland did not constitute a contiguous area in open-field
villages. For an extensive description of the scattering of private farmland in an Austrian
village, see Zöhrer (1965).
113In such a setup, the land of other farmers has to be crossed to work on the own land.
114This reduced the level of externalities since the alignment of production periods made it less
likely that some farmer would destroy the unripe crops of his neighbour in the course of
harvesting the crops on his private fields.
115More specifically, the sowing of winter cereal took place in fall and the crops were harvested
in August. Then the field remained fallow till the spring of the next year, when the cultiva-
tion shifted to summer cereals (barley), which were harvested in the summer of the same
year. Finally, the field remained fallow until the fall of the following year, when cultivation
of winter cereals started anew.
116Again, the commons usually consisted of a contiguous area of land, where, under certain
conditions, community members had been allowed to graze their livestock under the cus-
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thirdly, after the harvest the stubble fields on the privately owned strips in the
three big fields were also utilised. Yet to secure the third form of grazing, sev-
eral precautions had to be implemented. This was carried out by imposing the
collective obligation to open one’s fields for collective pasturing in the time be-
tween harvest and sowing. This obligation was imposed on the farmers in the
communities, meaning that private ownership only existed temporarily, when
collective pasturing did not take place.117
Apparently, this short description of the characteristics of the open-field sys-
tem offers several puzzling facts such as the persistence of collective owner-
ship, the collectivisation of private farmland, or the joint occurrence of scat-
tered private farmland and a forced crop rotation; yet on the following pages
I will return to the basic aim of this section which is to display the positive
aspects of collective ownership structures.
I start by looking at the extensively cited and criticised contribution of Carl
Dahlman (1980) who constructs a very sophisticated argument to prove the
efficiency of collective over private ownership in the open-field system.118
Dahlman starts by emphasising the importance of keeping livestock for eco-
nomic production in open-field communities. He notes that - although it
would have been possible to organise the grazing of livestock individually-
tody of the communal shepherd.
117Note that two of the the major economic contributors - which are McCloskey (1972), Mc-
Closkey (1975), Dahlman (1980), and McCloskey (1991b) - have put a strong emphasis on
the explanation of the scattering of private farmland and the dissolution of collective own-
ership that occurred in course of the enclosure movement(s). However, both explanations
of scattering seem to be problematic. Dahlman (1980), who emphasises the positive aspects
of scattering for group cohesion, has been criticised on account of the missing relation to the
historic facts. Further, McCloskey (1975) who, as I have already pointed out, emphasises
the positive aspects of scattering in providing insurance to the peasant population, has
been criticised for disregarding or misinterpreting other forms of insurance. For a detailed
and enlightening discussion I once again refer to Komlos and Landes (1991a), McCloskey
(1991a) and Komlos and Landes (1991b) as well as the contributions of Fenoaltea (1976)
and Fenoaltea (1988).
118Note that Dahlman’s study has been widely criticised by scholars of economics, anthro-
pology and history for his unhistorical and sometimes counterfactual description and ex-
planation of the medieval open-field system. Apparently, in this study there exist several
problems with the role of the local sovereigns, whose importance has been underestimated
by Dahlman. Yet in spite of the fact that Dahlman’s argument might be to unspecific to ex-
plain the problems of open-field agriculture, in my eyes the argument itself is very helpful
to display the advantages of collective ownership forms.
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the collective organisation of keeping livestock was preferable to the individ-
ualistic approach. Here the most obvious explanation for this claim relates to
the economies of scale that can be realised through the collective keeping and
the supervision of the cattle through a shepherd. Furthermore, on collectively
owned land, as Furubotn and Richter (1998, p.102) point out, economies of
scale emerge not only from collective keeping of livestock but also on account
of other reasons. It is Ellickson (1993, p.1332), who argues for a different cause
of economies of scale by noting that
“[...] the costs of fencing and other forms of perimeter monitoring
drop per acre enclosed.”
In a similar fashion, Dahlman (1980, p.116) emphasises that the costs of mon-
itoring will be lower under collective ownership. Under private ownership,
every owner would have to take care of supervision and monitoring himself,
while under collective ownership, the community would have the chance to
save on the costs by jointly preventing people from crossing or accessing the
smaller parcels of private land.119
Another advantage of joint activity and collective action emerges on account
of the transaction costs that develop in the course of negotiating an agreement.
In section 2.2.2.3, Demsetz (1967) argued that negotiations between the pri-
vate owners of smaller pieces of land would yield lower levels of transaction
costs than those negotiations that would take place if the respective pieces of
land were owned collectively without parcelling. The parcelling of a big re-
source into a large number of privately owned small fields was identified to
be optimal in the case of small events or individually created externalities,
since then the parties that are not affected could be left out of the negotiations
and this will apparently reduce transaction costs.120 Accordingly, if the cow of
one farmer tramples on the favourite daisies of his neighbour, under this form
of private ownership, the opportunity to negotiate between two individuals
to deal with this externality reduces costs, while under collective ownership
119Of course this positive aspect only emerges if the natural resource is so large that a single
owner could not enforce exclusivity.
120This has also been noted by Demsetz (1967, pp.356-357).
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the necessity to call for the assembly of farmers would increase transaction
costs.121 But - as already addressed - transaction costs do not only depend
on the number of parties involved but also on the the extent of the events on
which the negotiations between the different parties take place.122 Yet, in the
case of large events, catastrophes such as floods or fires, the private ownership
structure will be likely to increase transaction costs. Given that all owners of
farmland in the same geographic area are affected by the catastrophe, mutual
negotiations between all parties involved would clearly be time consuming
and increase negotiation costs. Hence, in this case it may be much more fea-
sible to take care of the situation within a bigger, collective framework. Here
- just as in the case study on common property in Montan - collective owner-
ship in addition to an organisational framework would allow for a reduction in
transaction costs. This is because the organisational setup would offer the ad-
vantage to negotiate within a well-established organisational framework; the
application of certain rules and norms in the organisation reduces negotiation
costs.123
Finally the last potentially positive aspect of joint activity I wish to discuss
relates to the possibility to spread individual risk among many participants or
users of the same resource. Ellickson (1993, p.1341) hints at this positive and
desirable aspect of group ownership, by stating that
“ [a] sole landowner bears the entire risk that his land will be
damaged, devaluated or unproductive. Group ownership, by con-
trast, pools risk. Because more individuals are risk-averse, the risk
spreading feature of group property is advantageous - even deci-
sive in certain situations.”
Once again, group ownership might be beneficial to a community in those
121McKean (1996, p.230) also points out that collective ownership in the form of a common
property regime is more efficient when it comes to dealing with large units, whereas large-
ness in her study refers to both the size of the resource unit and the size of the organisation.
Yet this is just a more explicit statement for the findings of economies of scale and the ne-
gotiation costs argument we have presented above.
122This has also been noted by Ellickson (1993, p.1332).
123Note that Demsetz (1967, p.357) also acknowledges that collective ownership may be useful
in the case of larger events.
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cases where the existence of more than one member of a community is threat-
ened by some external event. Hence if a farmer holds only one piece of private
land and this is destroyed by a catastrophe, then the existence of the owner
will be highly jeopardised, while by relying on collective property and col-
lective economic activities, risk could be spread among all members. Under
the condition of not all of the farmland within the respective community be-
ing destroyed by the catastrophe, this would be done by guaranteeing every
community member at least some output as a minimum income from the com-
munity grounds.124
However it is important to note that any of the described advantages of
group activity such as joint grazing or bigger areas to be enclosed do not nec-
essarily require the presence of collective ownership. Apparently, it would -
at least from a theoretical point of view - also be possible for a community
to realise the joint surplus by keeping the private ownership to the respec-
tive pieces of farmland and agree to allow for the grazing of the communities’
livestock. Dahlman (1980, pp.116-119) analyses this problem likewise expos-
ing that under both ownership forms, the establishment of collective pasturing
would have been possible by introducing some form of institutional arrange-
ment.125 Both under collective and private ownership there is no need to call
for a full assembly of all owners to a resource, since the implementation of
downsized panels and committees would offer the chance to reduce negotia-
tion costs. As such institutional arrangements would most likely take a similar
form, Dahlman further suggests that a comparison between the efficiency of
both systems can only be carried out by looking at the level of transaction
costs under both regimes. Here hereby points out that transaction costs would
be much lower under a system of collective ownership compared to the pri-
124However, there also exist various costs that are associated with the establishment of col-
lective ownership, implying that this form of insurance or risk-spreading is likely to be
employed only in those cases where other forms of insurance are not present. Once again,
in line with the property rights theory, one would expect this form of risk spreading to
vanish as soon as there are more efficient ways to secure a similar outcome.
125This would be the case since with the help of such an organisation, collective grazing could
be achieved smoothly without the necessity to fall back on recurrent negotiations between
the farmers.
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vate ownership solution.126 This argument can be explained if one keeps in
mind that every organisation that wants to accomplish the task of reducing
transaction costs necessarily needs to be endowed with some power. Other-
wise the organisation will be nothing more than a paper tiger since it cannot
enforce regulations or claims. Accordingly, some form of empowerment has
to be guaranteed and this will usually be achieved by transferring individual
rights to the organisation. Hence, if collective grazing is optimal for all farm-
ers, one can assume that every farmer has an incentive to limit himself and
transfer some of his ownership rights to the organisation. However, though
every farmer may benefit from doing so, this does not rule out the possibility
that some private owners may look for a possibility to further increase their
personal advantages by bargaining for a higher share of the joint surplus. Since
under private ownership any transfer of property rights to the organisation
would be voluntary in the sense that such a procedure would likely involve
the temporary transfer of an usus-fructus right to the organisation, every farmer
could threaten to withdraw the rights he has transferred to the organisation.
Given that there exist increasing returns to keeping livestock or monitoring ac-
cess to farmland, a farmer could cause serious harm by withdrawing his rights
from the organisation (Dahlman, 1980, p.119). Yet this improves the bargaining
position of every owner and hence every farmer, solely by imposing the threat
to withdraw from the institutional arrangement, can be assumed trying to im-
prove his own position by being bribed by the other community members to
stick to the agreement.127 While under private ownership this would increase
transaction costs on account of the circular bribing, under collective ownership
this sort of strategic behaviour would clearly be averted. This is because under
such a system, the rights will be owned by the organisation itself and thus no
farmer will have the opportunity to make a credible threat to withdraw from
the agreement. This clearly reduces transaction costs and leads to a superiority
of collective over private ownership.128
126As bargaining between all the farmers involved would be very costly one can assume that
institutional arrangements such as a village assembly or a simple system of majority vote
will replace individual bargaining and therefore economise on negotiation costs.
127Once again this is the problem of using threats as revenue generators.
128Hence, the collective ownership of farmland can also be interpreted as a means to constrain
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Finally, these insights offer the possibility for a tentative conclusion on the
desirable aspects of collective ownership structures. Interestingly it appears
that neither of the three presumed disadvantages of collective ownership - the
lack of transferability, the infeasibility of exclusion, and the incomplete assign-
ment of property rights - appear in the described way or lead to the described
negative consequences. While a major part of this chapter has argued that the
infeasibility of exclusion and the lack of universally assigned property rights
are characteristic for the open access and not for the common property case,
the lack of or more precisely the limited transferability of ownership rights
in common property regimes cannot be denied. However, though this ap-
parently constitutes a “ violation” of Posner’s efficiency criteria, I believe that
this “weakness” of collective ownership in some cases constitutes its major ad-
vantage over private ownership. Apparently, the implementation of the listed
advantages of joint activity and collective action would be aggravated by the
development of ex-ante transaction costs. Hence, the lack of transferability
reduces the opportunities the use threats as revenue generators and also im-
pedes transaction costs that would otherwise emerge out of the bargaining
on a higher share of the joint surplus. This adds positively to the likelihood
of maintaining beneficial forms of collective ownership. This suggests that
though from an individual point of view the transferability of land, the flex-
ibility of organisation or the freedom of action may turn out to be beneficial,
too much of them will be detrimental to welfare and the aims of a group.
opportunistic behaviour by the help of establishing forms of internal organisation to coor-
dinate joint production activities. Once again, the reference is Williamson (1975, 1985). In
another part of this dissertation I will use a somewhat similar idea to show how constraints
in transferability of both collective and private ownership can serve to maintain the eco-
nomic functioning of a small scale group and how this will lead to side-effects such as the
conservation of minority languages.
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2.4 The Bad Reputation of Collective Ownership
Reconsidered
While the previous sections have directly approached the question of what
conditions determine the efficiency of an ownership arrangement, the content
of this one is somewhat different. In this section I show that the popular mis-
conception of collective ownership leading to less efficient outcomes in general
was also a major factor in the discussion on the dissolution of collective own-
ership forms in earlier periods. Though so far, the chapter may have conveyed
the impression that the negative evaluation of collective land ownership had
been a product of the economic contributions that emerged in the second half
of the 20th century, this is certainly not the case. According to Wopfner (1997,
p.28), the idea that private ownership might be more useful for agricultural
productivity than collective ownership had been a major factor in the contro-
versy on agricultural reforms in Bavaria and Tyrol in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies.129 As a consequence, several authors have addressed the bad state of
the private fields and the commons and identified the well known problems of
collective ownership and the pasturing servitude as the culprits. Once again I
argue that such an explanation is problematic. Though I do not claim that all of
the negative aspects of collective ownership were disarmed by successful com-
mon property regimes, I offer an additional explanation that is in line with the
property rights theory: this explanation accounts for chances in production
technology and does not build on the presumably negative characteristics of
collective ownership forms. I therefore argue that the bad reputation of collec-
tive ownership stems from wrongly attributing negative aspects to collective
ownership forms that refer to other factors. Hence, in the remaining part of this
chapter I argue that the dissolution of collective ownership forms in Bavaria
did not emerge on account of the aim to introduce a more efficient ownership
system but due to the aim to introduce a more efficient production technol-
129It is also interesting to note that most of today’s theoretical arguments that favoured private
forms of ownership over collective forms had been antedated by an intense political and
economic discussion on the disadvantages of collective ownership that took place in the
18th and 19th centuries.
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ogy. This reduced the economic necessity to maintain collective ownership in
pastureland and led to the introduction of private ownership in farmland and
meadows.
2.4.1 The Historical Dissolution of Collective Ownership in
Bavaria
It is interesting to note that although the transfer of collective into private own-
ership had constituted a common feature of the development in agricultural
production since the Middle Ages, the bad reputation of collective ownership
only emerged at the end of the 18th century (Zückert, 2003, p.298).
In Bavaria, the first legal norm that included the transformation of collective
to private ownership dates back to an early version of the Bayerisches Landrecht
from the year 1346. Yet, in this context the Bayerisches Landrecht - which had
been the legal codification up to the establishment of the Codex Maximilianeus
Civilis in the 18th century in Bavaria - did not impose a legal directive to trans-
fer collectively owned land to private ownership; quite to the opposite this
early legal norm provided a legal guideline for the establishment of private
ownership in general and can therefore be interpreted as a safeguard to pro-
tect collective ownership structures from being arbitrarily dissolved through
the establishment of private claims and ownership rights (Wismüller, 1904,
pp.5-7).130 Only in 1648, shortly after the end of the 30 Years War did the first
Bavarian law that aimed at a dissolution of collective ownership rights emerge.
Back then, as a consequence of the destruction of the war, many farmsteads in
Bavaria remained vacant, while simultaneously a great area of farmland also
remained fallow and unproductive. Hence it was the lack of peasants which
made a reoccupation and intensive utilisation of these farmsteads problematic
and therefore most of the corresponding land had been transferred to the col-
lective ownership of the communities, which employed the fields as pastures
for the community’s livestock (Wismüller, 1904, pp. 5-13). The Bavarian gov-
ernment, however, which aimed to improve both agricultural output and its
tax income, had been eager to change the problematic state of Bavarian agricul-
130This also holds true for its later versions from 1468, 1518, and 1553.
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ture. Therefore, in 1649, 1651 and 1669, it dispensed several decrees to increase
the production of crops and to encourage the private take-over of these farms
by soldiers and other people who had been inexperienced in farming. Though
this certainly constituted a turning point in legislation since these norms en-
couraged the dissolution of collective ownership structures for the first time, it
appears that neither of these attempts emerged out of the conviction that col-
lective ownership was of lower efficiency than private ownership. Rather, it
appears that the decrees were enacted to support the aim of the Bavarian gov-
ernment to re-privatise farms that had lately been collectivised by the com-
munities and to earn income from it.131 This had also been the case in later
periods. In the 18th century the dissolution of communal farmland in Bavaria
had served as an effective and popular way to create income for the state and
the sovereign. Especially after the catastrophe of the Austrian occupation from
1706-1715, which evolved out of the Bavarian and French loss in the conflict on
the succession to the Spanish crown to the Austrian forces, there had been sev-
eral attempts to fill the treasury of the Bavarian administration by selling land
under collective ownership to farmers as private property (Wismüller, 1904,
p.6).
Only around the year 1750 and as a consequence of the enclosure movement
in England and the technological change from outdoor to indoor keeping of
livestock, did the political debate on the dissolution of collective ownership
forms in Bavaria change; this was the time when the transfer into private own-
ership was justified for the first time by referring to the negative consequences
of collective ownership types. Zückert (2003, pp.296- 302), without giving any
more detailed reference, refers to the work of the cameralist J.H.G von Justi
in 1754 - 1756 as the first contribution to emphasise that all of the collectively
owned land should be transferred into private ownership since it had been
responsible for the bad state of the Bavarian and Austrian agricultural produc-
tion in the second half of the 18th century. Here the similarity between more
modern statements on the problems of collective ownership and the statement
131The intention behind this effort was to bring back land to cultivation and increase the tax
income for the government.
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of von Justi is striking: 132
“ It is possible to make the general statement that all those parts of
land which belong to the ownership of the communities or to a big-
ger number of people, will always be used to a smaller degree than
those areas that constitute the special property of a private person.
Nobody takes care of ameliorating or of cultivating the state of a
resource which can be utilised by so many others; and while every-
one hastens to draw at least some use from the common object, this
will finally cause that nobody will quite gain any use from it.”
Apparently von Justi believes that the collective ownership structure of the
commons did not provide a sufficiently strong incentives to provide for an effi-
cient utilisation of the commons and therefore the productivity of the farmland
declined.133 Furthermore, it is not only the lack of contributing to the mainte-
nance of the natural resources but also the problem of over-exploitation that is
mentioned by von Justi to justify his claim of transferring the commons into
private ownership.134 Finally by presuming that every farmer will put more
emphasis to the care of his own property than to the care of collective own-
ership, von Justi closes his pleading for the privatisation of the commons and
emphasises that collective ownership forms can never yield equally efficient
results as a system of private ownership.
Though von Justi was the first to consider it the primary responsibility of
the government to improve the state of agriculture by transferring as much
land into private ownership as possible, he certainly has not been the only one
to argue for a general abolishment of collective ownership forms and the col-
lective pasturing on private land. Around the same time, a similar opinion
132I take this citation from Zückert (2003, p.298), though the translation is my own. Note that
there is some confusion with respect to the year of publication of von Justi’s contribution,
since Wopfner (1997, p.27) refers to the respective contribution of von Justi as dating from
the year 1760.
133This appears to antedate the work of Olson (1965b), who also pointed out that under a
system of collective ownership, no community member would voluntarily contribute a
sufficient amount of work to maintain the functioning of the collectively owned fields.
134As von Justi also identifies the non-exclusivity of communal ownership as the basic problem
of collective ownership, this could also be interpreted in the sense of the tragedy of the
commons.
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of private farmland being detrimental to technological progress in agriculture
was brought forward by Sternbach (1767), who almost literally emphasised the
same aspects as von Justi. In the same fashion as von Justi (1760), Sternbach
(1767) believed that any improvement of the state of agriculture necessarily de-
pended on the introduction of a system of private ownership.135 Even more,
the existence of the common fields, the common meadows and the common
pasture areas all have been criticised on account of collective ownership lead-
ing to over-exploitation, underinvestment and other severe damages to natural
resources (Zückert, 2003, p.303). Furthermore, Zückert (2003, p.302) refers to
Krünitz (1773), who addresses the problems of collectively owned land in gen-
eral and the servitude on the private land in particular. In this context, Krünitz
(1773) states that there is nothing more dangerous and more detrimental to
the welfare of the state than the confinement of property, since any constraint
above the level that is needed to maintain the “general order” will lead to a sit-
uation to be characterised by “phlegm” and “doziness”. Hence, the bad state
of the privately owned fields was also believed to develop as a result of collec-
tive ownership forms, since the pasturing servitude was believed to destroy all
incentives to improve the private land. This has also been noted by von Mersi
(1769, p.80) who strongly advocates for instant abolishment of the pasturing
servitude on the fallow fields in the community farmland, since - according
to his view - only this would allow the farmers to individually decide on the
production strategy to be employed and allow them to balance the growing of
crops and the production of hay to feed the livestock in a satisfactory way.
Finally, the change in the perception of collective ownership did not only
show itself in the opinions of the scholars but also in the legal statutes that
aimed for a dissolution of collective ownership in the second half of the 18th
century. In Bavaria, which, as one of the first states in Germany, introduced a
systematic legislation to transfer collective into private land, the statute from
the 24th of March 1762 clearly pointed at the missing productivity of the com-
mons in most communities and includes several orders to solve this problem
135Similarly, the work of Johann Christian Schubart (1734-1787) is, according to the contribu-
tion of von der Goltz (1902, p.359) on the history of German agriculture, characterised by
the general opinion that collective ownership forms are detrimental to agricultural produc-
tivity.
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(Wismüller, 1904, p.24).136
2.4.2 On Clover, Vetch and Technological Change
Though I do not oppose that the addressed problems of collective ownership
may have caused problems with the state of agriculture in some cases, I still
believe that several other factors - such as the lack of experienced farmers -
also reduced the productivity of agriculture. These factors did only indirectly
relate to collective ownership forms and hence I suggest that the bad reputa-
tion of collective ownership structures in Bavaria in the 18th century did also
emerge as a consequence of these factors being wrongly attributed to collective
ownership.
The first factor that has likely contributed to the problematic state of agri-
culture in Bavaria and Tyrol and the bad reputation of the pasturing servitude
relates to the political structure in the 18th century. This explanation has al-
most entirely been neglected in the economic literature on the efficiency of
collective ownership systems in the pre-industrial period.137 This “forgotten
explanation” may be easier to understand if one keeps in mind that the bad
state of the Bavarian agriculture did not only prevail with respect to the com-
mons but also dominated on the private fields. As already stated, this was
most commonly justified by referring to the negative effects of the obligation
136Wismüller (1904, p.3) notes that in the German Empire on the due date of the 14th of June
1895, there were 12 492 communities which had been employing their commons in an un-
divided fashion. These commons had been shared by a total number of 429 468 farms. Out
of the total number of communities, 3 396 were situated in Bavaria and these commons had
been shared 14 327 farms. Further, in the German Empire there had been 12 386 communi-
ties with undivided communal forests that had been shared by 510 846 farms. In Bavaria,
the numbers had been considerably smaller, at 3 187 communities shared by 145 465 farms.
Finally, in the German Empire, only 8 560 communities had transferred their commons to
the private ownership of 382 833 farms, while in Bavaria the respective numbers had been
1136 communities and 44 789 farms.
137I identify several reasons for this decline in productivity. I have already noted in section 2.4
that, after 1648, huge parts of the agricultural land had remained fallow as a consequence
of the population decline after the Thirty Years War and the corresponding shortage in
manpower and as consequence, these areas had been utilised as pastures. Of course, as
a consequence of the decrease in cultivated areas, the production of grain and other field
crops also declined. This reduction had been further aggravated on account of the fact that
several farms had been handed over to inexperienced farmers such as formers soldiers.
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to open the private fields for the community’s livestock. As the grazing of the
livestock took place on both the stubble and the fallow fields in the village
farmland, this was believed to have reduced the incentives of the private own-
ers to improve the condition of their private farmlands. Though it is certainly
right that this obligation might have played a role with respect to the state of
the farmland, yet it certainly did not play a role with respect to the bad state of
the capital stock i.e. the farmsteads.138
Note that before the 19th century, hardly any of the “private farmland” had
been owned privately in Bavaria. Rather, under the feudal system before the
19th century most of the “private” farmland had been granted as a fiefdom
from different parts of the feudality to the peasant farmers and as a conse-
quence there are at least three factors which also reduced the incentives and
possibilities to improve agricultural production and the state of the capital
stock.139 First of all, the obligation to hand over a certain percentage (usually
10) of the yearly harvest to the feudal lord reduced the privately realised re-
turn from a greater harvest and hence the incentive to add to the productivity
of the land. Second and probably more important, some of the conditions un-
der which a fiefdom could be granted did not guarantee the farmer an unlim-
ited right of usus-fructus.140 This implied that although the farmer had been
responsible for the maintenance of the land, his property rights in the land
had been limited. Hence, under certain circumstances, the lords could take a
bigger share from the peasants or take the whole fiefdom back. Though there
obviously existed certain limitations to reduce the power of the lord, there also
remained a certain degree of uncertainty on whether a farmer who had been
making improvements to his land would be the one to benefit from his efforts.
Finally, and equally neglected as the other two factors, one has to keep in mind
that the granting of land as a fiefdom was tied to a special form of tax payment
from the farmer to his liege lord. This form of payment, called the Laudemium
138This has also been emphasised by Wismüller (1904).
139It is interesting to note that the influence of feudality has been widely neglected in the as-
sessment of the causes of the problematic state of agricultural production.
140This had been the case for the so called Freistiftrecht. This implied that the lord had the right
to withdraw the fiefdom from the farmer at will. For a more detailed discussion see Lütge
(1949, pp. 79-94).
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had the form of a tribute that had to be given to the lord, each time the holder
of the land changed. Hence if a farmer died and one of his sons wished to
continue cultivating the land, the son was obliged to make a payment to the
lord. Yet the crucial part in this system is that the amount of the payment was
positively correlated to the value of the fiefdom to be granted. Accordingly, a
farmer who considered improving the state of his land or farm at his own costs
would have to take into account that in the case of his death, his descendants
would have to pay a higher tribute to the lord - increased on account of his
own effort and costs (Lütge, 1949, p.42). Accordingly, every improvement to
the private farmland would clearly disadvantage the successor on the farm by
increasing the amount of tribute, meaning that only the lords would be able to
gain from the improvement added to their property. Apparently, under such
conditions, the aim to improve the production opportunities of the farmers on
their own costs was greatly reduced and this might also have contributed to
the bad state of agriculture in Bavaria in the 18th century.
As a second explanation for the bad reputation of collective ownership struc-
tures both today and in the 18th century, I suggest that old production tech-
nologies that were linked to collective ownership rather than collective own-
ership itself was responsible for the problems in agriculture. Hence, I con-
sider it important to analyse the efficiency of collective ownership against the
background of a change in agricultural production technologies. Note that in
Bavaria, Austria and other parts of the European continent the old production
form of keeping the livestock on the pastures was - as a result of the success
of the enclosure movement in England - increasingly judged as old-fashioned,
backward and inefficient in the second half of the 18th century. At the outset
of the 18th century several changes had constituted the basis for a switch from
the outdoor- to the indoor keeping of livestock. Here it had been the increase
in population numbers that allowed for the switch to a more labour intensive
production mode in addition to the insight that higher yields could be attained
by keeping the livestock away from the pastures and using the pastures for the
growing of clover, vetch and other forage crops, which increased agricultural
production to a great extent.141 This was because the growing of forage crops
141Furthermore, the cultivation of forage crops also offered the advantage of contributing to a
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provided sufficient amounts of fodder to allow for the animals to be kept in
the barn for most of the year. The advantages of this change can be described
as follows. The indoor keeping allowed for a higher amount of dung to be
utilised as a fertiliser for the crop fields and this also increased the output of
the private fields in the long run, allowing for a higher supply of food (Zückert,
2003, p.298).142 Further, as the animals were kept in the barn for most of the
year, indoor keeping also reduced the likelihood of accidents while it also in-
creased the production of dairy products and meat.143 I therefore suggest that
in the presence of the new production opportunities, the old extensive sys-
tem appeared less appealing to the advocates of agricultural progress and it is
therefore understandable why many governments aimed for the introduction
of these new techniques. This had two consequences. First of all, it required
the abolishment of the pasturing servitude, while second the change in utili-
sation from pastures to meadows also led to the dissolution of the commons
and other forms of collective ownership. This is also confirmed by Wopfner
(1997, pp.278-291) who, citing the work of Kembter (1769, p.18), reports that
the opponents of the commons initially argued for their dissolution only to re-
duce the areas for outdoor keeping and force the farmers to switch to indoor-
keeping.
Interestingly, the claim that changes in the use of land will also lead to
changes in the ownership structure can also be explained from the perspec-
tive of the property rights theory. The argument I will present here is very
short, since I have already explained that the economies of scale inherent in
the joint keeping of livestock made it necessary to prevent opportunistic be-
haviour by the help of collective ownership forms. Hence, as there hardly were
any economies of scale to be realised in the harvesting of forage crops, it was
the shift from indoor keeping of animals which rendered it useless to secure
higher degree of productivity by adding nitrogen to the soil.
142Zückert (2003, p.296) also describes this switch and also emphasises the back-then prevailing
tendency to reduce the production of livestock in favour of the production of crops to allow
for an increase in the population.
143However, to switch to this more intensive mode of production, it is obviously necessary to
provide a sufficient amount of manpower and to guarantee a sufficient provision of fodder
during the whole year.
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collective pasturing and hence there was no further need to maintain collective
ownership forms. This can also be interpreted along the lines of the theory of
the firm, the problem of efficient boundaries and the transaction cost minimis-
ing requirements that may evolve out of the different utilisation of land. In this
context Ellickson (1993, pp.1132-1135) notes that most commonly, there exists
an optimal size in economic activity, beyond which it may be more efficient
for producers to shift from “internal hierarchy” to the employment of exter-
nal coordination mechanisms that depend on private ownership forms. If one
perceives agricultural land as a production facility, then one can also expect
that a change in production will imply changes in the (dis-)economies of scale
and this will also influence the different forms of transaction costs. Therefore
to minimize these costs a new, better adjusted organisational form is likely to
be established.144 As the optimal size of the organisational form relates to the
size of the land to be employed for production purposes, it is the costs of main-
taining the respective organisations which determine organisational forms and
ownership structures. Apparently this depends heavily on the sort of produc-
tion that is carried out. While the optimal scale for the outdoor keeping of
livestock might be rather big on account of the cattle straying on the pasture,
there is no need to maintain such complex ownership structures and optimal
organisational forms for the growing of clover and vetch. Hence, a change in
production from outdoor to indoor keeping that is accompanied by a change in
the utilisation of the commons from pasturing to the growing of forage crops
is likely to go hand in hand with a switch in production costs and therefore
with a reduction of the perimeters of an organisation. Demsetz (1967, p.358) in
this context notes the following:
“The greater are diseconomies of scale to land ownership the more
will contractual arrangement be used by the interacting neighbors
to settle these differences. Negotiating and policing costs will be
compared to costs that depend on the scale of ownership, and
parcels of land will tend to be owned in sizes which minimize the
sum of these costs [...]”.
144This aspect is of course also closely related to the ideas of Coase (1937).
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Apparently, there would be no necessity to bear the costs of maintaining a
complicated collective ownership structure, if there was no benefit from doing
so. While in the previous examples, collective ownership was used to reduce
transaction costs that were related to opportunism, private ownership can be
identified to reduce transaction costs that stem from administrative issues or
the costs to monitor smaller parcels of land also.
Though it remains undisputed that agricultural production at the beginning
of the 18th century had indeed been less efficient in contrast to more intense
forms such as indoor-breeding, I consider it problematic to solely attribute this
- as von Justi (1760), Sternbach (1767), von Mersi (1769), or Krünitz (1773) - to
the negative aspects that could arise under collective ownership. I therefore
suggest that the problematic state of agricultural production and the bad rep-
utation of collective ownership forms did not only arise out of the ownership
system but more directly related to the adaption of an old and less efficient
production technique: outdoor keeping of animals and the reluctance or the
incapacity to switch to a better and more intense production mode on account
of a shortage of manpower. This also offers the chance to interpret the dis-
solution of collective ownership structures in Bavaria along the lines of the
property right theory as a consequence of a readjustment to new production
techniques. As the cultivation of forage crops reduced the economies of scale
in production and also changed the structure of transaction costs, the optimal
size of land to be employed for agricultural production also decreased. This
also had implications for the nature of ownership and led to the dissolution of
collective ownership structures into smaller privately owned fields that consti-
tuted the transaction cost minimising production facility.145 Further, the culti-
vation of forage crops also made it necessary to abolish the pasturing servitude
as the second form of a collective property right in the old production facility.
Hence I believe that internal restructuring to minimise transaction costs in-
stead of some “tragedy of the commons” led to the dissolution of collective
ownership structures at the end of the 18th century.146
145Hence, as once again the production form which minimises transaction costs is believed
to succeed, this transaction cost approach can be conceived as a theoretical connection
between the theory of property rights and the theory of the firm.
146Note that there are also several problems with the present explanation. First of all, one
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the role of efficiency in determining property rights
structures and institutional change. After a short introduction, I have exposed
that in contrast to a popular notion, the property right paradigm does not pre-
dict a general superiority of private over other forms of ownership. Although
in the open access case, collective ownership implements several negative ef-
fects, groups may succeed in reducing these problems with the help of dif-
ferent regulations and constraints. As under a common property regime the
negative aspects of open access cannot unfold, collective ownership will be
equally or more efficient to a system of private ownership. Several authors
have suggested that the basic problem of collective ownership is to be found
in the problem of missing control and enforcement. However I have argued
several times that this misbelief roots in a confusion between the various forms
of collective ownership. Even further, though I have not exposed this aspect in
more detail, it might also be the case that under private ownership the exclu-
sion might be foreclosed if transaction costs are very high and hence the lack
of exclusion would create exactly the same problems under private as under
collective ownership.147
It should be noted that in the same fashion as the efficiency of an owner-
has to keep in mind that the setup of agricultural production in Bavaria had not been as
homogeneous as suggested above. This apparently limits the applicability of the present
argument. Furthermore, there is also a second limitation to my argument. I so far neglected
the historical fact that there was also an improved form of the open-field system in some
communities. In this improved form, which started to spread over central Europe from the
second half of the 18th century, the fallow field had been used for the growing of clover,
vetch and other forage crops, though initially animal husbandry took the form of outdoor
keeping of livestock. Yet my argument would suggest that such a setup would not have
lasted for a long time, since economic incentives would have rendered collective owner-
ship unnecessary. Unfortunately I have no information on the persistence of this improved
form of the open-field system. Finally, the present argument on the dissolution of collec-
tive ownership in Bavaria also excludes the analysis of many other important influencing
factors such as further political constraints, cultural factors or basic local conditions. I urge
the reader to keep these limitations in mind and to view the present argument as an alter-
native description of the economic processes that may have additionally contributed to the
dissolution of collective ownership forms.
147Consider Cheung (1970) for a detailed description of the problems of a non-exclusive re-
sources and how these problems might emerge under private ownership too.
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ship structure is not tied to the prevalence of private property rights, it is also
not tied to the existence of a collective ownership system. Though the present
chapter has focused on the beneficial side of collective ownership forms and
the negative aspects of private property, there is also a magnitude of stud-
ies which suggest that collective ownership can also be detrimental to effi-
ciency.148 This leads me to suggest that the basic question of efficiency does
not depend on the form (collective or private) but on the actual characteris-
tics (transferability, exclusion, and universality) of an ownership system. The
cases presented in the course of this chapter suggest that any ownership sys-
tem characterised by Posner’s three efficiency conditions will be able to reduce
transaction costs in equal fashion and reach the same allocative outcome. This
could also be interpreted in the fashion of Cheung (1969), who showed that
the form of contractual arrangement will not have an influence on economic
outcomes if property rights are specified in a way similar to the one of Posner.
Cheung (1969) emphasised that as long as private property rights exist, there
will be no differences in efficiency between different contractual forms under
which land ownership can be granted. He hereby showed that that the pop-
ular believe of share-tenancy leading to a less efficient result when compared
to the case where a farmer would not be share-tenant but owner was clearly
wrong. In spite of the fact that Cheung (1969) made his predictions under the
assumption of the existence of private property rights, in my eyes there is no
reason why - from a theoretical point of view - the same argument should not
hold if collective ownership takes the form of a common property regime.149
This creates a problem. Throughout the paper I have identified several char-
acteristics that make collective ownership forms more efficient than private
ones.150 So, if, from a theoretical point of view, collective and private own-
ership forms will implement the same level of efficiency, how can one justify
148See Ostrom (1990) for an overview of the literature.
149Of course this will only be the case if the common property regime also allows for the un-
constrained transferability of the collective ownership rights.
150Here I have stressed the positive aspects of collective ownership forms in providing insur-
ance in peasant populations that are characterised by the absence of market forms or the
beneficial aspects that emerge on account of using internal organisations instead of markets
to coordinate economic activity.
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the cases where one ownership form has proved to be more efficient than an-
other one? In my eyes this can be explained by accepting that under certain
circumstance, weakness is strength.151 Although it is widely accepted that the
limit transferability of collective ownership shares adds to the inferiority of
this system, I believe that the opposite is true. As already addressed above,
it seems that under certain conditions the limited transferability of some col-
lective ownership forms offers the chance to increase the level of efficiency
beyond the level of private ownership.152 Though these constraints make it
harder for the owner of a collective right to find a trading partner, they also
reduce opportunism and strategic bargaining.153
In the final section of this chapter I have emphasised that the presumed neg-
ative aspects of collective ownership cannot be made responsible for the mas-
sive dissolution of collective ownership forms in 19th century Bavaria. Ap-
parently several other factors had contributed to the bad state of Bavarian
agriculture at that time, while the aim to introduce a more efficient produc-
tion system rather than the aim to create a more efficient ownership system
lead to the transfer of collective land into private ownership. This stresses the
importance to abstain from using any prejudices on the characteristics of any
property rights form and turn to the true consequences and foundations of
ownership.
151Though this offers an interesting parallel to the work of Schelling (1956), I will not expound
this any further.
152Note that the importance of the transferability condition to reach an efficient equilibrium
has also been questioned by Ostrom and Schlager (1992, p.251).
153Interestingly this implies that one form of transaction costs will be created to reduce a dif-
ferent form of transaction costs.
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3 Between Justin and
Bartholomew: Class Struggle,
Interest Groups and Territorial
Behaviour on the Seiser-Alm
3.1 Introduction
In the Alpine region, an old customary arrangement constrained the owner-
ship of private farmland in favour of local elites to the time between the 1st
of June and the 24th of August up to the first half of the 20th century. Every
year, after the feast day of St. Bartholomew, which is the 24th of August, the
ownership right of the true owners expired and the utilization of the mead-
ows had been reserved to the local elites. Only at the feast day of St. Justin
the Martyr, the 1st of June, was private ownership reestablished. By look-
ing at the special case of the hierarchic ownership structure on the Seiser-Alm
in Northern Italy, this chapter seeks to explain the determinants of property
rights formation in the Alpine region. By accounting for both the likely dis-
tributional effects and the psychological foundations of property rights forma-
tion, it will be possible to explain the high level of transaction costs and the
stability of such a production-inefficient ownership system. Here, it will be
shown that the inclusion of an alternative form of transaction costs will correct
several shortcomings of the theory of property rights. This allows for a more
detailed examination of the behavioural implications of land ownership and
further advocates for a reconsideration of non-preference based foundations
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of human behaviour.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 introduces the ownership
structure on the Seiser-Alm and highlights the causes that led to its emer-
gence. Further, this section introduces several problems with the naive theory
of property rights, as Eggertsson (1990) has called the new institutional theory
of property rights formation. Second, section 3.3 introduces an alternative con-
cept for thinking about property rights formation which draws heavily on both
the theory of rent-seeking and the Marxist approach to explain the existence of
capitalist firms. Furthermore, this section, by relying on Leibenstein (1960) and
Nelson and Winter (1982), introduces a non-exchange and authority based con-
cept of worker coordination. Drawing heavily on the ideas of Schlicht (1998,
2008) and Kubon-Gilke (1997), this section also shows that accounting for the
psychological aspects of property rights formation and group membership, of-
fers an opportunity to explain several ambiguities in the ownership structure
on the Seiser-Alm. This also implies that any theory of institutional change
has to account not only for the efficiency consequences of a change in property
rights structures but also for the distributional and perceptional consequences
of such a change. The final section introduces the notion of transaction costs
stabilizing different ownership structures and once again advocates for a more
detailed analysis of the distributional and perceptional consequences of insti-
tutional change
3.2 The Seiser-Alm
The Seiser-Alm is the largest high mountain pasture in the Alpine region.154
Its surface area comprises 51,5 km2. On the Seiser-Alm, as in many other parts
of the Alpine area there existed, up to the 1930’s, a strange ownership structure
which limited the private ownership right for the less privileged members of
the village communities to the time between the days of St. Justin the Mar-
tyr and St. Bartholomew, which are the 1st of June and the 24th of August.155
154The first known written reference to the Seiser Alm was given in 1299.
155Only in course of the changes in 1886 was the utilisation period extended to the 1st of
September (Grass, 1990, p.311).
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Only during this time were the owners of certain hayfields on the Seiser-Alm
allowed to employ their fields for the cutting of grass. After this period, the
meadows were reserved to the village elites, who employed them for the graz-
ing of their livestock. In the special case of the Seiser-Alm, the basic structure
of ownership rights had already been recorded in written form in the period
between 1473 and 1477. Here, the so-called Seiser-Alm Zettel regulated the util-
isation of all the private hayfields and the collectively owned pasture areas on
the Seiser-Alm in 43 paragraphs.156 Though several minor adjustments were
made in 1582, 1593, 1619, 1742 and 1785, the structure of this old right was
maintained in a basically unchanged fashion until 1864 (Grass, 1948, p.198).
In the year 1886 some deeper changes which included the extension of the
utilisation for the less privileged groups till the 1st of September, extended its
validity up to the 1930s (Grass, 1990, p.219).157
3.2.1 The Structure of Ownership on the Seiser-Alm
I am especially interested in the old ownership structure on the Seiser-Alm
which generally distinguishes between collective and private ownership.158
Collective ownership dominates with respect to 98% of the forests that are sur-
rounding the high mountain pasture. Second, there exist two big collectively
owned pasture areas. Private ownership on the other side prevails with re-
spect to the hayfields and meadows that are situated in the central part of the
alp though, as will be exposed further down, private ownership to some of
these fields had been limited to a short period in the summer. Hence, apart
156This refers to Ausserer (1937, p.47), although Grass (1990, p.208) speaks of 45 paragraphs.
However, as Grass also refers to Ausserer, this divergence is likely to be be a type error.
157The final adjustment was, according to Ausserer (1937, p.47) made in 1900 and followed
the largest change, which had been imposed by an official intervention of the imperial
administration in Vienna in 1886. For a detailed description of this change I refer the reader
to Grass (1990, pp.217 - 219). Note that the limitation of utilisation rights to the period
between Justin and Bartholomew did not take place exclusively on the Seiser-Alm. Rather,
this form of differently shaped property rights could also be observed in several other
communities. Further, a similar setup can still be observed today in the community of
Aldein-Radein in Southern Tyrol. I take this information from several conversations with
Josef Perwanger, the former mayor of Aldein/Radein.
158My description refers to the version of the official charter from 1593, as recorded by Ausserer
(1937, pp.65 - 70).
104
3 Between Justin and Bartholomew
from the basic distinction between private and collective ownership, it had
been possible to observe three different utilisation rights on the Seiser Alm.
First, there is the right to make hay on the private hayfields. Second, there is
the right to graze cattle on the hayfields, while third, there is the right to em-
ploy the communal forests and the commons as a pasture for the oxen and the
young cattle. It was on account of these different utilisation rights and the lim-
ited utilisation periods for some groups that farmers on the Seiser-Alm were
divided into different social groups.159
Out of the 221 farmers who historically owned private hay fields on the
Seiser-Alm, 83 had a superior position within the community. This group,
the so-called Schwaigbauern, had full disposal of the three utilisation rights.
Hence, they were entitled to employ the common pastures and the common
forests, and to produce hay and graze cattle on their privately held hayfields.
In addition, and this is probably the most interesting fact, the statute of the
Seiser-Alm also empowered the group to employ the fields of the other two
groups between the 24th of August and the 1st of June of each year. Further,
the legal entitlement went along with the permission to add buildings and huts
(the so-called Schwaigen) to their meadows.160 This offered the Schwaigbauern
a superior position since it granted them the opportunity to produce milk and
other dairy products.
The position of the remaining 138 farmers, was not as privileged as that of
the Schwaigbauern. Here, it is possible to distinguish between two differently
endowed groups. According to Grass (1990), the second group in the hierarchy
on the Seiser-Alm were the Wiesenschwaigbauern. The members of this group
had considerably fewer rights than the Schwaigbauern, since the ownership to
their private hayfields was constrained in the manner described above. Fur-
ther, they had only limited rights to employ the commons,161 while the utili-
159Here I follow the explanations of Ausserer (1937), Grass (1948), Grass (1990) and Nössing
(2001).
160As a consequence, these meadows were called the Schwaigwiesen.
161 Here, Weber (1837) denies that anyone but the Schwaigbauern had the right to employ
the commons or the communal forests on the Seiser-Alm. Yet, on account of the fact that
the court of Kastelruth, which constituted the lobby of the less privileged groups, owned
several meadows on the Seiser-Alm, this statement is probably not true.
105
3 Between Justin and Bartholomew
sation of the communal forests was denied to them altogether.162 Finally, the
Wiesenbauern constituted the group with the fewest rights. Basically, this group
was allowed to produce hay on their private fields between the 1st of June and
the 24th of August, while any other other utilisation right was ruled out.163
Note that until the second half of the 19th century, the enforcement of servi-
tude was carried out in an extremely strict fashion. As the limited time span
until the 24th of August often did not suffice to bring in the hay, this implied
that the grass on these fields was either been trampled down or devoured by
the cattle of the Schwaigbauern. Further, the ban on entering the private fields
between fall and spring in combination with the restriction to produce hay
were not the only limitation on the property rights of the Wiesenbauern, since
the grazing of cattle during fall also prevented the fertilisation of the meadows
(Grass, 1948, p.88).
At this point it is straightforward to conclude that the property rights struc-
ture on the Seiser-Alm granted the Schwaigbauern a very privileged position
in comparison to the other two groups. Although, in some sense, the Wiesen-
schwaigbauern also profited from the ownership structure, this only holds true
162Note that there also exists some ambiguity with respect to the rights of the Wiesenschwaig-
bauern. While Grass (1990, p.309) notes that the Wiesenschwaigbauern also had the right
to graze their cattle on the meadows of the less privileged group between spring and fall,
this right was not mentioned in any other description of the ownership structure on the
Seiser-Alm. The ambiguities may at least partially result from the fact that some sources
such as Nössing (2001), utilise the term “Wiesenschwaigbauern” to describe those farmers
that had been allowed to graze cattle on their private land after the year 1927, while oth-
ers, such as Grass (1990) employ the term without any reference to time. Finally, as Grass
(1948) and Wopfner (1997), whose work had been edited by Grass, as well as the classic ref-
erence from Ausserer (1937), only distinguish between a privileged and a less privileged
user group, there seems to be a bit of confusion. In this context I advert to my personal cor-
respondence with Dr. Josef Nössing, the former chief registrar of the autonomous province
of Bolzano, in the year 2009. He refers to an eyewitness who confirms that his parents
had to take their cows and leave their private meadows and the whole pasture area after
the 1st of September. However, as the present economic arguments do not depend on the
question of how many user groups existed on the Seiser-Alm, I will describe the ownership
structure by following Grass (1990).
163This implies that the production opportunities of this group were heavily constrained, since
the private ownership of the hayfields could only be employed to produce hay for livestock
that had to be kept outside the pasture. Yet, it might have been possible for this group to
buy the right to add some cattle to the two commons on the Seiser-Alm. This seems to be
an exclusion of the rule (Grass, 1990, p.309).
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in comparison with the rights of the last group. Here, the right to graze cattle
on the private land obviously increased the production possibilities of this sec-
ond group in the hierarchy, yet the constraints imposed by the Schwaigbauern
also hit this group hard. Finally it is noted that the Wiesenbauern had been dis-
advantaged the most in relation to the other farmers, since they were limited in
virtually all of their rights on their own meadows. Of course, the opportunity
to produce winter fodder on the Seiser-Alm increased the economic welfare to
a great extent, yet the limitations that were imposed decreased the economic
opportunities even further.
Interestingly, there is clear evidence that the described ownership structure
on the Seiser-Alm led to several negative consequences regarding the efficient
utilisation and maintenance of this natural resource. Grass (1990, p.313) in
this context refers to Graf (1880 - 1882, p.740), who in turn clearly points out
that economic activity on the Seiser-Alm took place in a very primitive way
and, on account of the prohibition to enter the fields after the 24th of August,
no improvement had been carried out for ages.164 Furthermore, Grass (1990,
p.313) highlights the poor state of the Seiser Alm at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury by referring to several local conventions which dealt with the bad overall
condition of the natural resource.165 This raises the question of why the var-
ious inefficiencies were not eliminated in the course of the introduction of a
new property rights system. As changes in the ownership structure would
have improved the state of the resource significantly, the gains in production
or productivity should have motivated each of the three user groups to agree
to efficiency-enhancing change in the ownership structure.
3.2.2 The Chronological Development of Property Rights
Fortunately, the history of the Seiser Alm allows us to identify the causes
that led to the establishment of the described ownership structure. Here, sev-
eral leading legal scholars, including Wopfner (1933), von Wolkenstein (1936),
164Regarding the contribution of Graf (1880 - 1882), it should be noted that the general appraisal
of any form of collective ownership had been rather bad in the 18th and 19th century. I have
addressed this issue in a different part of this dissertation in more detail.
165These conventions for instance took place in 1905 and 1906.
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Ausserer (1937), Grass (1948), Grass (1990), and Wopfner (1995b) more or
less explicitly agree that the dominance of the Schwaigbauern on the Seiser-
Alm emerged on account of the chronological development and adjustment of
property rights to population pressures.166
In the beginning however, some minor notes on Alpine economic history
seem appropriate. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the term Schwaig-
bauern did not exclusively refer to the privileged farmers on the Seiser-Alm.
Rather, this term referred to farmers in general whose farmsteads not only gave
shelter to the livestock of the farmer but also the livestock of the sovereign.
This form of a Schwaighof, as Stolz (1930), Wopfner (1931) and Stolz (1932)
point out played an important role in the colonisation of the Alpine area. In the
early Middle Ages, the colonisation of the Alpine area was promoted by the
local sovereigns through the allocation of farms that were situated close to the
upper settlement frontier in the mountain areas. To foster economic activity
in these rather hostile areas, the respective Schwaigbauern usually received, in
addition to a starting capital in the form of 6-8 milk cows, the right to feed all
of the livestock that belonged to the farm on the sovereign’s land. In return,
the farmer had to pay a yearly interest of 300 loaves of cheese at an approxi-
mate weight of 1 - 1,5 kg each to the sovereign. Any production of dairy prod-
ucts beyond that amount constituted the income of the farmer.167 With this
166Such a development of property rights is not a unique observation. Within the ownership
structure of water rights to the Colorado River it is also possible to see the impact of a
chronological development of property rights. Within the regimentation of the Colorado
Water Law, seniority rights constitute the most important aspect in the guidelines of water
rationing. Starting in 1922, several negotiations on the water rights of the riparian states
were carried out to determine a new distributional key to the water resources of the river.
Still, up to the year 1944, the state of Arizona refused to sign the Colorado River Compact,
out of the concern that more extensive water rights to the state of California would reduce
the amount of water available to Arizona significantly and wash out the ancestral privi-
leges. This refusal delayed the settlement on the new appropriation rights up to the year
1928, when the Boulder Canyon Act was signed with the help of government intervention.
Yet Arizona agreed to the settlement only in 1944. For a comprehensive description of the
processes I refer the reader to Anderson (2002).
167Wopfner (1931) and Stolz (1932) have extensively discussed the milk yield of an average
cow to be fed on mountain pastures during the Middle Ages to find out to which degree
the milk from the sovereign’s cows contributed to satisfy the amount of milk required to
produce 300 loaves of cheese. If the milk produced by the 6 cows had not been enough to
fabricate the 300 loaves of cheese, then this, as Wopfner (1931) concludes, would suggest
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background knowledge in mind, it may be somewhat easier to understand the
development of the property rights structure on the Seiser-Alm.
In the early Middle Ages, as Grass (1990, pp.193-200) points out, the whole
area of the Seiser-Alm had been jointly utilised as a mountain pasture by sev-
eral farmers from the close-by community of Kastelruth. As Grass (1990, pp.
296-297) emphasises, after several years this first group of farmers was granted
private ownership to some meadows to facilitate production.168 This was
achieved in the 13th century, when several allotments of communal land were
created in the centre of the pasture, while the rest of the area was kept under
collective ownership and employed for the grazing of cattle and sheep (Grass,
1948, p.196).169 This allowed the owner to employ some of the meadows for
the production of hay and to continue to produce cheese and other dairy prod-
ucts. Furthermore, private ownership facilitated production activities since
such a transformation of communal land also allowed for the building of barns
and huts (Grass, 1948, p.197). However, in spite of these private allotments,
the collective nature of ownership to the Seiser-Alm continued to exist and
also showed itself in the institution of the Comaun - the unionisation of the first
farmers to own meadows on the Seiser-Alm. It seems that in the beginning, the
sole purpose of the Comaun - which as Ausserer (1937, p.49) notes developed
gradually - was to economise on the costs of building roads, bridges and other
forms of infrastructure on the Seiser-Alm, while only in later times did its pur-
pose change to lobbying for the interests of the Schwaigbauern. Yet as Grass
(1990) points out, at some point in time the inhabitants of the villages adjacent
to the Seiser-Alm faced the problem of responding to the increased population
density within their communities by creating additional farmsteads. As these
that the assignment of the Schwaigrecht was also accompanied by several other privileges.
168As these farmers also engaged in the activity of producing cheese, it seems reasonable to
suggest that in the course of the centuries, the terminology changed as the term Schwaig-
bauer had been transferred to describe all of the farmers who had the right to produce
cheese on the Seiser-Alm. Further, it seems plausible that the farmers of the Schwaighöfe
had been among the first farmers to employ the Seiser-Alm for agricultural purposes in the
Middle Ages, though certainly not all of the 83 Schwaigbauern on the Seiser-Alm had been
holders of a Schwaigrecht (Ausserer, 1937, pp. 55-57).
169Wopfner (1997) describes the process of property rights formation in more detail by empha-
sising that private ownership and the privileged position of the Seiser-Alm developed out
of the long-term private management of the meadows.
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newly established farmsteads also had to be endowed with some farmland to
secure their survival, a conflict between the involved parties emerged: while
the new members of the communities and the court of Kastelruth as their rep-
resentative emphasised the necessity to provide the new farmsteads with land
on the Seiser-Alm, the members of the Comaun tried to make sure that their
rights would not be affected negatively by the newly established regime.170 Af-
ter several disputes, a final agreement between the parties was reached, which
stipulated that the newly established farmsteads would be provided with the
opportunity to increase their income by receiving parts of the Seiser-Alm for
the production of hay (Grass, 1948, p.199). Yet this transfer of ownership was
granted under the condition of a pasturing servitude, which stated that be-
fore and after the period of hay making, the private plots had to serve as a
pasture for the cows of the Schwaigbauern again. Apparently, this allowed
the Schwaigbauern to utilise the whole area of the Seiser-Alm for the graz-
ing of their livestock as before. Further, the de facto prohibition to construct
anything but small barns, allowed the Schwaigbauern to prevent members of
the newly established group from exploiting the communal forests.171 This
reduced the required amount of wood for build and made sure that only the
Schwaigbauern would profit from the communal forests. Yet the new mem-
bers of the community also received the right to graze cattle on their private
fields and to employ the two common areas.172
170Though most of the disputes between the respective groups were settled quite early, the
discrepancy between the interests of the Comaun and the court of Kastelruth characterised
the history of the Seiser Alm up to the 20th century. Still, Grass (1990) alludes to the fact that
after some initial quarrelling between the different groups, the property rights structure on
the Seiser-Alm remained surprisingly constant over the centuries. Further, it seems that
the members of the different groups accepted the respective constraints on the utilisation
without difficulty. This suggests that the official regimentation on the utilisation of the
Seiser Alm had been accepted quite rapidly, and although there might have been occasional
violations, most of the activities such as the withdrawal from the pasture after the 24th of
August were carried out automatically.
171Grass (1990, pp.203-204) points out that around 1600 the court of Kastelruth decided to
increase the two pasture areas on the Seiser-Alm by buying additional meadows to provide
its members with better opportunities to graze cattle.
172It is straightforward to see that these newly established ownership rights constituted the
origins of what later was to become the group of the Wiesenschwaigbauern (Grass, 1990,
p.310).
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However, after this adjustment it became once again necessary to respond
to the increasing population numbers by creating additional farmsteads and
increasing the number of privately owned meadows on the Seiser-Alm, which
also required the balancing of different interests. Here, the court, which rep-
resented the interests of the inhabitants of Kastelruth - who did not have the
Schwaigrecht - negotiated with the members of the Comaun. Accordingly, to
prevent the Schwaigbauern once again from being negatively affected by the
newly established private meadows, a third form of private ownership rights
was introduced. As a consequence, the Wiesenbauern were neither allowed to
add any buildings to their property, nor to graze any livestock on the whole
area of the Seiser-Alm, with the exception of the commons. As their owner-
ship right was reduced to the harvest of hay during the summer months and
did not contain the right to utilise the forests, their rights also did not inter-
fere with the rights of the Schwaigbauern to graze their cattle on the whole
area and utilise the forests. Accordingly, the ancestral farmers were able to
maintain their supremacy, since neither the area of pasture the Schwaigbauern
grazed their cattle on nor the quantity of raw materials available to them had
been significantly diminished.173
3.2.3 Some Ambiguities with the Property Rights Structure
on the Seiser-Alm
The theory of property rights predicts that institutional change will take place
as soon as a change in the property rights structure is able to implement a
higher level of efficiency, whereas efficiency is defined as the minimization of
the joint sum of dead-weight losses and transaction costs. Yet, though such a
straightforward view of property rights formation offers many advantages,174
there exist three problems if such an optimistic view of institutional change is
173 Ausserer (1937, p.50) concludes that, as there exist no documents to describe any conflicts
between the court and the Comaun for the period after 1593, that this ownership system
had finally been stabilised at the beginning of the 17th century.
174The basic formulation of this theory is to be attributed to the writings of Demsetz (1967),
while other important contributions stem from Alchian and Demsetz (1972), or DeAlessi
(1980).
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applied to real world problems such as the ownership structure on the Seiser-
Alm.175
The first problem relates to the fact that the demonstration of the historical
evolution of property rights and the actual development strongly suggest that
the ownership structure added to the supremacy of the Schwaigbauern instead
of increasing the general level of welfare. Here, two questions need to be an-
swered. First of all, it remains to be analysed why property rights developed
in a fashion that increased the income of one social group instead of the in-
come of all three groups. Second, however, supposing that the Schwaigbauern
had indeed managed to shape the ownership structure in their favour, it re-
mains unclear why the local elites did not transfer all of the farmland on the
Seiser-Alm into their ownership in the beginning.
Yet, in addition to this first concern, there is also a second problem with the
application of the property right theory to the specific case of the Seiser-Alm.
Here, it needs to be analysed why such a complex form of ownership rights
was chosen even though it would most likely have been feasible to reach the
same distributional outcome otherwise, yet with the positive side-effect of re-
ducing the level of transaction costs arising from the three different ownership
groups and from the necessity to monitor the compliance to the regimentation.
In this context, the theory of property rights does not give any sufficient in-
formation on the question of why the supremacy of the Schwaigbauern was
secured by granting different forms of ownership rights although there would
have existed other forms of securing the privileges of a user group such as the
mandatory payment of tributes or compulsory labour.176
175The most basic problem with the majority of studies that are applying such a standard view
of property rights formation is, as Ogilvie (2007, pp.656-657) has pointed out, “[...] that
they never actually define the happy state of ’efficiency’ created by their favoured institu-
tions. They do not distinguish between rationality (agents are doing the best they can for
themselves as individuals), Pareto-efficiency (where no one can be made better off without
making someone else worse off) and being ’best’ or ’right’ in a more general sense (e.g.
according with acceptable levels of distributional justice).”
176This apparently touches on the issue of whether the character of a property rights system
is indeed relevant at all. In a quite different setting Schlicht (1998), in a similar fashion as
Cheung (1969), has stated that as long as property rights are universally specified, it will
be feasible to include aspects of collective ownership into a system of private ownership
and vice versa. This also implies that as theoretically every behavioural implication of
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The third problem relates to the question of why the ownership structure
on the Seiser-Alm was stabilized in spite of a fairly complicated ownership
structure that involved changes in utilization rights at least two times a year
and also included several negative consequences for the state of the natural
resources. Though it is always hard to argue that an ownership system had
been inefficient, in this case it seems to be straightforward that several alterna-
tives, such as a more flexible handling of the constraints on utilisation, would
have helped to reduce transaction costs and reach a better state of the natu-
ral resource. Keeping the basic prediction of the theory of property rights in
mind, it therefore remains unclear why these ’inefficiencies’ were not resolved
by changing the property rights system. Such a change could have taken
the shape of assigning unconstrained private ownership rights to all farmer
groups, since this would apparently have induced them to protect the state of
the natural resource more thoroughly.177 Hence, to use the words of Acemoglu
(2006, p.516), in our context the theory of property rights cannot satisfactorily
explain why
“societies [...] choose or end up with ’inefficient’ institutions that
do not maximise economic growth or aggregate economic welfare
[...]”
These three questions will constitute the starting point for the remaining parts
of this chapter.
3.3 On Hierarchies and the Nature of the Firm
Ownership rights can be understood as a way to influence individual be-
haviour and social interaction in small scale groups. This section introduces
one ownership system could also be carried out by another, it remains unclear how own-
ership influences behaviour at all. However, this is a rather ambitious goal that cannot
be sufficiently answered within the limits of this chapter. I therefore refer the reader to
Kubon-Gilke (1997) and Schlicht (1998).
177Keeping the work of Ostrom (1990) in mind, the same concern also holds true with respect
to changing the ownership structure into a highly regulated common property regime.
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several insights from the theory of social organisations and shows how an un-
derstanding along the lines of the Marxist and the perceptional theory of the
firm can help to understand the existence of hierarchies. Here, it is the view of
custom stabilizing group membership that allows for the dissolution of certain
ambiguities with the the previously described view of property rights forma-
tion.
3.3.1 Interest Groups, Social Organisation and Class
Struggle
There are two broader concepts which build the basis for the subsequent analy-
sis of the property rights structure on the Seiser-Alm. This section will present
two basic premises of analyzing the foundations of ownership and merge them
by looking at the Marxist theory of the firm.
3.3.1.1 The Firm as a Social Organisation
The starting point for the subsequent considerations views property rights as
an elementary part of social organization and therefore shifts the level of anal-
ysis from different bundles of property rights to the theory of the firm. At first
glance, such an advancement may seem bewildering, since the similarities be-
tween the organisational structure on the Seiser-Alm and what are believed to
be the most prominent features of a firm are scarce. Obviously, the overall situ-
ation on the Seiser-Alm does not include any of the dominant characteristics of
modern firms such as the payment of wages, labour contracts or an employer-
employee relationship. Even further, there only exist minor intersections be-
tween the different groups in the production process and this makes it hard to
identify a joint output altogether. Yet, as prominent as such features may ap-
pear in describing the existence of capitalist firms, as dispensable they will ap-
pear for the description of economic organisations in pre-industrial or agrarian
settings.178 This may become more clear by looking at the basic understand-
ing of what can be interpreted as a social approach to the firm. According to
178Obviously, these considerations touch on the question of the determinants of the nature of
the firm, which will be addressed further down in the chapter.
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this social view, firms are not exclusively characterised by the joint production
of goods; rather, they also constitute social entities that administrate various
activities between different “workers”. Most generally, this social approach to
the firm has been described by March et al. (1958, p.4), who describe organisa-
tions as
“[...] assemblages of interacting human beings [that] are the largest
[groups] in our society that have anything resembling a central co-
ordinative system”
According to this view, it is obviously neither the presence of a wage struc-
ture nor the existence of joint production that characterises the firm, but some
yet-to-be-identified coordination mechanism. However, even more than such a
coordination based depiction of organisations as a loose connection of interact-
ing individuals, the social aspect of the firm has been described by Leibenstein
(1960, pp.120 et seq.), who points out that organisations resemble
“[...] somewhat durable group[s] that perform certain activities,
[while] at least some of which are pursuit of common aims.”
Apparently, this mentioning of a common aim as one of the distinctive fea-
tures of the firm allows for a multitude of interpretations. Yet, in spite of such
a vague description, for the moment this loose definition of firms will be suffi-
cient for our purposes, since it allows us to perceive firms exactly as required:
firms are social groups characterised by joint activities or interests, whereas the
common aim of the firm unites its members beyond the level of independent
individuals that interact on markets.179
179Of course, these few lines and the two definitions cannot give a satisfactorily appropriate ac-
count of the “social dimension of the firm” in general and the importance of social roles and
“interrelated jobs” (Schlicht, 2008, p.614) that has been highlighted by Leibenstein (1960).
Yet, as I do not intend to employ the theoretical considerations of this approach for an ex-
tensive explanation of the ownership structure of the Seiser-Alm but rather want to stress
the viewpoint of firms as social organisations, I will not provide for a more detailed de-
scription at this point of the chapter.
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3.3.1.2 The Interest Group Approach to Property Rights Formation
The previous section has already highlighted the underlying notion of the
property right paradigm which, in its strong version, suggests that institu-
tional change will take place as soon as efficiency gains from applying a dif-
ferent structure can be realised. Since here, any move to a higher level of
efficiency will theoretically allow for the losers of the change to be compen-
sated, this view is apparently in line with both the fundamental theorems of
welfare economics and Stigler’s idea of a Coase theorem.180. Yet, there exist
several problems with the assumed manner of perfect market processes that
build the implicit foundations of both theorems; I will especially focus on the
consequences of a violation of the underlying assumptions for the distribu-
tional consequences of changes in property rights. As the second fundamen-
tal theorem of welfare economics holds only under very special assumptions
and since the Coase theorem does not consider distributional consequences by
assumption, both theorems cannot catch the likely consequences of changes
in the distribution of income since this will seriously affect the wealth of the
involved partners. Hence, the second building block in my proceedings al-
lows for an answer to the question that is related to the purpose of property
rights formation. Hereby it will be emphasized that against the presumption
of property rights always changing towards economic efficiency, the existence
of inefficiencies and stable ownership structures can be explained by looking
at the likely effects of interest group behaviour on the shaping of institutional
arrangements.
The basic aspect of the choice between individual profit and overall effi-
ciency has been noted by Weitzman (1974a), who contrasts the choice over an
inefficient free-access and an efficient private ownership system as alternative
systems for the management of common-pool resources. Even if private prop-
erty rights would always yield a more efficient solution to the well known
180Such a glorifying description of the Coase theorem and its achievements obviously ignores
problems with the issue such as the empty core in bargaining situations that involve more
than two parties (Aivazian and Callen, 1981) or the likely effects of information asymme-
tries as pointed out by Farrell (1987), Schweizer (1988), or Illing (1992). Further, even under
perfect information and zero transaction costs, as Schlicht (1996, 1997) has pointed out, the
“extortion problem” may render Coasean bargaining ineffective.
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resource extraction problem than free-access ownership, it can still be the case
that the negative distributional consequences of a change can induce individ-
uals to choose an inefficient system over an efficient one. According to Weitz-
man (1974a), individuals cannot do better under a system of private ownership
than under free-access when no redistribution between the involved parties
will take place, since the individual profit of an inefficient open access system
will be larger than the share an individual would receive under an efficient
distribution of private ownership.
In the same fashion, Eggertsson (1990, p.271) points out that in a real world
situation it will not only be important if a new ownership structure theoreti-
cally allows for compensation of the losers, but if indeed a compensation of
the disadvantaged group will be carried out by the winners.181 Hereby it
is the reluctance of certain privileged groups, who seek to influence govern-
mental action in such a way that the institutional structure of a society will
be changed in their favour, which helps to justify the existence of inefficient
property rights arrangements.182 As interest groups obviously try to influence
both legislation and the government in their favour by engaging in rent seek-
ing and lobbying, these activities, the invoked transaction costs as well as the
respective outcomes have to be considered in the analysis of different property
rights structures. Eggertsson (1990, p.276) hereby points out that
“ [t]he ability to influence elected representatives is often strong in
the case of relatively small, compact, special-interest groups, where
each individual has much to gain by an adjustment in the structure
of property rights, and when the group has an easy access to the
relevant information and is able to control or manipulate it. The
losers in the interest-group struggle tend to be individuals belong-
ing to large groups [...] for whom the adjustment in property rights
181Obviously, this cannot be guaranteed in real world situations since positive transaction costs
might prevent actual compensation from taking place and accordingly there is no reason
for us to expect that a group would voluntarily agree to a change in the institutional struc-
ture that would add to its disadvantage.
182This of course does not withstand the possibility that efficiency factors also play an impor-
tant role in determining the persistence of an institutional arrangement. However, I want
to point out that efficiency is not the sole aspect of property rights formation.
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[...] has a small impact on each person - the costs of organising are
high, free riding is a serious problem, and individual information
costs are high relative to the stakes.”
In a similar fashion, Libecap (1989) explains how changes in property rights
that would obviously have fostered efficiency had been blocked by the objec-
tion of certain pressure groups. Libecap (1989) hereby hints at the likely impact
that distributional consequences might have on the blocking of efficiency en-
hancing institutional change.183 Given that a certain pressure group had been
privileged under an existent system of ownership rights, the establishment of
a new ownership system might be blocked to avoid the unfavourable conse-
quences under the new regime. Accordingly, as Libecap (1986, p.228) points
out, the
“ [...] analysis of the likely winners and losers of economic and in-
stitutional change and their interaction in the political arena in spe-
cific settings is necessary before the observed pattern of property
rights can be understood.”
Apparently, Libecap accounts for the fact that it might not be feasible un-
der changed institutional conditions to guarantee privileged groups the same
supremacy as under the old regime. Hence, in the presence of existing claims,
a comparison between the wealth effects of different systems of property rights
is needed to totally understand the process of institutional change and the rea-
sons for the establishment of any ownership system.184 Note however that
both of the presented approaches explicitly assume that interest groups will
183Note that there is also a variety of economic contributions that incorporates rent-seeking
into institutional analysis by pointing out that rent-seeking itself creates efficiency. Ogilvie
(2007, p.662) in this context refers to the contribution of Greif (2006) and points out that
although Greif opposes the efficiency view of property rights formation, he still claims
that institutional arrangements contributed to create an “efficient volume of trade” and
“efficient agency relations”.
184Note that North (1990), who initially had been one of the strongest advocates of the effi-
ciency view of property rights formation, also indirectly acknowledges the importance of
distributional conflicts and the influence of pressure groups on blocking efficiency creat-
118
3 Between Justin and Bartholomew
influence governmental activity in their favour, yet the stability of inefficient
institutions can also arise in those cases where the government cannot be in-
fluenced by lobbyists, simply because no government exists to provide an in-
stitutional framework.185
Ogilvie (2007) approaches the issue of distributional consequences in state-
less societies by viewing property rights and institutions as the result of differ-
ent groups competing for a good, a resource or more generally for a superior
economic and political position in society.186 Ogilvie (2007), hereby drops the
assumption that institutional change will always be characterised by changes
towards efficiency. This shifts the level of analysis, in the same fashion empha-
sised by Schelling (1956, p.281), to 187
“[...] the situations in which more for one man is less for the other.”
According to Ogilvie, distributional conflicts often arise in those cases where
negotiations do not take place between equally informed parties. Here, the
lack of an external enforcement authority leads to the basic problem that an
affected party 188
“[...] cannot itself make binding agreements, since by definition
there is no other party to enforce them.”
ing changes in the overall institutional structure of a society. Though in his contribution
he strongly emphasises the importance of path dependencies, he also acknowledges that
the cause of inefficient institutions can be found in the failure of the state to provide an
adequate, low cost enforcement of contracts.
185This seems also to be the essence of Weitzman (1974a).
186Note however that although some of Ogilvie’s ideas are pretty much in line with the above
mentioned view of the interest groups influencing property rights formation, there is also
a crucial difference. While the interest group theory of property rights formation assumes
that efficiency would be reached if rent-seeking could be precluded, Ogilvie (2007) points
that the formation of property rights can also emerge on account of other causes.
187This idea is obviously quite close to the basic insights of Coase (1960, p.415), who offers
a useful way to think about the reciprocal nature of externality avoidance by stating that
“ [t]he traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what
has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a
problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A”. A similar
idea can also be found in the contribution of Hirshleifer (1994).
188Ogilvie (2007, p.664)
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In these cases, it will be the group which possesses what Ogilvie (2007, p.664)
calls the “monopoly of physical violence” which will shape institutions in their
favour. This will establish property rights although no external authority is
there to guarantee them.
A similar example of the emergence of property rights in cases of a lacking
external authority has been addressed by Umbeck (1981). In his study on how
the threat to enforce private claims by physical violence helped miners to set-
tle disputes on rights to gold claims during the California Gold Rush, Umbeck
gives a description of the emergence of property rights in stateless societies.189
Here it is especially the underlying idea of the theory that “might makes right”
that grants helpful insights into the formation of property rights, though Um-
beck (1981) himself considers the outcome of such a process to be efficient.190
Hence, given that members of small scale groups compete for the utilisation of
a resource without the interference of any external governmental or legal inter-
vention, it is plausible to suggest that different positions of power - something
Umbeck would call the “the possibility to enforce claims by violence” - will
shape the structure of property rights. Accordingly, Umbeck (1981) puts for-
ward that negotiations on the establishment of property rights will take place
between the involved parties and even more that the threat of violence might
be sufficient to stabilise an ownership structure.191
Accordingly, the basic problem of persistent inefficiencies in the presence of
obvious possibilities to change the system cannot be captured any better then
by referring to Ogilvie (2007, p. 664), who states that
189The theory itself builds on the idea that violence can be seen as an alternative form of allo-
cating labour to enforce individual claims to a resource. As those who are willing to invest
more time or effort in violence are more likely to succeed in the competition for the re-
source, any contractual equilibrium has to mirror this idea and accordingly in equilibrium
every contract between the miners will reflect the different attitudes towards violence by
endowing each individual with exactly the amount of land that he would have gained
through violence. However, as in the model every miner is fully informed and aware of
the potential outcomes, no violence will take place and as a consequence contracts between
the miners on the optimal size of the claims will be agreed.
190A more detailed critique of Umbeck’s theory with respect to the historical details is provided
by Clay and Wright (2005).
191There are several problems with the view that it is only the threat of physical violence that
stabilises property rights and leads individuals to follow certain regulations. I will ap-
proach this later in the chapter.
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“ [e]fficient outcomes are possible only if all affected parties can
negotiate their way (without serious problems of asymmetric in-
formation) to a binding agreement. But binding agreements pre-
suppose an enforcing party with a monopoly of physical violence.
And a party with a monopoly of physical violence cannot itself
make binding agreements, since by definition there is no other
party to enforce them. Therefore, a party with a monopoly of
physical violence will be in constant temptation to use that capac-
ity to cheat, rob, or oppress others (or to support institutional ar-
rangements that coercively distribute resources away from others),
thereby inflicting externalities on them.”
This idea will build the stepping stone for the subsequent analysis.
3.3.1.3 On Authority and the Distinction between Labour and Labour
Power
The Marxist theory of the firm unites, in a convenient way both the view of
distributional conflicts being important for the formation of property rights
and the view of groups as social entities. This will allow for an interpretation
of hierarchies as the outcome of a quarrel between different groups within a
society.
The Marxist approach to explaining the existence of firms goes back to the
conceptualisations of Marglin (1974) and Gintis (1976), yet it is the latter con-
tribution that will be analysed over the subsequent pages. Gintis begins his
observation by pointing at the fallacies of the neoclassical approach in explain-
ing the hierarchical structure within capitalist firms. Gintis hereby abstracts
from Marx’ idea that labour neither constitutes a commodity in the production
process, nor can labour be analysed by simply looking at exchange relations.
This builds the fundamental aspect of his analysis. According to the Marxist
theory of the firm, there exist two general problems with the efficiency based
theory of the firm and it is the identification of these problems which offers the
opportunity to gain a better understanding of the existence of social organisa-
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tions. First of all, it is the neoclassical view of 192
“[...] the organisation of the capitalist enterprise as the solution to
the problem of finding a least-cost technique of production given
an array of factor prices”
which induces manifest disagreement. The neoclassical theory of the firm, in a
similar fashion to the view of the firm as a specialised market as proposed by
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), asserts that the coordination of the workforce is
exclusively driven by incentives that govern quid pro quo interactions equal to
those that occur on markets or in reciprocal exchange. According to this view,
firms either develop on account of certain advantages of team-production or
on account of other aspects that are hidden in the neoclassical production func-
tion. Hence, the underlying view of the internal interaction between an em-
ployer and an employee inside the firms can be described as not any different
from the interaction between two independent parties in a market. This view
shows itself in the famous citation of Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p.777), who
state that
“ [t]elling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that
document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna
rather than that brand of bread”
This view of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) obviously denies the special organi-
sational nature of firms and implicitly suggests that all of the inherent aspects
of the firm, such as the hierarchic structure of jobs or the wage distribution
will be efficient, since they will satisfy the aim of minimising costs using the
available techniques of production.193
In contrast to this view, Gintis (1976, p.37) emphasises that the “structure of
hierarchical authority” in capitalist firms mirrors the “essential elements” of
192Gintis (1976, p.36)
193This equalisation of the neoclassical with the ideas of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) appar-
ently disregards the important aspect in their theory that firms offer a way to save on
transaction costs. Yet as the ways to coordinate worker behaviour are apparently very sim-
ilar in both approaches, it seems to be justified to extend Gintis’ critique to the contribution
of Alchian and Demsetz.
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class struggle between capital and labour. Therefore it is not the maximisation
of firm profits by finding the least-cost method of production which charac-
terises the organisational form of an enterprise, but rather the aim of the capi-
talists to extract surplus value. This has to be considered as a final explanation
for the setup of capitalist production. Hence, while the neoclassical view of
the firm would implicitly interpret every existing firm structure as efficient,
the Marxist theory of the firm, in the same fashion as the interest group ap-
proach, acknowledges that most internal organisations will accept inefficient
results as long as the aims of the capitalists are satisfied. Here, the explanation
of Gintis (1976, p.51), who points at the basic premise of these ideas, cannot be
surpassed in its straightforwardness
“ [...] in a correct formulation of the theory of the firm, profit max-
imisation entails divergences from Pareto-efficiency which can be
understood only in terms of class analysis. [...] The employer can
increase the piece of the pie accruing to capital and management
by reducing the size of the pie to less than its maximum. Workers
would gain by reorganising production to increase output, work
satisfaction and wages. Indeed, they could compensate the capital-
ists for his of her losses and still be better off - but of course once
they had power there would be no reason for them to do so.”
However, it should be noted that the wide neglect in economic analysis of how
hierarchic ownership structures can serve purposes other than efficiency is ac-
cording to Gintis (1976), not exclusively due to a view of exchange as the only
coordination form of worker behaviour inside social organisations. Rather, the
same understanding is also to be found in an alternative theory of the firm
that stresses the importance of authority as a coordination mechanism. Here
Gintis (1976, p.40) points out that the view of authority as a coordination de-
vice that was advanced by Coase (1937) and Simon (1957a,b) also has a severe
shortcoming. This becomes partly evident from the famous statement of Coase
(1937, pp. 387-388), who pointed out that
“ [i]f a workman moves from department Y to department X, he
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is
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ordered to do so. [...] Outside the firm, price movements direct pro-
duction which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange trans-
actions on the market. Within a firm these market transactions are
eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with
exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator,
who directs production.”
According to Coase (1937) the presence of authority as a control mechanism is
made necessary on account of what he calls the “costs of using the price mech-
anism”.194 Hence, in contrast to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Coase (1937,
p.404) cites Batt (1929, p.7) to assert that
“ [...] that which distinguishes an agent from a servant is not the
absence or presence of a fixed wage, or the payment only of com-
mission on business done, but rather the freedom with which an
agent may carry out his employment.”
Accordingly, while the exchange between independent agents in the market
is characterised by the freedom to either agree to an exchange or to abandon
it, the same does not hold true for the relevant situation inside firms. As this
view highlights the subordination of a worker under the authority of the em-
ployer, the freedom of choice does not relate to the question of carrying out an
order or not but to to question of continuing the employment relation or not.
Hence, in contrast to the view of a firm as a specialised market, it is not the in-
centives and exchange but the authority of the entrepreneur which coordinate
worker behaviour inside a firm, while exchange via market activity is still the
dominant coordination mechanism outside the firm. As a consequence, in this
theory the size of the firm depends on the costs of using the price mechanism
and the costs of internal organisation since 195
“[a]t the margin, the costs of organising within firms will be equal
194These transaction costs can be interpreted as the costs that occur to identify the relevant
prices on the market. Yet Coase (1937, pp.390-391) also identifies “[t]he costs of negotiating
and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction [...]” as being relevant
transaction costs.
195Coase (1937, p.404)
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[...] to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be “organ-
ised” by the price mechanism”
Nevertheless, though Coase obviously recognises the importance of authority
as a coordination device in internal organisation, the implemented view yields
the basic belief that an entrepreneur will choose the apportionment between
the activities to be carried out over the market, using the price mechanism,
and those activities to be carried internally, with the help of authority, in a way
that leads to the least cost and the most production-efficient outcome. Yet, as
important as this understanding may be, the view advanced by Coase (1937),
at least in the eyes of Gintis (1976), is only slightly more investigative then the
view of the firm as a black box or the view of firms as specialised markets. This
is because in the Coasean view, according to Gintis (1976), the activities inside
of firms are again considered to be exogenous, whereas the only difference to
the neoclassical/team-production view is that the operations within the box
will now be carried out with the help of authority instead of the help of prices.
Yet the approach of leaving the formation of authority and hierarchical struc-
tures widely unexplained may cause severe problems, since portraying author-
ity as an exogenous factor that will automatically be established as soon as a
worker enters the employment relationship misses out on the distinction be-
tween labour and labour power. As in the Marxist sense, labour, in contrast
to labour power, cannot be treated as a commodity in the production process,
the view of workers as passive agents that subordinate themselves under the
power of the capitalist firm owners misses out on important aspects of firm
organisation that are relevant for the establishment of authority and the coor-
dination by command.
According to Gintis (1976), it is exactly the wrongly presumed equality of
labour and labour power that create the most severe problems with both the
neoclassical and the Coasean theory of the firm. This is due to several prob-
lems. First of all, a characterisation of the firm that views the development
of authority and the conflict between workers and capitalists as exogenous
provides nothing more than the description of an equilibrium, while the ad-
justment process is virtually ignored. However, in real world situations, the
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relationship between employers and employees appears not as harmonic and
easy as suggested by the neoclassical theory and the view of Coase (1937) or
Alchian and Demsetz (1972). As it is obviously not the case that workers fol-
low the directions of the employer in the same fashion as a robot follows the
control of a computer, a theory of employer authority has to take account of
the reactions of the workers with respect to the commands of the capitalists.
Gintis (1976, p.41) approaches this aspect in the same fashion as Simon
(1957a), by pointing out that most of the workers’ activities within a company
are not enforceable through external authorities. This is because not every
relevant aspect of production can be recorded in labour contracts and this ob-
viously precludes the possibility of an external legal authority being able to
enforce such a behaviour in the interest of the employer.196 Yet, this insight
has two consequences. First of all, it clarifies that there must be some other
mechanism which guarantees that the instructions of the capitalists will be re-
alised by the workers. Secondly it clarifies that in the course of their work
time, employees can pursue goals that are not consistent with the goals of the
company or, more specifically with the ultimate aim of the capitalist to extract
surplus value (Gintis, 1976, p.44).197 Hence, while the previously addressed
approaches to the nature of the firm have simultaneously emphasised the ef-
ficiency of the hierarchic ownership structure in firms and further assumed
away the possibility that the interest of the workers could not be in line with
the interests of the employer, Gintis (1976, p.40) points out that
“if the hierarchical division of labour is necessary to the extraction
of surplus value, then worker preferences for jobs threatening cap-
italist control will not be implemented.”
The lesson from these insights is obvious: if there is no external authority to
enforce that the behaviour of the workers is in line with the interests of the
196This is the basic essence of the problem that work-to-rule cannot be punished by external
authorities. Apparently serious damages can be imposed by workers limiting their work-
ing effort to those aspects that are either written down in their labour contracts or to exactly
those aspects that are specified in the rules of their superiors.
197Once again this is the consequence of the missing distinction between labour and labour
power.
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capitalists, then the characteristics of the organisation itself will have to re-
place external control by simultaneously accounting for the likely reactions of
the workers to the actions of the capitalists.198 Hence, the hierarchic structure
inside capitalist firms is not the outcome of the authority of the capitalist to
enforce his commands, but rather should be viewed as a supplement which
supports the aims of the capitalists.
In the Marxist theory of the firm the structure of the social organisation con-
stitutes a way to support the task of creating and enforcing the authority of the
capitalist over the workers to finally allow for the extraction of surplus value
(Gintis, 1976, p.43). Apparently, this implies that the hierarchic structure of a
firm is itself endogenous to the behaviour of the individuals, since both the
success and the costs of implementing such an organisational structure will
heavily depend on several aspects such as the worker’s behaviour or his at-
titudes. Furthermore, this also shows that hierarchies can be interpreted as a
way to prevent transaction costs that would likely emerge on account of the
opportunistic behaviour of individuals, though such a view is usually tied to
the ideas of Williamson (1975, 1985). Apparently, it is the degree to which the
interests of the workers differ from the interests of the capitalists which affects
the level of transaction costs, and it is this general uncertainty of the influenc-
ing factors of worker behaviour which makes Gintis (1976, p.44) point out that
“ [...] the capitalist will, in the interest of profits, attempt to struc-
ture the consciousness and limit the power of workers.”
This is the basic duty of hierarchies in business firms and therefore Gintis’ ap-
proach can be understood as an appeal to not only to account for different
incentives but also to endogenize preferences in analysing worker behaviour.
This emerges from the idea that the behaviour of the workers itself crucially
depends on a variety of different factors such as the accountability of the work-
ers, the consciousness of belonging to the working class or the perception of
legitimacy of the capitalist as the authority in the firm. Though it would go
198Displayed in this fashion, the approach of Gintis (1976) can be viewed as an early efficiency
wage theory. Furthermore it should be noted that neither authority nor the structure of
hierarchy in a firm should be viewed as exogenous or rigid.
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too far at this point to list all of the factors that influence the behaviour and
the preferences of the members of the working class, it is still interesting to
account for some of the consequences that arise out of hierarchic structures for
the extraction of surplus value.199 Here it is a factor that addresses the neces-
sity to shape organisational structures and attitudes of the workers in a way
that prohibits the collusion of the working class to take place that is especially
important for the analysis in this chapter. Note that Gintis views the collusion
of workers to be especially harmful to the interest of the capitalists since it
“[...] can swiftly [...] destroy the downward transmission of direc-
tives [...], [while further] sanctions that can effectively control the
behavior of individual workers may be useless when a group of
workers is acting in concert.”
Apparently, concerted action and solidarity among the workers impose a big
obstacle to the capitalist’s aim to increase his own share of income.200 This is
the case since in addition to the problems that are imposed by joint action, a
close interaction between the workers amplifies the likelihood of workers be-
haviour being influenced by horizontal or subordinate groups. This will lead
to a mutual amplification of (potentially negative) feelings towards the au-
thorities and will likely reduce the influence of the superior authorities such
as the capitalists or their direct agents. Accordingly, to ensure the aims of the
capitalists it becomes crucial to reduce both the influence of other workers on
the worker consciousness and the likelihood of successful collusion by split-
ting the working class into several parts and by reducing common interests.
According to Gintis (1976, p.48) this is likely to be achieved by increasing the
social distance between the workers, by creating different conditions of work
at different levels of the hierarchy as well as by considering social hierarchies
when creating job hierarchies (Gintis, 1976, p.46).201 This view however cul-
199For an extensive treatment see Gintis (1976, pp.42-51)
200Note that this aspect of the Marxist theory of the firm is very similar to the later developed
view of Witt (1998, pp.166-168)
201This is believed to stabilise the internal hierarchic structure of the firm by psychological
reinforcement and the limitation of conflict that might occur out of the simple fact that the
hierarchies inside and outside the firms should be consistent. Otherwise, several problems
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minates in 202
“ [t]he general assertion that class fragmentation is a normal part
of the extraction of surplus value through enforcing the labor ex-
change [...]”
The Marxist explanation of the firm has offered several useful insights to think
about the structure of ownership on the Seiser-Alm. First of all, this view of-
fered the possibility to analyze group processes as a conflict among different
parties over the resource supremacy in a group, where the production effi-
ciency of the setup might be subordinated to the aim of preserving the advan-
tages to a certain group.203 Furthermore, Gintis’ view has provided an useful
introduction to perceive hierarchies not only as the outcome of authority but
as a means of enforcing the authority of a certain group by influencing worker
behaviour. This aspect will be further illuminated in the next section, yet at this
point it is already possible to conclude that the subsequent analysis of the hi-
erarchic ownership structure on the Seiser-Alm will employ a view of the func-
tion of institutional constraints that is quite different to the one in the property
rights theory. In line with the Marxist theory of the firm I hereby point out that
there must be a deeper understanding of how hierarchies constrain individual
behaviour than the simple presumption of exogenous levels of authority or the
idea of “might creates right”.
might arise if a less privileged social group would have the authority over a higher class
inside the firm.
202Gintis (1976, p.48)
203Hence, the avoidance of certain opportunism related transaction costs can be interpreted
not only to serve the aim of generating efficiency but also to add to other goals. Further-
more, this also implies how close in several aspects the Marxist approach to the firm is
to the transaction cost approach of Oliver Williamson. This becomes even more evident
if the profit of the firm is interpreted as the residual income of the capitalists, since then
capitalists would also have the incentive to generate a production efficient organizational
structure. Nevertheless it should be noted that as the organizational structure that aligns
the interests of the workers to those of the capitalists is not necessarily the ownership struc-
ture that optimizes production efficiency or accounts for a optimal level of extraction and
contribution to the resource, a distinction between the various consequences of institutions
should be highly appreciated.
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3.3.2 Duties, Routines and Interest Group Behaviour
The previous section has emphasised that the presence of hierarchies itself
might have consequences for shaping the behaviour of workers. This has cul-
minated in the claim that class fragmentation can be understood as an essential
mechanism to enforce the interests of capitalists, since it allows them to re-
duce the influence of other individuals or groups on the mental attitudes and
the consciousness of workers. Apparently it is not authority in the sense of
physical power which stabilises the hierarchic structure of a firm and therefore
Gintis (1976, p.44) quotes Simon (1957a, p.227) stating that
“ [a]uthority, unless buttressed by other forms of influence, is rela-
tively impotent to control decisions in any but a negative way.”
This once again implies that any form of influencing individual behaviour such
as keeping the workers in line with the interests of the capitalists may not only
be a matter of authority, power or other formal institutions such as monitor-
ing, screening or information gathering, but also emerge out of other aspects
such as self-perception or interest group behaviour. The respective notion that
individual behaviour in social organisations is guided by factors other than
preferences and incentives will be presented over the following pages. Here,
it is Schlicht (1998, p.217), who points out that in addition to the two familiar
factors of exchange and authority, it is custom in the form of interacting du-
ties and routines, which takes over the function of coordinating the behaviour
of individuals in firms, groups or other social entities.204 With respect to the
importance of job specific duties, Schlicht (1998, p.222) notes that
“[t]here are partnerships that cannot that easily be characterised
in terms of command structures, yet they are firms. Furthermore,
even in hierarchical firms the workers are not required primarily to
obey commands. Rather, they are required to fulfil their duty and to
204Schlicht (1998, p.218) in this context also refers to the work of Polanyi et al. (1957a), who
paraphrases roughly the same concept with the terms exchange, redistribution, and reci-
procity, while Heilbroner (1972) refers to market, command and tradition as the relevant
expressions.
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do what their job requires. [...] The duties of the job might require
the worker to react in a certain way to certain information.”
Apparently, such a view of workers carrying out the tasks that are directly
related to their jobs instead of following direct commands from a higher au-
thority, allows one to perceive firms as205
“ [...] a system of interlocking social roles, embodied in job descrip-
tions. The role of the entrepreneur would be to influence these roles
and responsibilities, introduce new roles and shape role descrip-
tions such that new exigencies can be met.”
In addition to the behavioural consequences of perceiving something as the
duty of one’s job, there also exists another aspect contributing to custom as
a coordination form in social groups. Here, work specific routines interact
closely with the instrumental functioning of explicit norms, duties and job de-
scriptions (Schlicht, 1998, p.225). This is why Nelson and Winter (1982) have
emphasised the importance of coordination by job routines for the running of
business organisations, since206
“[...] the prevailing set of routines embodies a firm’s operational
knowledge. As the routines are largely automatic, the knowledge
embodied in them, is mainly tacit and widely dispersed. Everyone
has to know how to do ’his job’, but he will not and need not know
very much more.”
Accordingly, the beneficial function of routines in reducing costs emerges due
to the simple fact that because of their presence, the endless repetitions of other
coordinating activities such as command or job descriptions can be avoided.207
Furthermore, as work routines also go hand in hand with the formation of
tacit knowledge, coordination by custom allows for the saving on those costs
that would likely arise out of the Sisyphean challenge of specifying all of the
relevant operational procedures that are attached to a job.
205 Schlicht (1998, p.223) hereby refers to Leibenstein (1960, pp.119-154)
206Schlicht (1998, p.225)
207The importance of routines and customary work flows shows itself in the already addressed
threat of work-to-rule.
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Apparently, this view of custom guided behaviour can also be applied to
pick up Gintis’ postulation of modelling hierarchies in firms as a function of
worker consciousness. Here, the identification of duties and routines as two
dominant parts of work specific custom allows for a better way to explain
worker behaviour than the incentive and preference based view of human
behaviour.208 The foundations of worker behaviour that are especially em-
phasised in this context strongly build on individually perceived entitlements
and obligations, psychological clarification processes, and the importance of
rule preference.209 Hence, this view offers an advantage in explaining social
processes such as conformity, conservatism, or obedience. Yet, in the present
context, it is especially the importance of perceiving oneself as a specific part
of a group or entity that will allow for a better understanding of worker be-
haviour in hierarchies.
The view in this chapter suggests that self-perception will strongly channel
individual behaviour both by shaping direct behavioural rules and by creat-
ing, changing and shaping preferences, motives and convictions in a way that
is consistent with the behaviour of the other members of the same social entity
and the individual perception of the role in this entity.210 More importantly,
this implies that worker behaviour in social entities will not only be guided by
the individual aim to increase utility. Rather, individual behaviour in firms is
understood to be influenced and guided to a great extent by the norms and
general convictions of one’s own reference group. Obviously, such a view
of preferences as endogenous to self-perception and group membership pro-
vides, in the same manner as postulated by Gintis (1976), for an opportunity to
account for the effects of the worker’s consciousness or his perception on the
208More specifically, the adherence to individually perceived norms is to be distinguished from
incentive and preference triggered behaviour due to the simple fact that the rules that come
along with the norms generate differently shaped incentives i.e. by eliciting entitlements
and obligations. They therefore have to be viewed as a preliminary stage to preference
formation (Schlicht, 2008, p.616).
209For an extensive treatment of the underlying idea of human behaviour see Schlicht (1998).
210This paraphrases Schlicht (1998, p.119). Note that the presented view implicitly builds on
Tajfel and Turner (1986) and Turner et al. (1987).
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outcomes of the class struggle in capitalist firms.211
A convenient way to merge the idea of individual behaviour being influ-
enced by self-perception to Gintis idea of the class struggle in capitalist firms
is provided by the perceptional theory of the firm that builds on Schlicht (1998,
2008). This will allow me to advance further in identifying the causes for the
stability of hierarchic ownership structures. Schlicht (1998, p.240) in this con-
text states that
“[t]he firm is, first and foremost, a perceptional unity [...]. It is im-
portant that those who control the firm share this perception, be-
cause it gives rise to specific behavioural responses. The perception
of rules that are characteristic of the firm generates a tendency to
follow the rules “
Accordingly, it is the worker’s perception of being a part of a certain organisa-
tion or a special group which can be interpreted as an important determinant
in guiding worker behaviour in capitalist firms. This shows that the member-
ship in the social organisation and the perception of the individual role in the
workforce - rather than external forces - channel the behaviour of a worker in
a way that makes makes him accept the authority of the capitalists. As a fur-
ther development of the view of Gintis (1976), this implies that the changes
in worker behaviour do not (only) result from the fact that the worker might
be constraint by the authority of the capitalists, since the described foundation
of behaviour goes far beyond the popular instrumental view that institutional
arrangements simply limit individual behaviour by imposing exogenous con-
straints.212 Note however that the premised view will not necessarily imply
that the perceptional effect of accepting one’s position will lead to an unlim-
ited amount of power for the superiors and an all-embracing subjugation of
worker behaviour; rather, it implies that both groups will accept authority and
subjugation within a given set of rules and hierarchies. Any attempt to increase
211Of course, this also stresses the view of institutions being different to simple exogenous
constraints to rational utility and profit maximizers.
212Here, the analogies to the theory of self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1987) and the theory of
social identity (Sherif et al., 1961; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) are apparent.
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power beyond that level is likely, as will be shown below, to cause severe prob-
lems.
On a more applied level, this finally offers the chance to return to the work
of Gintis (1976) and point out what consequences and problems the implied
view of worker behaviour might cause. It has been noted above that a certain
form of worker consciousness can be detrimental to the capitalist’s ultimate
goal of extracting surplus value. Hence, turning the argument the other way
round, it will, as Schlicht (1998, p.223) has highlighted, also be possible for an
entrepreneur to increase efficiency in an organisation by influencing worker
behaviour through the assignment of job specific duties and the establishment
of job routines. But given that it is possible for the entrepreneur to foster ef-
ficiency in firms by shaping custom in the desired way, then the same must
obviously hold true with respect to the role of the capitalist and the goal of
extracting surplus value.213 Accordingly, workers not only subordinate them-
selves to the authority of the capitalist entrepreneur on account of the instru-
mental constraints that have been imposed on them but also because the hier-
archy itself creates customs that contribute to make the working class accept
their position in the social organisation.214
Yet, at this point it remains important to accept that custom is not an ex-
ogenous factor in shaping worker behaviour. It seems that only in very few
cases, the three familiar modes of control act independently from each other,
whereas it is equally seldom that the existence of organisations can be reduced
to the sole existence of just one of these three mechanisms of control. Hence,
it is more likely that the three forms of control interact closely with each other
213A similar view of entrepreneurs being able to influence the behaviour of workers for the
goals they consider most important can also be inferred from Witt (1998).
214A simple example would be that a worker who perceives himself as a subordinate to his
boss would not consider it as an alternative to work at the office desk of his supervisor,
even though no direct command had been issued, the likelihood and extent of sanction-
ing are limited and no exchange had taken place. Furthermore, this view also implies that
the acceptance of one’s position in a group also constrains behavioural alternatives such
as strategic bargaining and limits the opportunities for institutional change. This also pro-
vides an explanation for some problems with the behavioural implications of ownership,
especially with the view of Hart and Moore (1990).
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and jointly shape human behaviour inside social organisations.215 This basic
insight should already hint at the fact that consciously influencing worker be-
haviour through custom is not as easy as it has been suggested in the previous
lines. In the same way as every stupid boy can kill a bug and yet the smartest
professor cannot recreate it, it will be much easier to destroy an existent sys-
tem of customs than to create a new one. Accordingly several problems have
to be taken care of, whereas most importantly one has to account for the prob-
lem that the different combinations of exchange, command and custom will
oppose each other and limit each others’ functionality.216 This holds especially
true with respect to the problem of maintaining authorities in business firms.
Here, it is the influence of command which - through the creation of prece-
dents - influences, destroys and forms routines and custom (Schlicht, 1998,
p.232). Hence, in the same fashion as an entrepreneur may consciously shape
job descriptions, a superior can contribute to the formation of routines. Yet this
happens under the requirement that the respective commands are consistent
with existing routines and job descriptions while, furthermore it is also impor-
tant to make clear that the relevance of the respective commands is clear to the
subordinates.217 Schlicht (1998, p.227) in this context points out that
“ [i]t is typical for firms internally to coordinate activity by com-
bining elements of exchange, command, and custom. The result
of this combination is, however, quite different from what could
be expected by merely superimposing the effects that could be ex-
pected from using the elements alone. [...] In Mill’s terminology,
the control modes interact not ’additively’, but chemically.”
This view of the three coordination mechanisms mutually affecting each other
implies, as already stated above, that both command and exchange can be in-
215This, however, does not rule out that the function of one mode of control will be absorbed
by another one, i.e. that the coordinating function that had initially been carried out by
command will in the course of time be absorbed by custom.
216Here, the supposed close interaction of of the three forms of control does imply that the
effects of each of the mechanisms will in many cases not work in the same direction.
217For the origins of custom I refer to the contribution of Schlicht (1998) whereas Schlicht (2008)
gives an extensive treatment on the importance of consistency in organisation.
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terpreted as a preliminary stage to the formation of routines and duties. There-
fore the insights from this section can be summarized as follows.
First of all, the present view acknowledges the possibility that an en-
trepreneur or, to stick with the previous terminology, a capitalist will be able
to influence the consciousness of the workforce in his interest by changing job
descriptions and routines through command. Second, however, this also im-
plies that the respective entrepreneur or capitalist can cause severe harm if his
commands or attempts to change behaviour through exchange violate existent
duties or routines. The reasons for this are diverse. For one, issuing commands
that are inconsistent with previous ones or the existing routines and job de-
scriptions might undermine the authority of a superior, since the subordinates
might perceive the superior as being badly informed or volatile. Moreover, any
unjustified form of coordination that runs against existent custom may disar-
range the whole setup of duties and routines and create frictions in the setup of
the organisation. Finally it could well be that certain commands, changes in the
organisational structure or a change in the property rights structure would not
only violate routines and create additional transaction costs, but also infringe
upon individually perceived entitlements and obligations. The consequences
of such behaviour will be depicted below.
3.3.3 The Psychological Aspects of Ownership and the
Analogy to Territorial Behaviour
Before I start to resolve the three ambiguities on the Seiser-Alm, it should be
made clear that custom is not limited to shape behaviour in firms but also
with respect to the ownership of an object.218 In this context, Schlicht (1998,
p.238) notes that
“[p]sychological aspects of ownership entail direct efficiency conse-
quences in so far as alternative ownership structures generate dif-
ferent perceptions of individual responsibility.”
218This implies that there is a direct influence of ownership on behaviour while there is also an
indirect influence that works through the formation of groups that have the same owner-
ship rights.
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Yet, as already addressed, the psychological aspects not only have direct ef-
ficiency consequences, but they also have consequences for other ambitions.
This is especially true with respect to the legitimisation of authority, which can
also be interpreted as a means of a person individually perceiving and accept-
ing his or her role in the hierarchy.219 To get a better understanding of the
underlying processes, consider the example of a worker and his superior in a
company. Here it can be shown that different bundles of property rights may
play an important role in legitimatising the authority of a superior.220 It is true,
as Coase (1937) has pointed out, that a worker who moves from department Y
to department X will not do this because of a change in relative prices but on
account of the command of a superior S. But this also presupposes that S will
have the right to determine the course of things in department Y and that the
workers perceive their superior to be legitimatised to send them to department
X. Otherwise, the members of department X and all the other workers would
oppose the external interference from S by keeping the worker out of their de-
partment. Hence, the right to determine the events in both departments is a
precondition for the acceptance of authority. Yet, in business firms, it is not
only, as Schlicht (2008, p.617) has correctly pointed out, that the legitimisation
of authority is closely tied to the entitlement of command but also to the per-
ception of ownership. This implies that the assignment of differently shaped
bundles of property rights might influence the perceived legitimisation on ac-
count of the simple fact that the holder of the more extensive rights perceives
himself and will be perceived as the owner by the holders of the fewer rights.
Here it should be pointed out that the exposed arguments hold interesting
analogies to the evolutionary theory of the firm. It is especially Nelson and
Winter (1982, pp. 108-109) who have interpreted the stabilisation of organisa-
tional structures in firms by custom along the lines of evolutionary biology.221
Here, Nelson and Winter interpret the stability of internal firm organisation
219The importance of legitimisation of authority has also been emphasised by Gintis (1976).
220The respective legitimisation will hereby be supported by the granting of certain property
rights, which however have to increase with the level of hierarchy.
221This is of course a very incomplete description of the literature, since numerous other con-
tributions have equally emphasised the analogies between evolutionary biology and the
theory of the firm.
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as a truce between the different members of the organisation. It seems ap-
propriate to transfer this idea to the interpretation of the employer-employee
relations as a class struggle between workers and capitalists.222 Note however
that, as Schlicht (2008, p.616) has criticised, the term “truce” suggests that sta-
bility of the hierarchy is only short-lived on account of the recurrent flare-up of
conflict between the parties; the view taken in this chapter is somewhat differ-
ent. Accordingly, it is not the case, as in the fashion of Umbeck (1981), that hi-
erarchies will be stabilised by the threat of violence or physical power. Rather,
the view suggests that after some initial fighting between employers and em-
ployees, the situation will be stabilised on account of the mutual acceptance
of entitlements and obligations as well as the development of certain routines.
Here perception and acceptance based custom rather than the recurrent threat
of physical violence stabilises the ownership structure within the boundaries
of the mutually accepted entitlements and obligations.223 Hence, after the vari-
ous conflicts between the parties have been terminated, everybody will accept
and defend the respective conventions, though someone might not even be
concerned from a change in the rules.224
Many authors have emphasised the analogies between the honouring of so-
cial boundaries and other regulations with the territorial behaviour of animals.
Here, the workings of Maynard-Smith (1978) on evolutionary game theory of-
fer an excellent way to underpin the claim that ultimately hierarchies will not
be stabilised by the threat of violence, since in many cases the outcome of fights
between animals does not reflect the power relations between the two parties.
In this context, Maynard-Smith and Parker (1976) and Maynard-Smith (1978)
have shown that, as Small et al. (2009, p.1213) put it,
222The interpretation of organisational equilibrium as a “truce” between the workers and the
capitalist also offers the chance to account for the criticism Lerner (1972, p. 259) has ut-
tered with respect to neoclassical economics “[a]n economic transaction is a solved political
problem. Economics has gained the title of the queen of social sciences by choosing solved
political problems as its domain.”. This is the case, since such a view explicitly accounts
for the quarrels between the respective groups and other problems of adjustment.
223Apparently this also implies that any violation of these boundaries would evoke severe
conflict on account of moralistic aggression.
224This also implies that people will stick to the routines, even though the routines contribute
to their “subordination”.
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“ [t]he outcome of aggression between males may also be influ-
enced by resource ownership, as the owner often enjoys a higher
probability of winning contests. This is because, when resources
are not limiting, there is selection in favour of simple decision rules
(for example, ‘owner wins’) that allow low-cost resolutions of con-
tests. [...]”
Hence, while initially physical power is likely to influence the outcome of a
fight on the ownership of a territory, the outcome of this fight, in the form
of ownership to the territory, also determines the outcome of other conflicts,
since both the intruder and the owner seem to abstract or generalise from the
outcome of the first fight to the outcome of other fights by looking at territo-
rial ownership. This will have the strange effect that the owner of a territory
will be more likely to succeed in a conflict on the territory, even in those cases
when the intruder is physically stronger than the owner himself. This own-
ership effect emerges due to the fact that the ownership of a territory induces
the owner to be more aggressive than the intruder. As both parties will take
this disposition into account,225 this influences their incentives for invading or
maintaining the territory.226 In this context, Schlicht (2008, p.616) has noted
that
“[the owner] has obtained, so to speak, an entitlement in the terri-
tory, which induces [him] to defend it more fiercely than [he] would
225The higher level of aggressiveness of the owner has also been interpreted in terms of asym-
metries in investment in a resource between the owner and the intruder. Yet, as Gintis
(2007, p.7) points out, this cannot sufficiently explain why the ownership effect can also be
found in cases where the first possession of the territory had only occurred several seconds
before the first conflict, such as in the cases of butterflies occupying sunny spots. This also
rules out the popular idea that the ownership effect emerges on account of the effect that
the owner of a territory has a constant supply of food, which allows him to gain an advan-
tage in the fights over the territory. For a short review of other explanations see Small et al.
(2009, p.1214).
226See Gintis (2007) for a game theoretic model of territorial fighting that drops the assumption
of exogenous levels of contribution, which had been one of the basic assumptions in the
original Hawk, Dove, Bourgeois game of Maynard-Smith and Parker (1976). Here, by ac-
counting for the endogeneity of the resources that are devoted to the contest by the parties,
Gintis (2007, pp.10-14) identifies the conditions for the rare occurrence of conflicts that are
characterised by an “intruder effect”.
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fight as an intruder, and the intruders’ aggressiveness is muted by
the partial recognition of the territorial rights of the owner [...]”
This implies that both the owner and the intruder accept the boundaries of
their territories. Although some initial quarreling and fighting may occur, it
seems to be the case that stability of the boundaries is more likely than over-
throw. This offers the possibility to explain the stabilisation of hierarchies and
the subordination of groups in the context of this chapter. The proposed view
of custom being responsible for coordinating worker behaviour hereby allows
for both accounting for the effects of worker consciousness on the effectiveness
of hierarchies and for a non-power/authority related explanation of subordi-
nation.
The next section will show how the stabilisation of hierarchies on the Seiser-
Alm can be interpreted by looking at the development of custom. This in-
dicates that it the perception or acceptance of the Schwaigbauern as the first
and legitimate owners of the Seiser-Alm might have contributed to stabilising
the ownership structure.227 Further, this section also proposes how the aim to
prevent the negative consequences of changing routines and custom through
authority has stabilised the ownership structure in spite of several inefficien-
cies.
3.4 Class Fragmentation, Efficient Boundaries
and Transaction Cost
In spite of the fact that the basic setup on the Seiser-Alm is different from the
classic understanding of a capitalist firm, it still seems feasible to analyse the
respective situation along the lines of social organisation. I will hereby draw on
insights from all of the different approaches of explaining the existence of firms
227This would also go in line with David Hume’s idea that “first possession” or “occupation” is
on of the immovable psychological rules to grant the stability of possession, which is sup-
posed as the basic aspect of the instrumental aspect of property rights assignment. Hence,
this implies that “[...] the concept of property emerges from rule perception and from a
desire to establish regularity.”(Schlicht, 1998, p.169). For a more detailed discussion see
Schlicht (1998, pp.151-171).
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and, as pointed out in section 3.2.3, this will offer the possibility to answer
several questions with respect to the property rights structure on the Seiser-
Alm, which the traditional theory of property rights had left unanswered.
3.4.1 The Problem of Efficient Boundaries
The first question I want to resolve is why the Schwaigbauern did not decide to
transfer all of the land on the Seiser-Alm to their private ownership in the be-
ginning. Apparently, this would have offered a better opportunity for them to
regulate the utilisation of the pasture in their interest in contrast to transferring
only smaller shares of land into their private ownership.
Though there are a variety of reasons that may have contributed to such a
decision - reaching from social responsibility to the influence of the court of
Kastelruth and to the aim to provide related community members with some
additional form of income - there are also purely economic reasons for such
a decision. This may become more clear if one keeps in mind that a decision
on the size of farmland and the causes for constraining ownership can also be
analysed by looking at the determinants of the boundaries of the firm. Here, a
purely instrumental view, in the fashion of Coase (1937) and Ellickson (1993),
offers a way to explain the considerations that have led to the self-restraint of
the first Schwaigbauern. The most basic form of the argument builds on the
simple observation that there are not only positive aspects to land ownership.
Most basically, there exist the costs of fencing and of other forms of perimeter
monitoring as well as the costs that are directly related to either production
or leaving the land idle. Hence it would just be a matter of equating marginal
benefits and marginal costs of additional units of land to determine the optimal
size of private land ownership.
In a similar though more sophisticated fashion, this has also been noted by
Ellickson (1993, pp.1132-1135), who has pointed out that different economic
activities are usually tied to production facilities of different optimal size. This
can be directly transferred to agricultural production on the Seiser-Alm. While
cattle usually stray over a wide area to satisfy each cow’s nutritional needs,
the production of hay is highly labour intensive and it therefore takes place
141
3 Between Justin and Bartholomew
on smaller units of land. This however implies that the optimal size of land
for the keeping of livestock will be larger than the optimal size for the produc-
tion of hay. Yet, while it would in principle have been feasible to disregard
the optimal size of land for the production of hay and organise both activi-
ties on a larger than optimal area, this would have imposed high costs on the
farmers. These costs would simply emerge out of the necessity to monitor
the individually owned parcels of land or out of the necessity to provide fenc-
ing and other forms of perimeter monitoring, which would increase with the
size of the area enclosed.228 Yet, as a second hypothetical choice, it would also
have been possible to disregard the optimal size of land for the keeping of live-
stock and graze the cattle on smaller than optimal sizes of land. Yet this would
also impose costs since it would obviously increase the damages to the plant
surface and reduce the effective amount of fodder available to every cow. Ac-
cordingly, the requirements of grazing the livestock on large fields and making
hay on small fields seem to have shaped the decision for parcels of less than
maximal size.229
Finally, though this may explain the existence of less than maximal pieces of
private land, the present argument does not answer the question of why any
land was transferred to the less privileged groups at all. Here, there is also a
purely economic reason that can at least explain a part of the appropriation
rights that were granted to the Wiesenschwaigbauern. By allowing more peo-
ple to mow parts of the pastureland, the Schwaigbauern managed to reduce
the costs of leaving the land idle. The costs of idle land emerge for example
on account of the uncontrolled growing of scrub and weeds, which in the long
run would have prevented an efficient utilisation of the meadows as a pasture;
this would have prevented the cows of the Schwaigbauern from finding a suf-
ficient amount of fodder on the pasture. Hence, by granting the mowing right
to other farmers, this also transferred the necessity to invest in the maintenance
of the pasture and, therefore, the partial transfer of land can be interpreted as
228Further, there are also the ecological and economic costs of leaving the land idle that will be
explained below.
229This is just one of the many arguments to explain why different forms of economic utilisa-
tion may implement changes in ownership structures. I have highlighted some of these
explanations in the first part of this dissertation.
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a cheap way of conserving the landscape.230 Accordingly, a setup which shifts
different production activities to differently sized areas of land is optimal in-
sofar as it reduces losses that would otherwise evolve out of the organisational
structure or the land remaining idle. This might also contribute to explaining
why not all of the farmland was transferred into the private ownership of the
Schwaigbauern.
3.4.2 The Problem of Class Fragmentation
The second ambiguity I want to resolve addresses why a fairly complex form of
ownership rights was chosen to stabilise the privileges of the Schwaigbauern,
even though other forms could have easily achieved similar results while si-
multaneously reducing the overall level of transaction costs. Apparently, it
would have been far easier and less costly for the Schwaigbauern to monitor
one instead of two different ownership groups. Apart from the instrumen-
tal causes that have been depicted in section 3.2 and which have suggested
that the increasing population numbers in addition to equal utilisation rights
would have reduced the utilisation opportunities for the Schwaigbauern, there
exists another approach how to explain this fact. As already stated in section
3.3.1.3, class fragmentation has been identified as an important means to in-
fluence worker behaviour in the interests of the capitalists. In this vain, Gintis
(1976, p.48) has argued that
“[t]he solidarity of a worker coalition depends on the degree of
commonality of interests [...]. The employer can then prevent
230There is also a second explanation for the granting of mowing rights on the Seiser-Alm,
which draws on the observation that the quality of the fodder for the cows is affected pos-
itively by the “double burden” of mowing and grazing. This is because the livestock tends
to aerate the surface of the soil and also contributes to the destruction of bad weeds, which
otherwise would suffocate other plants. Further, the combined occurrence of mowing and
grazing also reduces the growth of the meadow saffron, which is noxious for the cattle.
This could explain the willingness of the Schwaigbauern to transfer parts of the pasture-
land to other groups instead of making it their own property. Yet, one should also keep the
other consequences in mind that stem from the simple observation that the quality of the
hay would have been increased to a greater amount than the quality of the grass. Hence,
this argument would suppose that the less privileged groups would also have profited
from their fields serving as a pasture for the cattle of the Schwaigbauern.
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coalition-formation by fragmenting work groups [...]”
Interestingly, such a form of dividing subgroups with the help of different in-
terests can also be observed in the present case study. As the Wiesenschwaig-
bauern as the second group in the hierarchy owned more extensive rights than
the Wiesenbauern, this prevented collusion and impeded a concerted action
against the privileged position of the Schwaigbauern. This was due to the sim-
ple reason that any aim of the least privileged group to abolish the pasturing
servitude of the Schwaigbauern would have simultaneously been accompa-
nied by a reduction of the privileges of the Wiesenschwaigbauern, who also
had the right to pasture their livestock on the fields of the Wiesenbauern.231
Accordingly, not all of the farmers represented by the court of Kastelruth were
interested in the abolishment of all the privileges of the Schwaigbauern and
this might have created some interest conflicts within these groups. Con-
versely, any reduction in the complexity of the ownership structure would
have been accompanied by an alignment in the interests of the other two
groups. Hence, this would have made it much more difficult for the Schwaig-
bauern to defend their privileges against the other owners of private farmland.
An equalisation of utilisation rights would not only have strengthened the op-
position with respect to the utilisation of the pasture areas but also with respect
to other aspects of social life. Here, one should note, as the contributions of
Ausserer (1937) and Nössing (2001) suggest, that the property rights structure
on the Seiser-Alm was stabilised by the creation of correspondent social groups
in the community of Kastelruth. This was carried out by tying voice and voting
rights in the political assembly to the different levels of appropriation rights on
the Seiser-Alm. Hence, the class fragmentation that was induced with the help
of different utilisation rights on the pasture also showed itself with respect to
other aspects of social life and, therefore, any change in the utilisation of the
Seiser-Alm would have led to a reorganisation of the whole social structure.
231Here the distinction between routines and custom on the one side and command on the
other in the present coordination device may be a little problematic. This is because we
know that the prohibitions were also written down in the official regulations and that any
infringement of this norm was punished. Yet, this norm, independent of any possibility to
enforce it externally, apparently contributed to the shaping of certain routines.
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Finally, the maintenance of the respective ownership and utilisation struc-
ture can also be interpreted from the viewpoint that human behaviour is
guided by the individual perception of one’s own role in the organisation and
the correspondingly created entitlements and obligations. While I have in-
ferred that this form of behaviour will lead to the acceptance of certain aspects
and circumstances, it has also been noted that such behaviour usually takes
place in certain well established boundaries. Hence, given that one accepts that
the establishment of property rights for the Wiesenschwaigbauern created cus-
tom by shaping entitlements and obligations, then it seems straightforward to
accept that any attempt to deprive this group of their entitlements by reducing
property rights would have caused severe problems by leading to moralistic
aggression, which, according to Schlicht (1998, pp.30-31.)
“is irrational in the sense that it would require each of the parties
to engage in actions that worsen their position, but it is precisely
this [...] disposition to act aggressively in non-normal cases that
sustains smooth transactions in the normal case.”
3.4.3 The Problem of Inefficiencies and Positive Transaction
Costs
The previous sections have answered questions regarding the complexity of
the ownership structure on the Seiser-Alm as well as the question of why not
all of the land was transferred into the ownership of the Schwaigbauern. How-
ever, so far I have not touched on the question of the remaining inefficiencies
in the institutional structure as well as the problem of high transaction costs.
I therefore start this final section by looking at one specific aspect of ineffi-
ciencies on the Seiser-Alm, and analysing the problems and ambiguities which
stem from the rigidity of confining the pasturing servitude to the period be-
tween the 1st of June and the 24th of August and from the purpose of the
servitude itself.232 While the reasons for the existence of the servitude remain
232Again, this raises the question of why such a complicated form of property rights had been
chosen to stabilise the privileges of the Schwaigbauern.
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somewhat in the dark, it seems obvious that rigid enforcement of regulari-
ties also imposed several costs on the community, since at least some more
flexibility with respect to the vacating the meadows would have clearly im-
proved the overall welfare in the system. As the ripening of the grass clearly
depended on the weather conditions, this should also have affected the time
of harvest. Hence, in the case of bad weather conditions, the granting of an ex-
tension of just one more day beyond the 24th of August would have allowed
the less privileged groups to bring in the hay. On the other hand such an ex-
tension would not have imposed a big loss on the Schwaigbauern, since this
would just have meant leaving their cattle on the commons for one more day
instead of grazing them on the meadows of the other groups.233 Clearly such a
flexibilisation would have increased the overall level of production in the com-
munity, even more so as the gains from a more flexible handling of the norms
could have been employed to compensate the Schwaigbauern for their (small)
losses.234 Yet, apart from the problem of enforcing theoretical claims of com-
pensation, there is also another problem that emerges from the presupposed
consequences of property rights formation for individual behaviour that can
be used to explain the refusal to adapt more flexible norms.
This will become more clear if one keeps the psychological consequences of
ownership in mind. In the previous sections, it was suggested that the per-
ception of ownership of the superiors had certain behavioural consequences
which were especially apparent in the willingness to subordinate under the
authority of the respective group. In the present case study, this has been justi-
fied by referring to the importance of the rule of first possession and the over-
all perception of the Schwaigbauern as being the first and legitimate owners of
233Remember that after the 24th of August, cows were grazed on the meadows and this would
have implied the destruction of the harvest or the hay by the cows of the Schwaigbauern.
234In addition, there also exist the high costs of enforcing such a form of ownership through
monitoring the agreement. Furthermore, the determination of such strict limits also in-
creased the costs of production and contributed to the dissipation of resources. This was
because since the limitation to certain processing times obviously did not take account of
the weather conditions which affected the growth of the plant surface while it also con-
tributed to the concentration of working load in the last weeks of the summer. Finally, a
more flexible interpretation of the rules would have allowed the owners to fertilise their
meadows and this would obviously have contributed to a more efficient production form
for all farmers on the pasture.
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the Seiser-Alm.235 Yet, such a view apparently implies that, given that the per-
ception of ownership by some other criterion was established, the behavioural
implications of such a newly established form of ownership would change.
Different perceptions of ownership can therefore be expected to cause un-
wished behavioural consequences such as the emergence of what Williamson
(1975, 1985) has called opportunistic behaviour or the negative consequences
for surplus extraction that have been emphasised by Gintis (1976). Any such
behaviour would apparently impose a severe threat for the privileges of the
Schwaigbauern and for the stability of the group and therefore one can suggest
that the Schwaigbauern would have been interested in preventing the others
from perceiving themselves as the owners of their hayfields. Once again it is
Hume (2000, pp.326-327) who provides for the identification of a different cri-
terion of establishing ownership perception that fits well to explain the presup-
posed negative consequences of such a change on the Seiser-Alm. Here, it is
the importance of prescription or, more explicitly, the importance of long pos-
session that is likely to create competing ownership perceptions. It is straight-
forward to see that the presence of long-term possession of the hayfields could
have led to ownership perceptions that would have triggered the described
unfavourable consequences for the Schwaigbauern.
It is therefore possible to interpret the rigidity of the pasturing servitude
and the servitude itself as a means to prevent ownership perceptions of the
less privileged groups from arising out of the long term possession of hay-
fields. The pasturing servitude, apart from granting the instrumental purpose
of being able to graze the cattle on the meadows, hereby makes sure that both
the Wiesenschwaigbauern and the Wiesenbauern perceived themselves as the
holders of a limited utilization right instead of considering themselves own-
ers. Hence, the servitude can be understood as a way to save on the costs that
would arise out of the opportunistic behaviour that is related to the establish-
ment of different ownership perceptions. Further, the rigidity of the regulation
can be interpreted as a way to protect the norm of pasturing servitude against
235David Hume has labelled the rule of first possession “occupation” while simultaneously
emphasizing the importance of this form of establishing psychological justifications for the
stability of ownership. (Hume, 2000, pp.324-326)
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erosion.236 As a more flexible norm would more likely have been washed out,
this would allow for an erosion of the norm in general and lead to the estab-
lishment of an unwanted establishment of ownership perceptions. This would
further imply that such a rigid regimentation would be perpetuated even in
those cases where it did not serve any instrumental purpose.237
Hence, given that, as proposed by Schlicht (1998), the described problems
of opportunistic behaviour might be interpreted to constitute a different form
of transaction costs,238 then this will also explain the various inefficiencies or,
even better, will justify deviations from the optimal degree of exploitation, pro-
duction or investment.239 Yet the view of inefficiencies in one dimension of
the property rights system resulting from the aim to prevent ’opportunistic
transaction costs’ that would emerge on account of different ownership per-
ceptions, offers the chance to explain the existence of the last ambiguities on
236One could also interpret the rigidity of the utilization periods in the sense of clarity as pro-
posed by Schlicht (1998, pp.67-86), yet as I have not exposed the fundamental premises of
this argumentation, I abstain from proceeding in this manner.
237Though such a hypothesis cannot be confirmed with respect to the Seiser-Alm, the situa-
tion in the community of Aldein/Radein in South Tyrol allows for a similar interpretation.
In the 19th century, this German community sold the right to utilize the surface of some
former community pastures to Italian farmers from the nearby Fiemme valley. Yet this
happened under the prerequisite that the Italian farmers had to gain the approval of the
German community for every construction on the pasture. Further, they were forced to
transfer the pasture to the German farmers after St. Bartholomew’s day. In spite of the
fact that the community of Aldein/Radein draws no profit from such a regimentation, and
the additional utility to the German farmers from grazing their cows on the respective
pastures is limited under the present state of agricultural production, the regimentation is
maintained up to the present day.
238In the context of the perceptional theory of the firm, Schlicht (2008) has pointed out that the
alignment of the different control mechanisms with the help of psychological consistency
requirements - that is, the avoidance of negative chemical reactions - as a potential solution.
Note that the proposed argument of the importance of such a different form of transaction
costs builds on the contributions of Schlicht (1998, 2008) and Kubon-Gilke (1997). In the
broadest sense, the proposed view can also be related to the concept of “moral transaction
costs” that has been proposed by Kubon-Gilke (1997, pp.419-420) and Schlicht (1998, pp.
186-189).
239Further, note that this chapter does not intend to give a sufficient treatment of the question
of how property rights influence human behaviour and why they are important. Here
Schlicht (1998) and Kubon-Gilke (1997, pp.384-451) have proved far more competent to
cope with the task of providing the foundations for the influence of property rights and
ownership on human behaviour.
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the Seiser-Alm.240 Here, it seems reasonable to suggest that the likely effect of
“psychological costs”, which are the costs of changing customs and routines,
in addition to the costs to arise out of opportunistic behaviour, might have pre-
vented changes towards a higher level of production efficiency or towards an
increase in the level of surplus extraction.
Finally, though the exposed explanation of the ownership structure on the
Seiser-Alm has offered several important insights, two of them seem especially
worth mentioning. First of all, the view expressed in this chapter suggests that
there might be more to the existence of transaction costs than constituting ob-
stacles that prohibit a community to reach a higher level of efficiency. Rather,
it seems to be the case that, as also mentioned by Schlicht (1998, pp.184-190
), certain forms of rituals, norms or regimentation constitute important fac-
tors in stabilizing different ownership arrangements. Hence, although such
“frictions” might exist at the cost of efficiency or some other goal, they con-
tribute to the stability of an ownership system; it therefore seems necessary to
include them in any analysis of property rights systems or institutional change.
Second, it should be noted that the view of property rights that has been pre-
sented in this chapter is very much distinct from the view of property being
nothing more than a social construct. This conception of property arising out
of mutual agreement between different social parties usually builds the com-
mon understanding of ownership in the new institutional economics. Yet, as
addressed above, such a view misses out on the important fact that non-social
conventions and conformities will strongly contribute to the establishment of
ownership and the perception of ownership being established. Hence owner-
ship on the Seiser-Alm might have been established in partially the same way
as ownership has been established as ownership on Robinson’s lone island be-
fore the arrival of Friday: by imagination forming an inner connection between
the object and its owner.
240Accordingly, this argument can be interpreted as an application of the ideas of Gintis (1976)
and Williamson (1975, 1985) to the consequences of changing ownership structures and
perceptions.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the formation of property rights and the implica-
tions of land ownership on the Seiser-Alm by applying them to both the Marx-
ist and the perceptional theory of the firm. In this context, the findings have
implied that inefficiencies in maintaining the functioning of the resource as
well as limitations on the optimal degree of extracting surplus value can be
understood well from the view of the costs that arise out of violating existent
forms of customs or routines. Finally, the chapter has emphasized the impor-
tance of certain forms of transaction costs in stabilizing ownership arrange-
ments and advocated for a more thorough consideration of the psychological
factors and consequences of ownership formation.
Since the chapter has in large parts adopted the terminology of Marxist class
struggle, some minor notes on the utilisation and the analysis of the purpose of
hierarchies in general seem to be adequate. Though this chapter has analysed
the stabilisation of property and social relations by employing the terminol-
ogy of the Marxist theory of the firm, the exposed understanding of property
and institutions in this section is quite different from the view of Marx. While
Marx interprets property as a social construction, the view of this chapter em-
phasises the importance of non social acceptance based foundations of prop-
erty. Accordingly, there seem to exist three different approaches to justify the
existence of hierarchies in business firms. First of all, the neoclassical view
interprets hierarchies as the outcome of productivity related efficiency consid-
erations. Obviously, this theory offers no room for analysing the struggles be-
tween employers and employees. Second, the radical approach to hierarchies,
which is generally referred to as the Marxist approach, asserts that hierarchies
only serve the purpose of oppressing the workers and extracting surplus value.
In the basic understanding of this theory, as expressed by Marglin (1974), Stone
(1974) and to a minor extent by Gintis (1976), there is no room for the efficiency
enhancing side of hierarchies, since non-hierarchical organisation forms are
perceived as equally efficient while simultaneously yielding a higher level of
job satisfaction. Finally, there is Williamson (1980) who emphasises the bene-
ficial side of hierarchies in reducing transaction costs. Yet, it seems that none
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of these three theories is able to explain the purpose of hierarchies to a satis-
factory extent. While both the neoclassical and the Marxist approach have to
be criticised on account of their claim of exclusiveness and the failure to ex-
plicitly account for transaction costs, the transaction costs approach has to be
criticised for missing out on the important fact that certain transaction costs
may serve the important task of stabilising ownership structures and property
rights, and that an ultimate prevention of these factors might even be harmful
to both efficiency and surplus extraction.241
Note that it has neither been the intention of this chapter to argue that hier-
archies cannot be beneficial to either form of efficiency in an internal organisa-
tion, nor that hierarchy is to be understood exclusively in terms of class strug-
gle or transaction costs. Rather it has been the basic intention of this chapter
to show that there exist certain situations in which hierarchies have to be in-
terpreted as the outcome of processes that sacrifice efficiency for the profit of a
certain group.242
Finally, the supposed analysis of the ownership structure on the Seiser-Alm
might, in spite of its partial incompleteness, point not only to a new form of
institutional analysis, as proposed by Kubon-Gilke (1997) and Schlicht (1998,
2008), but also contribute to the following understanding. Stability is not ef-
ficiency and efficiency may neither be just nor desirable. This should be kept
in mind before analysing institutional arrangements and before implicitly jus-
tifying the misery of unprivileged groups by providing it with the label of
an undefined form of efficiency, as encountered sometimes in economic argu-
ments.
241Furthermore, it should be noted that one of the basic criticisms to neoclassical economics can
also be applied to an unreflected form of transaction cost economics: just because a certain
institution is efficient (in terms of transaction costs), this does not automatically imply that
it is also desirable. Apparently, such a view would implicitly accept that social injustice
might be justified on account of transaction cost efficiency.
242 With the underlying conviction of this section in mind I would answer the question of
whether hierarchies will always be the outcome of a (transaction cost) efficient process in
the same fashion as the question of whether hierarchies are always to be viewed as the
outcome of class struggle - with a “no”.
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4 The Hidden Frontier: Property
Rights and Minority Language
Survival in the Italian Alps
4.1 Introduction
An analysis of property rights in general and more specific the one of the fac-
tors that lead to the establishement of different ownership forms is not only
an end in itself but also offers the opportunity to explain other economic phe-
nomena. In this chapter I use an analysis of property rights structures to ex-
plain the linguistic survival of minority language groups as well as linguistic
and cultural segregation in the presence of strong economic incentives for lin-
guistic assimilation. For the last couple of years, public attention has been in-
creasingly concerned with the destruction of cultural heritage and the demise
of minority languages within Europe. The European Union recently stated in
course of the “European Day of Languages” that a majority of Europe’s minor-
ity languages were bound to disappear over the next years, since the number
of native speakers of these idioms had subsequently been declining. Neverthe-
less, many of the endangered language groups have survived the pressure to
assimilate, in spite of having a comparatively small number of native speakers
and facing severe economic disadvantages. However, the basic understanding
of the assimilation process which is backing up the gloomy predictions of the
European Union seem to make it worthwhile to analyse the problem from an
economic point of view. Most commonly, economic approaches to minority
language survival predict linguistic assimilation to emerge as a direct conse-
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quence of minority groups engaging in trade with larger groups as this will
offer a chance to improve the wealth of the groups involved. Accordingly, the
question of linguistic assimilation is analysed as a basic decision on the costs
and benefits of acquiring more human capital by learning another language.
Yet it is not the nature of this assimilation process which generates problems.
Rather, the basic approach of several studies to explain minority language sur-
vival by referring to exogenously given assimilation costs has to be questioned
since it does not offer an adequate description of the social processes that lead
to minority language survival. Though the view that exogenous costs - which
could arise out of the necessity to overcome geographical isolation or linguis-
tic distance - are responsible for the purity of a language may be justified in
the cases of very isolated groups,243 it certainly fails to explain the century
long persistence of those language minorities that lived in close vicinity to
highly populated areas on the European continent. Here, the analysis of prop-
erty rights is able to provide a theory of linguistic and cultural segregation
that goes beyond the geographical isolation or a simple taste-for-linguistic-
independence approach. Therefore, the present approach is required to gain a
better understanding of the underlying factors that lead to the maintenance of
linguistic autonomy.
In this contribution I introduce an approach to explain the stabilisation of
minority language use by looking at the case of small scale language commu-
nities in the Italian Alps. Although historically the respective groups have
consisted of a comparatively small number of native speakers, they refused to
assimilate linguistically and accepted several economic disadvantages in spite
of being located in close vicinity to the Italian language group in the pros-
perous urban areas of Northern Italy. With respect to the German speaking
minority in the Fersina Valley, which is a small mountain valley close to the
city of Trent in Northern Italy, I argue that several institutional arrangements
were adopted to deal with the severe climatic and environmental conditions in
the valley and these factors rather than the geographic isolation of the group
are responsible for their linguistic survival.
In line with Viazzo (1989) and other research in ecological anthropology, I
243Here the speakers of Gaelic on the Aran Islands west of the Irish coast come to mind.
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show that the production patterns of peasant communities that live under se-
vere environmental conditions are fundamentally different from those in other
parts of the world. Here, environmental and climatic factors render agricul-
tural production highly labour intensive and this imposes the necessity to
maintain a sufficiently high degree of manpower in the community to allow
the groups to survive. Further, this constraint shapes production patterns by
introducing a mixed production strategy that includes the production of field
crops and the keeping of livestock on both collectively and privately owned
farmland. Here, it is the necessity to protect the collectively owned resources
against the detrimental influences of individualism - these are factors that cre-
ate the omnipresent threat of the “tragedy of the commons” - that stabilizes
minority language use. The high degree of mutual dependence between the
community members offers effective ways of social punishment and this per-
mits the communities to satisfy the requirement of a socially dependent work-
force. The consequences of economic production being influenced by environ-
mental constraints culminate in a high degree of endogamous marriages in the
communities.
The second part of this chapter gives a short overview on the general situ-
ation of linguistic minorities in the Italian Alps before turning to the linguis-
tic, social, and economic situation of the German language minorities in the
Fersina Valley. The third part proceeds by introducing an approach to interpret
the question of linguistic assimilation on the basis of some basic economic con-
siderations. Section 4.4 analyzes the climatic and environmental constraints on
the agricultural production patterns in mountain areas. The link to the linguis-
tic survival of small scale language communities is established by analysing
the interconnection between marriage patterns, inheritance schemes and pro-
duction costs.
4.2 Minority Languages
This section provides a short overview of the situation of language minorities
on the European continent with a special focus on the situation of the Middle
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High German language communities in the Italian Alps.
4.2.1 Upland Language Minorities in the Alpine Region
According to page 2 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Lan-
guages, minority languages are languages that are:
“[...] traditionally used within a given territory of a state by Nation-
als of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the rest
of the State’s population [...].”
Though this definition - on account of the exclusion of dialects and the
languages of non-nationals - in general appears too restrictive for an all-
embracing study of minority language survival, it serves sufficiently well for
the purposes of this chapter. Out of the 91 different languages which are spo-
ken on the European continent, 47 are spoken by 500 000 speakers or less (Pan,
2008, p.14). Furthermore, out of those 47, another 22 languages are spoken
by less than 100 000 people. Currently, Cornish (1000 speakers), Manx-Gaelic
(300 speakers) and Livonian (135 speakers) are considered the most endan-
gered languages in the European Union.
According to Steinicke (2006), the area in Western Europe with the highest
ethnolinguistic diversity is the Alpine region in Italy. The region comprises the
minority idioms Slovene, Occitan, Franco-Provencal, German, Middle High
German dialect forms, and Rhaethoromanic languages such as Ladin and Friu-
lian. The population sizes of these groups, which are in most cases fully sur-
rounded by the Italian speaking majority, reaches, as Table 1 shows, from over
half a million speakers of Friulian to only 7700 speakers of different Middle
High German dialects that used to be spoken in the Holy Roman Empire in
the Middle Ages. Geographically, speakers of both the seven minority idioms
and speakers of the different German dialects are widely scattered across the
Alpine region. Speakers of Friulian occupy parts of northeastern Italy close to
and also within the city of Udine, while the second biggest linguistic group -
which consists of close to 300 000 speakers of (modern) German - lives in the
autonomous region of South Tyrol. Close to the French border in the western
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Number of speakers Location
Friulian 526 000 Friaul/Udine
German 288 000 Trentino- Alto Adige
Occitan 178 000 Torino/Cuneo
Franco-Provencal 90 000 Aosta/Torino/Piedmont
Slovene 60 000 Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Ladin 43 000 Trentino- Alto Adige /Veneto
Middle High German 7 700 See Table 2
Table 4.1: Language minorities in the Italian Alps (Maurer-Lausegger, 2004,
pp.5-18)
part of the country, two Gallo-Romanic idioms, Occitan and Franco-Provencal
are spoken, while the Slovene language minority can mostly be found in the
eastern part of the country. Finally, the Ladin group, whose language is re-
lated to both to Friulian and the Romansh idioms in Switzerland, is spoken in
some valleys in the Northern part of the Italian Alps (Maurer-Lausegger, 2004,
pp.11-13).
The present chapter will focus on the case of the few small language commu-
nities that employ different versions of Middle High German up to the present
day. This predecessor of today’s High German was spoken all over the Ger-
man language area from the 11th to the 14th century, but today can be found
exclusively in 6 locations that are scattered all over the Italian Alps.244 Here,
it is the comparatively low number of native speakers, the fact of being com-
pletely enclosed from the Italian language area, the geographical confine from
244Note that each of the language groups has been preserved a different version of Middle High
German and this renders the communication between the communities, at least without
reverting to more modern forms of German or on Italian, virtually impossible.
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Location Number of Speakers Location
Aosta and Sesia Valley 2950 Piedmont
Tischlwang (Timau) 2000 Udine
Zahre and Canal Valley 500 Udine
Pladen 1400 Belluno
Fersina Valley 1000 Trentino- Alto Adige
Lusern 370 Trentino- Alto Adige
Table 4.2: Speakers of Middle High German in the Italian Alps (Pan and Pfeil,
2000, p.89)
each other, as well as - at least in most cases - lower level of economic prosper-
ity in comparison to the surrounding Italian majority that renders these cases
interesting from an economic point of view. Table 2 lists the respective linguis-
tic enclaves and shows that they are scattered all across the whole range of the
Italian Alps, reaching from the Aosta Valley and the Sesia Valley in the west to
the communities Tischlwang (Timau), Zahre, and Pladen close to the Slovene
border in the east. In the following parts of this chapter I will focus on lan-
guage minority in the Fersina Valley that is located in the central part of the
Alps.245
245Note that there are also three other settlements in the area that still use old German dialects.
These are the community of Lusern and the so called VII and XIII Cimbrian communities
in the region of Veneto, close to the cities of Vicenza and Verona. In the latter ones however,
the German dialect is with the exception of some 50 speakers in the community of Roana
and a handful of elderly people in the village of Giazza, extinct.
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4.2.2 The German Language Minority in the Fersina Valley
In the year 1923, the Austrian author Robert Musil, who stayed in the valley
during parts of the Great War, noted in his novella “Grigia” 246
“There were odd people living at the end of this valley. Their an-
cestors had arrived from Germany at the time of the sovereignty
of the Trent bishops, and they had up to the present day, outlasted
like a weathered rock between the Italian population. They partly
had forgotten and partly had conserved their old way of living, not
understanding it either.”
4.2.2.1 On the Linguistic and Economic Segregation in the Fersina
Valley
The Fersina Valley is a typical v-shaped Alpine high valley which is situated
at altitude levels of 700m - 1000m. It is located approximately 20 km east of
the city of Trent and spreads 2 kilometres northeast from the town of Pergine
at the beginning of the Sugana Valley.247 Entering the valley from the town
of Pergine, the geographic, economic, and linguistic segregation becomes evi-
dent immediately. In general, the valley is characterized by the fast increasing
steepness of the hillside, which is more pronounced on the left hand side of
the Fersina torrent that divides the valley into two parts. Furthermore, several
geographic differences have also contributed to a economic segregation of the
valley. The area on the right hand side of the Fersina Torrent - which faces
the southeast - is characterized by a comparatively higher level of agricultural
prosperity that only decreases towards the end of the valley. The left hand side
of the torrent - which faces the northwest - is rather unsuitable for agricultural
production (Bellinello, 1990, p.75). This difference is due to a rather moder-
ate increase in altitude, a comparatively high amount of agricultural land, rich
vegetation, and a high amount of sunshine on the more prosperous side. The
246Musil (1992, p.8 my own translation)
247Often, the Fersina Valley is also referred to by the synonyms “Valle delle Mòcheni”, “Val
Fersina”, “Fersental” or “Bersntol” . Yet in this study I will stick to the term Fersina Val-
ley.
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other side is more steep and offers a comparatively poor quality of soil and
a small amount of farmland in general. Furthermore, this side of the torrent
is dominated by pastures and forests. Here, the vegetation mostly consists of
shrubberies and groves (Bellinello, 1990, p.75).248
Finally, the linguistic segregation of the valley reveals itself on account of the
fact that there are four villages that still use the Middle High German language
form. This dialect dates back to the time when settlers from Bavaria joined the
Italian population of the valley. Three of the four settlements - Gereut, Eichleit,
and Florutz - are located on the left, less fertile, side of the Fersina Torrent
(Mastrelli-Anzilotti, 1994).249 Only the most remote German settlement, Palai,
is, like the five Italian villages (Canezza, Serso, Viarago, Mala and St. Orsola),
located on the right side of the torrent (Pettener et al., 1994, p.131).250
While the valley had been jointly inhabited by both language groups for
more than 800 years, in our day and age most of the remaining 1000 members
of the “German” minority in Florutz, Palai, and Eichleit still use the dialect in
their day to day lives, while another 1300 live outside the valley.251 In Gereut
the German dialect appears to be almost extinct.252
248Note that the geographic ’amenities’ of the northwestern part of the valley do not apply to
the location of the only German settlement, Palai. On account of the surrounding moun-
tains it receives less sunshine, while the amount of arable land also appears to be small.
249It is said that the hillside in the German parts of the valley is so steep that in the German
communities there is no proper place to build a bowling alley. Furthermore, the Italian
population of the valley states that the German inhabitants of the valley can be recognized
fairly easily. They claim that the geographic conditions of their habitat have forced the
Germans to adopt a specific gait, which arises from both feet never being situated at the
same altitude.
250Of course, nomenclatures such as “Italian” or “German” are the result of political devel-
opments that took place several centuries later. They therefore can only restrictively be
applied to the situation described here. Yet as I am interested in the relations of two differ-
ent linguistic groups, I consider it appropriate to continue using these terms in the course
of the chapter.
251Most of the German inhabitants in the valley can also speak Italian, while only the minority
of the Italians speaks German and only a few can speak the old German dialect.
252Note that the homepage of the community of Gereut reports that 95.2% of the population
of this community considers themselves as members of the German language minority,
while 70.3% state that they can understand the dialect and 68.1% indicate that they use the
dialect in every day transactions. Yet, since today the village Eichleit constitutes a district
of Gereut, these numbers reflect the number of speakers in both communities. With respect
to the numbers depicted here, I rely on my personal conversation with Prof. Dr. Anthony
Rowley, who has worked on the situation of the linguistic minority in the Fersina Valley.
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1880 1900 1910 1962 1983
Gereut 100 236 320 15 47
Eichleit 176 334 357 340 231
Florutz 331 614 674 376 284
Palai 454 430 399 348 243
Table 4.3: Development of the German Population in the Valle dei Mòcheni
(1880- 1983) (Mirtes, 1996, Table VIII)
4.2.2.2 Population Development
Usually, an analysis of the population development of the linguistic groups
would offer a chance to gain a better understanding of the assimilation process
that has shaped the situation of the language group over the past decades.
Unfortunately, such an analysis can - on account of the poor quality of the data
- only provide unsatisfactory results in the present case study.
Table 3 depicts the development of the German speaking population in the
four remaining communities from 1880 - 1983 on the basis of the study by
Mirtes (1996, Table VIII).253 The first issue of note is that on average the Ger-
man population had increased in all settlements up to the year 1910, before
dropping in the years 1962 and 1983. The decline of the German language is
most pronounced in Gereut, although the numbers in the other communities
also decreased by a considerable amount. Though it is not easy to explain this
development, it might be appropriate to ascribe this decrease in population
The same information can also be found in Rowley (1986, 2008).
253The population level for Florutz combines the population of the two districts Ausser- and
Innerflorutz. No data were available for the population of Ausserflorutz in 1983. Further-
more, it should be noted that because Eichleit belongs administratively to Gereut, most
studies, e.g. Bellinello (1990, p.78), report the numbers of both settlements combined for
Gereut. However, since both villages are clearly distinct geographically and there is a pro-
nounced difference in the way the German population has developed in both villages, I
report the data separately.
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numbers between 1910 and 1962 to the quasi forced emigration of the German
population of the valley to the Czech Republic during World War II (Wurzer,
1969, p.84). Furthermore, Bellinello (1990, pp.78-79) states that an improve-
ment in infrastructure as well as the increased opportunity to engage in wage
labour in the nearby cities of Pergine and Trent are likely explanations for the
reduction of the German language in the valley.
The second characteristic factor of the population development depicted in
table 3 is the near doubling of the German population in Gereut, Eichleit, and
Florutz between 1880 and 1900. As it is hardly possible to find a sufficient and
reliable explanation for such an extreme change in population numbers, the
following considerations also serve as an indicator for the already addressed
poor quality of the population data. First of all, one of the most severe prob-
lems that may have affected the numbers depicted in table 3 emerges out of the
political tensions of the time. In spite of the fact that the valley was divided be-
tween the Italian and the German population for centuries, there was always
a small number of people of the other language group, which inhabited farm-
steads outside the settlements of their own language group (Bellinello, 1990,
p.78). This severely affected the quality of the data in political times. In the
19th century both the Italian and German nationalist forces tried to claim the
valley for their ethnic group. On account of these ideological tensions, both the
administration of the Habsburg empire and the local Italian administrations,
who were influenced by the “Irredenta” movement among the Italians, had
the incentive to overstate the population numbers in the population census254
in order to gain a stronger moral position in the quarrel on the question of
the Fersina Valley being of German or Italian ancestry (Bellinello, 1990, pp.78-
79).255
The poor data quality is also confirmed by a comparison with other studies.
254Bellinello (1990, p.78) further alludes to severe technical problems with the collection of the
data in the period up to 1921.
255There is also another explanation for the huge increase of the German population between
1880 and 1900. As the economic activity in the valley included the temporary emigration
of males (up to 50%) in the winter time to seek additional sources of income outside the
valley, the discrepancy might also reflect the carrying out of the surveys at different points
in the year, one time in the winter with the “emigrants” being away from the settlements
and one time in the summer with the “emigrants” being on-site.
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It is Pettener et al. (1994, p.133) who report different numbers for the devel-
opment of the population in the period from 1890 to 1910. According to their
study, the population numbers of Italian and German inhabitants of the valley
had been developing similarly between 1837 and 1890, whereas the number
of Italian inhabitants was at least 50% higher than the number of Germans.
However, in contrast to the numbers displayed in Table 3, their data in this
study report a drop in the total number of German speakers around the year
1895. Pettener et al. (1994, p.133), who draw on clergy data from the nearby
parishes, attribute this drop to a decrease in the German population of Florutz,
whereas it is stated that the population numbers of the other three villages con-
tinuously increased over the observed period. However, this is also in contrast
to the findings that have been presented in table 3. To add further to the con-
fusion, Camelli and Schiaffino (1980, Tavola 1, p. 679) report that the German
population in the Fersina Valley increased by 10% from 1847 to 1880 and sub-
sequently dropped by 5% until the year 1900, before increasing to the level of
1880 in the year 1921.
On account of the reasons addressed, the numbers depicted above should
only serve as a rough indicator of population development.256
4.2.2.3 Some Notes on the Economic History of the Fersina Valley
Historically, the emergence of the German settlements in the valley has been
dated to the 13th century, when miners from the Upper Loisach Valley in
Bavaria migrated to the remote valley to exploit the local silver mines on de-
mand of the Trent archbishop Friedrich von Wangen (1208 - 1218) (Wurzer,
1969).257 Politically, the autonomous province Trento and therefore the Fersina
Valley belonged to the Holy Roman Empire until 1806 and subsequently came
256Additional factors that have a negative influence on the quality of the data include the prac-
tice of assigning the whole family to the nationality of the patriarch without paying at-
tention to the actual situation in the census. Furthermore the fear of political backlashes
might also have tempted inhabitants of the valley to voluntarily give false responses to the
quarrel.
257This has also been pointed out by Bellinello (1990, p.74). Further historical evidence pro-
poses that as early as the year 1150, the diocese of Freising had sent settlers and farmers to
this area and others that are located close to the river Brenta (Kranzmayer and Hornung,
1981).
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under Austrian administration. Due to the fragmentation of the Holy Roman
Empire, most of the regional administration was executed by the Italian com-
munity of Pergine (Sellan, 1979, pp.42-43), which is situated at the entrance
of the Fersina Valley. Furthermore, since the public jurisdiction over the val-
leys German communities was divided among the archbishops of Trent, the
town of Pergine, and the town of Caldonazzo, the valley’s official administra-
tion was for centuries dominated by the Italian language group (Sellan, 1979,
pp.42-44). After the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire, the valley was part of
the Habsburg Empire, yet the Italian influence on the valley continued to exist
up to the end of the Great War. It further increased when the valley fell under
official Italian administration on account of the treaty of St. Germain in 1919.
This was the time when the pressure of the Italian administration increased
and started to affect virtually every aspect of every day life. This process cul-
minated in the quasi-forced emigration of most of the German population of
the valley; during a brief period in World War II, the German and the Italian
fascist administrations forced the German population on Italian territory to ei-
ther opt for leaving the valley and become resettled in the parts of the Czech
Republic, which was occupied by the Nazi administration back then, or choose
to stay under the rule of the Italian fascists in the valley. Yet the possibility to
stay in the valley was tied to the condition of forgoing any utilization of the
German language and culture, and this would have implied a complete assim-
ilation to the Italian majority.258
Note that it was not only the changing political conditions that imposed se-
vere problems to the existence of the German population in the Fersina Val-
ley. Though the whole population of the valley has historically been Roman-
Catholic, the parishes of the Fersina Valley belonged to the Italian diocese of
Feltre until 1786 (Sellan, 1979, p.42).259 Furthermore, Sellan (1979, p.42 ) and
Bellinello (1990, pp.76-77) suggest that the first church in the valley was built
only in the 16th century and it took until the middle of the 18th century be-
258 After the end of the war, most of the Germans who had opted for emigration returned to
the valley and repopulated their former settlements.
259Yet, this kind of Italian influence might not have been as harmful as it might seem on first
sight, since up until the 1960s the services had been carried out in Latin, and only the
sermons had been spoken in the native languages.
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fore a priest was installed in the German communities to administer funerals,
baptisms, and regular services (Piva, 1990, p.137). Only in 1920 were the first
marriages conducted in the valley and not in the parish of Pergine. This also
meant that the inhabitants of both the Italian and the German settlements had
to wander to the parish of Pergine to attend services.
Even more than this, infrastructural problems characterized economic and
social life up to the second half of the 20th century. Up to the year 1914, all
settlements were only connected by small mountain trails; the connection be-
tween Palai and St.Orsola, which is the Italian settlement closest to Palai was
the worst one.260 The first road which could be used to carry bigger loads was
only constructed in 1883 and it was not until 1977 that a modern bridge in Palai
connected both sides of the valley (Camelli and Schiaffino, 1980, pp.677-678).
At this point it should be noted that the improvement of the infrastructure in
the valley - like in many other areas in the Alps - was not a product of the in-
dustrial revolution, which neglected the valley up to the 1960s, but emerged on
account of the effort of the Austrian military, who wanted to utilize the valley
as a retreat for their troops.
The impression that the Fersina Valley was segregated from the major politi-
cal and economic changes of the time manifests itself even further when taking
a more detailed look at its economic history. It may be interesting to note that
the major components of economic production stayed roughly unchanged up
to the 1960s, and this may have tempted several scholars to point out that in
the Fersina Valley the Middle Ages had lasted up to the second half of the 20th
century. Still, it should be noted that in spite of the segregation of the Ger-
man settlements from the major changes in world history, the communities in
the valley historically maintained trade relations with each other and with the
towns of Pergine and Trent.261 Yet the major factors that historically dominated
260Until the 18th century there also existed a trail connection to the adjacent Fiemme Valley,
but this connection was destroyed by command of the archbishops of Trent to prevent the
smuggling of alcohol (Piva, 1990, p.137).
261Bass (1909) however points out that the Italian communities in the valley had always main-
tained more active trade relations than the German settlements. Still, it should be noted
that these relations, like the economic development of the whole valley, were also exposed
to the cyclical fluctuations of market involvement, which dominated the history of the
whole Alpine region and led to the rotation of economic openness and economic closure
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the economic sector in the Fersina Valley were agriculture and mining, while
in contrast to other regions in the Alpine area, forestry only played a minor
role in the valley’s economic development.262 The first historical account of
mining for silver, copper, and lead in the Fersina Valley dates back to the year
1330, though the mines were most active between 1400 and 1500 (Preinfalk
et al., 1998, p.99). Though after 1500, mining activities continuously declined
and historical evidence suggests that miners did not belong to the permanent
population of the valley, but were employed only temporarily before moving
back to their residences, it appears that mining bestowed relatively high levels
of prosperity to the valley.263 As a consequence of the decline of the mining
sector, agricultural production had been the most important source of income
for the valley over the course of centuries. It is commonly accepted that with
the end of the mining era, the valley irrevocable fell into economic closure
and this had the effect that agricultural production remained the only income
source for its inhabitants. As stated this was the case at least up to the end of
the Second World War, and this is why the economy of the German parts of the
valley has often been characterized as an agricultural economy with a highly
labour intensive production technique (Bellinello, 1990, p.77).
Finally, it should be noted that after the decline of the mining era, the pros-
perity in the German communities was never high since neither of the de-
scribed production forms bestowed high levels of income on the German in-
habitants.264 Most commonly, agriculture was carried out for self-sufficiency,
though often this did not suffice to feed the whole population over the winter
time. As a consequence, the majority of the male inhabitants were forced to
emigrate during the winter season and therefore, most of the men decided to
supplement their family’s income by temporarily leaving the valley to work
(Viazzo, 1989, pp.127-177).
262This was because the steepness of the valley prohibited the excessive cutting of timber due
to the threat of soil erosion, and the Fersina Torrent further prohibited the rafting of the
logs.
263This also shows itself in an increased degree of market involvement and economic activity
with outside valleys.
264Unfortunately I have no data on the relative prosperity of the German and the Italian com-
munities in the settlement. Yet it appears that the more favourable environmental condi-
tions of the Italian side also bestowed higher level of agricultural prosperity to the Italians.
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as roaming salesmen all over the Habsburg empire. Starting in the beginning
of the 18th century, the salesmen left the valley every year in late autumn after
the fields were harvested, and spent the winter months abroad before return-
ing back to their homes in early spring (Sellan, 1979, pp.66-68).
4.3 On the Economics of Language
The aim of this section is to provide an introduction into the economics of
language. After a general introduction, the section continues by analyzing the
basic economic factors that might influence the decision of the members of a
linguistic minority to assimilate to a majority group. Finally, the section gives
an overview on some existing economic theories that try to explain minority
language survival.
4.3.1 Economics, Language, and Linguistic Assimilation
Though, the study of the economics of language is widely considered as an
exotic subject, several economists have contributed to this area of research. Yet
it is Rubinstein (2001, p.4) who emphasizes that
“ [...] economics attempts to explain social institutions as regular-
ities deriving from the optimization of certain functions; this may
be applicable to language as well.”.
Still, most commonly, the honour of the first contribution to the field is at-
tributed to Marschak (1963), who analyzes language and the development of
linguistic codes and traits from the perspective of economic efficiency. Here,
Marschak (1963) argues that the evolution of language or communication
emerges just as institutions emerge in the property rights theory, on account
of the aim to create more efficient forms of communication,265
“[...] where effectiveness is understood as requiring the lowest pos-
sible time input to communicate a certain message.”
265Grin (2003, p.15)
166
4 The Hidden Frontier
Other important contributions in the field analyze the distribution of foreign
language skills from a game theoretic perspective (Selten and Pool, 1991), or
stress the importance of language as a means of social and economic interac-
tion by highlighting several analogies between the study of language and the
study of social institutions. Chiswick (1991) and Chiswick and Miller (1995,
1996) on the other hand turn to the labour market implications of language by
analyzing the relation between linguistic skills of immigrants for their labour
market success,266 while Sproull (1996) analyzes the effects of minority lan-
guage use on regional economic development. Finally, Rubinstein (2001) high-
lights the possibility of applying economic methods to the study of linguis-
tics, such as using evolutionary economic models to explain the emergence
of grammar, words, or meanings, while he further acknowledges the impor-
tance of analyzing the economic consequences of the specific language that
economists use in their research.267
Apart from these fields of research, there is also a small group of scholars
who are concerned with the implications of multilingualism on the economic
and social structures of a society. This last approach is the one most simi-
lar to the ideas that will be presented in this chapter.268 Accordingly, this
section will highlight the interplay of those economic variables that relate to
the membership in different economic groups and as a consequence will iden-
tify those factors that are relevant for the economic analysis of the linguistic
assimilation process. Here, the basic idea is that the individual decision of
a person whether to assimilate linguistically to a majority group or to stick
with his own mother tongue can be reduced to the decision on the costs and
benefits of human capital acquisition.269 In the following description of the
economic aspects of linguistic assimilation, I will rely on the contribution of
266For a detailed overview of these findings see Chiswick and Miller (2007).
267For a compressed overview of what Rubinstein considers as important research areas within
the economics of language, see Rubinstein (2003).
268For a good overview on this field, see Grin (1994, 1996) and the articles in the edited volume
of Lamberton (2002).
269Though there are several apparent reasons why such a reduction might lose on important
aspects of the assimilation decision, the basic approach serves well as an indicator of the
economic approach to linguistic assimilation, while it further allows one to identify some
of the relevant economic factors in more detail.
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Lazear (1999, pp.97-100), who uses a special form of the network externality
model of Church and King (1993) to formalize the basic economic dimension
of the assimilation decision.270 It is the interpretation of linguistic identity in
terms of membership in a club, whereas being a member in more than one
club is on the one side beneficial for individual trading opportunities, but on
the other also costly, which builds the major foundation of Lazear’s analysis.
Lazear (1999) approaches the topic by using a random matching model
in which a common language is necessary for the members of the different
groups, to communicate with each other. Simultaneously it is assumed that
language minorities are assimilated to a language majority by the prospect of
potential gains from trade, where strategic interaction between both groups is
ruled out by definition.
Imagine an economy that consists of two different linguistic groups A and
B. A constitutes the majority group. The total number of individuals in the
model is normalized to one and therefore pA and pB can be used to describe
the relative size of the different language groups. Hence, as A constitutes the
majority group, pA > pB also holds true. In the model, every actor has the
opportunity to increase his stock of human capital by learning the language
of the other group. Yet, in this case, he has to bear individual assimilation
costs of tj, whereas higher costs are depicted by a higher amount of tj. In this
framework costs of assimilation can stem from a variety of reasons, such as
linguistic differences or the geographic isolation of a language group.
The benefits of human capital accumulation through learning another lan-
guage are modeled by assuming that in every period members of the two lin-
guistic groups randomly meet to trade with each other. Given the case that
both individuals belong to the same linguistic group, they will realize gains
from trade of size 1, while in the other case both will depart without any eco-
nomic profit being realized. This implies that the probability of meeting a per-
son of the same linguistic group can be depicted as a strictly positive function
of the relative size of both language groups and therefore the initial expected
gains from trade Ri = pi ∗ 1 for each group are defined as functions of the
270Similar models have also been constructed by John and Yi (1997) and Grin (1992).
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relative population shares:271
Ra = pa (4.1)
and
Rb = pb (4.2)
This implies that every actor in the model faces a trade-off concerning his
decision to learn a second language. The respective trade-off emerges out of
the following considerations: if an individual can speak both languages, he
will be able to communicate with individuals from both groups and therefore
he will also individually receive gains from trade of size 1 in every period. Still,
to achieve this, he will have to learn the foreign language and this implies that
he will have to bear individual assimilation costs of the size tj. An individual
will only learn the other language, if the benefit from increasing individual
trading opportunities minus his learning costs is greater than the status quo of
his trading opportunities. Hence a member of the minority group B will only
assimilate to the majority group A, if
1− tj > pb
or
tj < 1− pb (4.3)
From 4.3, one can easily deduct the assimilation decision for the whole
group. Here, g(tj) and G(tj) describe the probability density function and the
distribution function of tj and this allows one - by reasonably assuming that
assimilation costs will be equally distributed among both language groups -
to compute the share of group members of B who are willing to learn the lan-
guage of A from the probability of equation 4.3 becoming true:
271This presupposes that the value of a trade per trader is 1. Furthermore, note that the as-
sumption of pa > pb also implies that the members of group A will be more prosperous
than the members of group B in this framework.
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prob(tj < 1− pb) = G(1− pb)
Apparently, it is also possible to compute the share of members from group
A, who want to learn the minority language by the same reasoning :
G(1− pa)
Furthermore, holding individual learning costs constant, one can also infer
that the relative size of the two linguistic groups determine both the proba-
bility of linguistic assimilation. Here, the first derivatives of the distribution
function G(tj) with respect to the relative population shares
∂G(1− pb)
∂pb
< 0
∂G(1− pb)
∂pa
> 0
or accordingly
∂G(1− pa)
∂pa
< 0
∂G(1− pa)
∂pb
> 0
imply that the share of individuals deciding to assimilate is a decreasing
function of the size of one’s language group and an increasing function of the
size of the other language group. This is the case since the different group
sizes determine the individual trading opportunities, whereas the assumption
of having a majority and a minority group pa > pb guarantees that the number
of members of the minority group assimilating to A will be bigger than the
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number of members from A going over to B.
Without going deeper into the model, it is straightforward to see that the
incentives to assimilate will be higher the smaller the minority population be-
comes. In spite of the static framework of the model, it is also possible to
predict that in the long run a complete assimilation of minority group mem-
bers into the majority group will take place in this framework, since a smaller
share of people speaking the minority language reduces the expected gains
from trade with this group and therefore reduces incentives to learn the lan-
guage. In the basic model, equilibrium will be characterized by a situation
in which both language groups communicate with each other using a lingua
franca, which is the majority idiom.272
Yet at this point it might be objected that the learning of one language will
not necessarily lead to a complete assimilation in the sense of individuals ir-
revocably losing their mother tongue. Of course, and this has also been noted
by Lazear (1999, p.98), learning other languages will not necessarily be detri-
mental to the individual use of the first language, yet there is also research
in linguistics which shows the opposite. In this context, Rowley (2008) refers
to Mattheier (1994), who supposes that in situations similar to the one of the
Fersina Valley, second language acquisition would finally lead to cultural and
linguistic assimilation of the minority group in just three generations.273
Accordingly, if one takes the implications of the model and of the linguistic
research seriously, then one would suggest that in the Fersina Valley both the
relatively low number of native speakers and the higher level of agricultural
fertility of the Italian settlements inside and outside the valley should have
created sufficiently strong incentives for the German inhabitants of the valley
to assimilate linguistically. The next section will look at several approaches to
be used as an explanation for the survival of minority languages in spite of the
272One can further conclude that the difference in group size is positively correlated with the
assimilation speed of the language minority, which will also be favored by decreasing as-
similation costs.
273For an overview of research on the negative influences of second language acquisition on
first language use see Köpke and Schmid (2004). Note however that this study looks at the
consequences of second language acquisition from the viewpoint of language attrition. Ac-
cordingly the respective study concentrates on the loss of proficiency in the mother tongue
from an individual perspective.
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presence of potentially high gains from trade. Unfortunately, the majority of
these explanations appear to be too unspecific to gain a better understanding
of the factors that have contributed to the stabilization of the minority idiom
in the Fersina Valley.
4.3.2 Geographic Isolation, Exogenous Assimilation Costs,
and Minority Language Survival
Economic theory offers several approaches to shed light on the causes of mi-
nority language survival in the Fersina Valley, yet most of these cannot explain
the phenomenon in a satisfying way.
The most simple explanation of linguistic survival refers to the existence of
exogenous assimilation costs that emerge on account of the isolated location of
a linguistic enclave. High assimilation costs stemm from the necessity to over-
come geographic obstacles such as great distances or high mountains, and this
- on account of the high ’transaction costs’ of economic activity - prevents lin-
guistic assimilation to take place. Contact with potential trading partners is
prevented and therefore linguistic segregation continues to exist.274 Unfortu-
nately, this simple explanation is not able to explain the situation in the Fersina
Valley on account of several factors. First of all, the Fersina Valley is itself di-
vided between two linguistic groups, while it is also situated in close proximity
to the Italian towns of Pergine and Trent. Furthermore, contact between both
linguistic groups was frequent since the members of both language groups had
to wander to the parish of Pergine to attend services there. Finally, both Ger-
man and Italian peasants had also resided in the villages that were dominated
by the other language group and this - in addition to the other factors - implies
that contact between both language groups was existent and this renders the
geographical isolation hypothesis an inappropriate explanation in the present
context.
Lazear (1999, p.100) also proposes an explanation for the persistence of mi-
nority idioms. He points out that the random matching assumption of his
274Here, one of the standard references for this explanation is the situation of the Gaelic dialect
on the Aran Islands west of the Irish coast.
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model might be too strict. On account of the geographic concentration of some
groups, matching between potential trading partners will not necessarily occur
randomly in real world situations. As a consequence of individuals spending
most of their time within a certain geographic or social area, the number of
minority and majority group members becomes less relevant since the trading
probabilities will be determined by other factors also. This implies that con-
tact between members language groups is not necessarily a positive function
of the relative population shares but also depends on the geographical distri-
bution or the location of the two language groups.275 As a consequence of
this change in the assumptions, the population shares, which were the driv-
ing forces in Lazear’s model, become less important in determining the out-
come and speed of the assimilation process itself. A high number of outgroup
trading partners loses its importance for the assimilation process when contact
is infrequent or does not take place at all.276 Lazear justifies the dropping of
the random matching assumption by relating the occurrence of geographically
concentrated trading patterns to the low degree of economic specialization in
these groups.277 In this context, Lazear (1999, p.99) states that in societies
“[...] in which each individual produces everything that he or she
consumes, there is little reason to encounter individuals outside a
very narrow group of family and neighbors.”
Although the claim that geographical concentration is an important determi-
nant of minority language survival is highly supportable, I consider it some-
275This would for example be the case in neighborhoods that are dominated by a certain ethnic
group.
276Such a modification of the basic model is obviously reasonable, yet to gain a better under-
standing of the underlying processes, it will be important to analyze the causes that lead
to the segregation from other groups. Note that the explanation of individuals focusing on
their reference groups can also be interpreted from the perspective of Sahlins (2004).
277Church and King (1993) also show that under certain conditions the survival of a linguistic
minority can be maintained. They hereby identify the structure of total costs to be crucial
for minority language survival. In their game theoretic model they show that in the case
of two language groups, different cost structures can stabilize three different equilibria,
containing the assimilation of either language group as well as a non-assimilation situation.
However, since there is a magnitude of different causes for the existence of assimilation
costs, the model fails to provide further insights into the problem of linguistic survival
under economic pressures.
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what problematic to reduce this to an exogenously given “affluence” or the
low level of wants in self-sustaining economies.278 Still, apart from this point
of critique, it appears also questionable, if an explanation that relies on the ge-
ographical concentration hypothesis, really provides any additional insights,
since without any deeper knowledge, no explanation on the factors leading to
the concentration will be provided.
Finally, a more applied approach to the problem of minority language sur-
vival is presented by Grin (1992), who shows that it is not only the total number
of native speakers but also the number of situations in which the language is
actually used that determines if a minority language group will assimilate to
the majority group or not. Grin (1992) hereby relates the vitality and attrac-
tiveness of a minority language to the emergence of ethnical self-confidence
and linguistic status, while he also highlights the importance of the external
provision of cultural goods such as TV programs or newspapers. Although
Grin’s theory provides several interesting insights into the social forces that
determine linguistic assimilation, its applicability to the problem that has been
depicted in this chapter seems, due to the focus on modern communication
devices, limited.279 Virtually the same aspect, though from a historic point of
view, is emphasized by Houston (2003), who discusses and relates minority
language survival to different factors that encourage the utilization of a lan-
guage such as the occurrence of print media, the representation by political
interest groups, or the existence of formal education. Admittedly, this aspect
might have been an important factor in the stabilization of minority idioms, yet
unfortunately it seems that there had been neither a significant degree of the
278Though Lazear might have had a different situation in mind when arguing this, in my eyes
it seems rather confusing to find him adopting a position that argues that individual needs
rather than individual wants determine economic outcomes. More formally, this can also
be rejected on account of the contribution of Krugman (1980), who showed that in such
a situation the introduction of economies of scale will suffice to motivate trade between
countries that possess equal factory endowments, tastes, and production technologies.
279There is also a magnitude of other explanations which relate minority language survival to
preferences for linguistic homogeneity or, in a similar fashion as Grin (1992), to ingroup
status and identity. However, as important as the sort of social variables that have been
addressed by Grin may be for the understanding of the assimilation process, I consider it
important to endogenize these factors by looking at the economic determinants of these
social and psychological aspects
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occurrence of significant print media, literature, nor a well developed school
system in the Fersina Valley.280 Furthermore, any such reliance on exogenous
factors would also not provide any more detailed insights of the process that
has led to the linguistic survival of the language minority in the Fersina Valley.
4.4 Upland Peasant Communities
The remaining parts of the chapter present an argument that relates the emer-
gence of linguistic and cultural segregation to the Alpine production cycle and
several institutional arrangements that were build to facilitate economic pro-
duction under the conditions of a harsh environment. I approach the question
of why differences in agricultural prosperity and group size have not led to the
linguistic assimilation of the German minority in the Fersina Valley. The sec-
tion starts by identifying the general environmental conditions of agricultural
production in mountain areas. Furthermore, I highlight how both the scarcity
of arable land and the highly labour-intensive mode of production influenced
agricultural production in the Fersina Valley. The need to stabilize collective
ownership by creating homogeneous groups at the community level in addi-
tion to the Alpine production mode leads to a social lock that stabilizes the
utilization of the minority idiom.281
4.4.1 Climatic Conditions and the Optimality of
Agropastoralism
4.4.1.1 Environmental Constraints on Agricultural Production
Before I turn to the basic economic argument for the survival of the minority
idiom in the Fersina valley, it might be wise to take a closer look at the link be-
280Paradoxically, there used to exist a fair number of publications in the idioms of the other
Middle High German language groups, such as the Cimbrian catechism that had been
used by the now virtually extinct linguistic enclaves of the VII and XIII communities.
281In anthropology, there are several contributions, such as the work of Friedrich Ratzel, that
highlight the importance of environmental factors for the emergence of different cultural
variables. This form of environmental determinism found its critics in the possibilist school
of French geographers like Paul Vidal de la Blanche or Lucien Febvre.
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tween agricultural production and environmental factors in mountain areas.
Agricultural production and social life in mountain environments are highly
influenced and shaped by different environmental factors, such as tempera-
ture, humidity, precipitation, air pressure or insolation. All of these factors
vary considerably with the altitude in mountain areas and they subsequently
affect vegetation and wildlife differently.282 In line with Viazzo (1989, pp.16-
19), it is possible to classify Alpine ranges into five different vertically aligned
zones.
At the level of 500 up to 1000 meters (though only in sunny exposures), the
colline zone is defined by the production of viniculture and orcharding as well
as the cultivation of corn and grain. At higher altitude levels, the montane and
the sub-alpine zones spread to the upper limits of the deciduous (800m-1700m)
and coniferous woods (1600m-2400m). The alpine zone extends from the tim-
berline to the first appearance of permanent snow and finally gives way to the
glacial zone. In both of the upper zones, hardly any other vegetation but heath
can be found and this reduces the opportunities to utilize them economically.
In general, several factors complicate agricultural production in the regions
above the montane zone. First of all, it is the low temperatures that affect the
growth of vegetation and the cultivation of crops negatively.283 Furthermore,
the level of altitude in general affects the quality and quantity of soil,284 while
different exposures to sun light affect the ripening of crops and pasture. In ad-
dition, agricultural production in mountain environments will be aggravated
on account of the increased probability of crop failure, which arises on account
282In this context, Rhoades and Thompson (1975) point out that in Alpine ranges it is possible
to observe a vertical arrangement of different climatic zones and biotopes within a narrow
range of a few thousand altitude differences, which is similar to the latitudinal alignment of
biomes and climatic zones from the equator to the poles. Eggertsson (1992) provides a de-
tailed description of environmental conditions influencing agriculture and pastoralism in
medieval Iceland. His description bears close similarities to the climatic factors influencing
mountain habitats that are identified in this chapter.
283Viazzo (1989, p.18) states that fruits like chestnuts, which constitute an essential part of the
diet for inhabitants of mountain communities, can hardly be found above 1200 m altitude.
In addition, winter wheat ripens approximately one month later in higher altitudes and
cannot be found above 1600 meters in the southern part of the Alps.
284Roughly 10% of the land occupied by upland communities in the Alps is suitable for culti-
vation (Viazzo, 1989, p.19).
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of the abrupt occurrence of thunderstorms, hail, and temperature drops in up-
land areas.285 Finally, it is the low quantity of arable land on account of the
steepness of the mountainside and the prohibition of efficiently utilizing ma-
chinery that reduces the production possibilities. Further, most of the attempts
to increase the area under cultivation at these levels of altitude through defor-
estation are also prohibited on account of the threat of soil erosion.286
4.4.1.2 Transaction Costs and the Alpine Production Cycle
The influence of the environmental conditions depicted in the previous section
shows itself in the adoption of a special production strategy that is similar in
most of the upland peasant communities within the Alpine region and other
mountain habitats. The basic feature of this “Alpine production cycle” - which
in part has also been described in the previous two chapters of this dissertation
- is to diversify the risk of crop failure and optimize production under the
constraint of a limited amount of arable land by relying on a mixed production
form.
This mixed production form splits the growing of crops and the keeping of
livestock to “production areas” at different levels of altitude. As land at mod-
erate levels of altitude is usually scarce in mountain areas, all of the available
compound that exists at different levels of altitude has to be utilized to provide
the communities with a sufficiently high income. However, most of the land at
higher levels of altitude is - on account of the environmental features that have
been described above - usually not suitable for the cultivation of crops. There-
fore, to use the grasslands between the timberline and the glacial zone for eco-
nomic production, pastoralism in the form of keeping livestock provides the
only way to use this otherwise barren land for productive purposes. This im-
proves the insufficient provision of edibles from the clods close to the village
communities. Furthermore, in this production mode, the keeping of livestock
is supplemented by using the plots at lower levels of altitude for the cultiva-
285According to Parry (1975, pp.4-5), the probability of crop failure rises exponentially with
altitude and falling temperatures during the summer months.
286This is the case since the hard rain at higher altitude levels will easily wash away the fertile
layers of soil in the deforested areas.
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tion of field crops such as potatoes, cabbage, corn, or beet. Agropastoralist
production is severely conditioned by the different ripening and harvesting
times of the vegetation at different altitudes. Therefore the alternating occur-
rence of agricultural and pastoral work constitute the major characteristics of
production.
Early in spring, when snow and ice still prevent the utilization of pastures at
higher altitudes, the fields and meadows around the community settlements
are used for grazing and the production of crops and hay. Only after sev-
eral weeks, when the higher temperatures melted the snow and the bloom of
vegetation has started, will the animals be moved to the lower and finally to
the upper pastures that are situated at higher altitudes. The sequences of the
Alpine production cycle are further influenced by the necessity to keep the
livestock from overgrazing the pasture areas and to prevent soil erosion. This
is regularly achieved by employing a shepherd out of the community, whose
job it is to continuously move the animals up the hillside to pastures at differ-
ent levels of altitude during the summer months. Obviously, this also offers a
chance to save on manpower.287 At the end of the summer, the animals return
from the highest pastures to the lower ones, before they migrate to the mead-
ows around the village and finally return to the barn.288 The advantages of
this production strategy are readily apparent. In addition to being able to uti-
lize the otherwise meager pastures up the hill, the subsequent moving of cattle
and sheep up and down the hill allows vegetation to recover from grazing, and
can therefore be used several times a year to provide hay and fodder.289 Fur-
thermore, an additional advantage of agropastoralism lies in the product and
risk diversification. Here the spreading of agricultural tasks to different levels
of altitude makes sure that climatic shocks on produce and livestock will not
threaten the survival of the whole community.
287In this context, Viazzo (1989, p.22) notes that “[...] in mountain areas the optimal ratio of
herders to cattle can be as high as 1:30-40, and that the number of sheep which can be
managed by a single shepherd is even higher.”.
288One should keep in mind that this procedure takes place at the same time as the classical
agricultural tasks, which include the sowing of grain, the planting of vegetables and the
harvesting of crops.
289This takes into account that pastures and vegetation cannot regenerate as fast at higher alti-
tudes.
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Still one should also keep in mind that agricultural production in mountain
areas is characterised by the coeval occurrence of private and collective own-
ership. Most commonly, pastures and meadows in the montane, sub-alpine,
and alpine zones are jointly owned, regulated, and utilized by the commu-
nity.290 The plots at lower altitudes in contrast are owned privately, although
the transfer to farmers from outside the village sector is restricted by the com-
munity.291 The optimality of such a breakdown of ownership forms is evident.
With respect to the use of the grasslands as a pasture for the cattle and sheep
of the community, the collective ownership of pastures presents itself as being
more efficient than private ownership.
First of all, one needs to accept that the individual organization of keeping
livestock is very costly in those cases where the environmental conditions pro-
hibit the utilization of machinery. Given that working on private crop fields
and the keeping of livestock takes place at the same time but on different lev-
els of altitude, then the high amount of manpower that is required to work the
fields renders it necessary to economize on the employment of labour in the
keeping of livestock. As livestock usually stays together while straying on big-
ger areas, many animals can easily be supervised by a single shepherd. Hence,
collective ownership shows the optimality in combining the opportunities to
realize economies of scale in joint pasturing. 292
Yet under private ownership of the pasture land, the realization of
economies of scale in the joint keeping of livestock would cause high transac-
tion costs.293 This is because under private ownership, every individual has
the right to exclude the community’s livestock from his fields. Yet the com-
munity members could misuse this freedom as a threat to bargain for a higher
290Note that there are several strict regulations on both the degree of utilization and the group
of users that stabilize collective ownership.
291See Ostrom (1990, pp.61-65), Netting (1972) and Viazzo (1989, pp.100-121) for a detailed
description of collectively owned pasturage system in Alpine Switzerland and Italy.
292This has also been stated in the contribution of Ellickson (1993), who points at the problem
of “efficient boundaries” and emphasizes that different forms of economic utilization will
commonly take place on production areas of different optimal economic size. Yet, Ellick-
son (1993, pp.1132-1135) looks at the topic of economic activities with different optimal
production areas taking place on the same area of land, while in the present case study the
production areas do not overlap.
293I have explained this argument in more detail in the first part of this dissertation.
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share of the jointly produced surplus. Such behaviour will obviously not be
feasible under collective ownership, since, according to Dahlman (1980, p.119),
the joint owners of a collectively owned resource have no right to withdraw
from the agreement. Hence, any attempt to increase one’s own income by
threatening to withdraw from the collective agreement will be identified as an
empty threat. This will reduce the level of transaction costs. Furthermore, the
optimality of collective ownership does not only emerge from the possibility
of reducing the level of transaction costs that arise out of bargaining on higher
shares of the joint surplus. Collective ownership also reduces transaction costs
that may arise out of the problem of guaranteeing the community members
equal production opportunities. Since land is not only scarce at moderate
but also at equal levels of altitude, not all of the community members would
receive land at the same level of altitude. However, as the level of altitude
severely affects both the quality of land and the production opportunities on
account of the environmental constraints, some community members would
have to pasture their livestock at higher levels of altitude, while others would
receive the “high quality” pastures at lower levels. Accordingly, this implies
that a system of private ownership would permit the owners of the better
pastures to graze their livestock on the pastures quite early in the year, while
this would, on account of the remaining snow cover at higher levels of alti-
tude be denied to the private owners of the low-quality pastures. Hence, to
give every community member the same production opportunities, recurrent
negotiations on compensations or the periodic shifting of ownership would
be required. This form of transaction costs would also be prevented under a
system of collective ownership.
4.4.1.3 A Short Note on Agropastoralism in the Fersina Valley
In the German part of the Fersina Valley, the mode of agricultural production
is very similar to the agropastoralist production system which was described
in the previous section. Yet there also some specific aspects which make it
worthwhile to consider the local conditions in more detail.
The major part of the settlement area within the German part of the Fersina
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Valley is forested, so only minor parts of the area around the village commu-
nities and the pastures at higher levels of altitude can be used for agricultural
production. In addition, agricultural production is also affected negatively
on account of other environmental characteristics. This holds especially true
with respect to the steepness of the hillside which prohibits the cultivation of
the majority of compounds between 800 and 1100 meters (Sellan, 1979, pp.45-
49).294 With respect to the territory above 1100 meters of altitude, it is possible
to observe the following breakdown in ownership structures: below 1500 me-
ters, all of the farmsteads, fields, orchards, and gardens are owned privately.
Between 1500 meters and 2000 meters, privately owned poor, rich and wood
pastures spread horizontally across the hillside, and this allows for a fairly
equal allocation of small meadow areas. In this zone, small cabins give shelter
to the farmers to allow them to make hay and produce dairy products during
the summer months. Above the level of 2000 meters, the vegetation becomes
more scarce. This implies that these areas were - which are owned up to 90%
by the communities - utilized as pastures. The pastureland was independently
owned by the four German communities and this implied that their use was re-
served to members of the respective communities. All other farmers, indepen-
dent of their ethnic origin, were without exception excluded from utilisation.
(Sellan, 1979, p.46).295
Yet similarities between the general setup of agricultural production in the
Alpine area and the situation in the Fersina Valley did not only arise with re-
spect to the breakdown into private and collective ownership. Rather, the gen-
eral setup of agricultural production displays similar circular processes. In
every year production started with the processing of the private crop fields
before farmers started to drive up their livestock to the summer pastures.296
294 In some areas the steepness amounts to 50%.
295Ironically, this exclusionary practice created severe problems and disputes among the Ger-
man villages of the valley, while this issue did not come up between the German and the
Italian settlements due to the location of the villages at different sides of the torrent.
296Due to the relatively long winters in the Fersina Valley this happened at the end of May
only.
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Yet since this implied that production work was to be done at different levels
of altitude, some workers also left the farmsteads and moved up to the cab-
ins to spend parts of the summer at higher levels of altitude. After a month,
the livestock moved up to the communal upper pastures that were situated at
even higher levels of altitude and this was also the time when the cattle were
placed in the care of a communal shepherd, who supervised and organized
the movement of the animals between the pastures at different levels of alti-
tude (Sellan, 1979, pp.63-65). For the families the months between April and
September were the most labour intensive time of the year. This was because
in this time the keeping of livestock coincided with the necessity to take care
of the fields at different levels of altitude.297 The double burden of taking care
of the orchards, plots, the fields at higher altitudes, and of part of the livestock
forced the farmers and their families to continuously commute between the
summer huts, their residences and the pastures. 298
It is worth mentioning that in the special case of the German part of the
Fersina Valley - as in many other parts of the Alpine area - the harsh environ-
mental constraints also influenced economic activity in a way other than the
agricultural. While during the summer, there existed a shortage of manpower
in the valley, this situation changed considerably during the winter months.
Here, the labour shortage rapidly turned into a overpopulation of the valley,
which expressed itself in a shortage of housing space. This led to the tempo-
rary emigration of a part of the valley’s population during the winter months.
As already addressed above, most of the male inhabitants of the valley left the
German communities in November to work as roaming salesmen.299 Only in
297For a more extensive description of economic and social life in peasant economies, see the
substantivist position of Dalton (1971) and the contribution of Viazzo (1989) and Cole and
Wolf (1999), who give a detailed description of this issue with a special focus on living in
mountain environments.
298To meet the required amount of labour that emerged from the fragmentation of private farm-
land and the high production costs, farmers usually employed close relatives or members
of the extended family. See Sellan (1979, pp.49-59) and Bellinello (1990, pp.76-77) for a more
detailed description of this topic.
299In 1776, the salesmen from the Fersina Valley acquired an imperial decree from the Austrian
Empress Maria Theresia to freely move and trade within the Habsburg empire (Sellan,
1979, p.42). Subsequently they focused their activities on market transactions within the
German language area, however after the end of Habsburg monarchy they were mainly
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spring did they return to the Fersina Valley to work on the farmsteads of their
families.
4.4.2 Collective Ownership and Cohesion at the Community
Level
The findings from the previous section can be restated as follows. Agropas-
toralist production appears to be the optimal adaption to the harsh environ-
mental conditions in the Fersina Valley. This is because the strategy accounts
for the scarcity of land at different levels of altitude, adjusts for the different
ripening times of pastures, and takes into account the threats of soil erosion or
thunderstorms that may cause crop failure or the death of livestock. To protect
crops from temperature drops and to save on production costs, vegetable and
grain fields are established on privately owned fields at lower levels of alti-
tude close to the village sector. At higher levels, communal pastures are used
for the production of hay and the feeding of cattle and sheep. Furthermore, the
production costs that emerge from the fragmentation of farmland make it nec-
essary to employ members from the extended families as workers. To provide
the livestock with a sufficient amount of fodder during the summer months,
the livestock has to be shifted up and down between the pastureland situated
at different levels of altitude. This offers the chance for agricultural production
without exposing precious pastures to soil erosion and overgrazing.
Yet in spite of its positive features, agropastoralist production also brings
with it several disadvantages. Basically there are two dominant problems
in agropastoralist production that severely jeopardize economic production
in the respective communities. First, the vertical fragmentation of plots and
pastures increased transportation costs and made production highly labour
intensive. Secondly, agropastoralism generated the problem of organizing the
utilization and the management of the collective resources in a way that pro-
hibited overexploitation and the tragedy of the commons.300
to be found in what constitutes South Tyrol or more formally the autonomous province of
Bolzano in the region Trentino- Alto Adige today.
300This necessity is also increased by the occurrence of high production costs, which on account
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4.4.2.1 Common-Pool Resources, Open-Access Management and
Common Property Regimes
While the problem of labour shortage in production was discussed in the pre-
vious section already, I will analyse the problem of maintaining collective own-
ership in more detail in this one.
Amongst many others, Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) have stated that
the maintenance and efficient exploitation of natural resources under a regime
of collective ownership is severely jeopardized by the consequences of indi-
vidual utility maximization and the failure of individuals and groups to co-
ordinate their behaviour for the joint benefit of the natural resource and the
group. Based on these considerations, Hardin (1968) makes the gloomy predic-
tion that all collectively owned natural resources will be destroyed in the long
run, since the failure of the individual users to account for the consequences
of their actions on the utility of the other users will lead to overexploitation
and the destruction of the natural resource.301 Given that all other members of
a community stick to an agreement and avoid excessive grazing, then it will
be optimal for every individual to deflect from an agreement that imposes an
upper limit on the utilization of the pastures. While the overexploitation of
one farmer will keep an individual’s livestock sufficiently nourished this will,
given the non-deflecting behaviour of the others, also add only minor damage
to the plant cover. Therefore every farmer will have the incentive for overex-
ploitation.302 Yet as every farmer has the incentive to deflect the destruction of
the pasturage cannot be prevented. This is the tragedy of the commons.
Often it is believed that the tragedy of the commons can only be prevented
by either transferring the land into private ownership or turning to the state for
help.303 It is Ostrom (1990) who explains the century long persistence of many
of small plot sizes and in addition to the steepness of land, prevent farmers from efficiently
employing machinery.
301This of course also presupposes a certain degree of scarcity.
302Well fed cattle and sheep supply more nutrition by providing more milk and meat, while
the livestock will also be more resistant against the hazardous environment than poorly
nourished animals.
303Here, the solution of state ownership is often associated with the idea of the government
owning the resource and taxing extraction. This idea can be found in the contribution of
Pigou (1920) and was criticized by Coase (1960).
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common-pool resources in the absence of state regulation or private owner-
ship.304 Here it is the especially the failure of Gordon (1954), Hardin (1968)
and many others to distinguish between those natural resources that are man-
aged in an open access way and those that are managed as a common property
regime that added to the prediction that all collective ownership types were
bound to be destroyed.305 Yet the necessity of an appropriate differentiation
between both management forms may become more evident when looking at
the exact definitions. While the open access case is characterized by the non-
exclusivity of the resource and the nonexistence of any other regulations on
utilization, the opposite holds true for the case of a common property regime.
Under such a management form, there exist strict regulations, while the own-
ership rights to a natural resource are collectively owned by a well defined
group. As the joint owners of the resource administer control over the resource
in the same way as the owner of a private right administers control over his
garden, the collective owners also have power to exclude people from gain-
ing access to the resource. Though, the danger of overexploitation is equally
present under a common property regime, both the regulations for its mem-
bers and the exclusion of certain user groups reduce the danger of a tragedy
of the commons. This is because joint coordination may eliminate the nega-
tive consequences of the divergence between the private and social costs of
individual behaviour. Therefore overexploitation is likely to be prevented.306
Yet there are also certain conditions that need to be fulfilled to effectively es-
tablish and maintain a common-pool resource in the form of a common prop-
304Ostrom (1990) points out that collective ownership is more likely to be stabilized when
group members are homogeneous in the sense of being connected by similar interests on
the usage of the common property, and the returns to reputation are high due to a steady
flow of information. For a detailed description on the topic see Ostrom (1990), Feeny et al.
(1990) and Kissling-Näf et al. (2002).
305Common-pool resources are natural resources that can jointly be utilized by a larger num-
ber of individuals or groups, whereas the activity of one appropriator will influence the
opportunities of the other appropriators. Furthermore the geographical characteristics of
a common-pool resource allow its owners to exclude others from its use, though this may
create costs.
306Hence, if the exclusion of outgroup members is feasible and regulations on the utilization
of the resource can be enforced, then the tragedy of the commons will be avoided without
the group being forced to privatize or turn to state ownership.
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erty regime. As communities need to establish effective regulations, institu-
tional arrangements, and sanctions to prevent their members from misbehav-
ing, the next section will present how the German communities in the Fersina
Valley stabilized collective ownership and took care of the shortage in man-
power over the summer months.
4.4.2.2 On the Enforcement of Rules, Social Punishment and Public
Organization
Before I turn to the factors that stabilized collective ownership structures, I con-
sider it important to take a closer look at the formal institutional arrangements
that expressed themselves in the form of the local self-administration and the
organisational setup in the German part of the Fersina Valley. In the German
communities, political decision making was carried out by a public assembly,
which consisted of the representatives of the farmsteads in the villages (Sellan,
1979, pp.58-61). The assemblies debated and decided on all aspects of social
and economic life in the communities such as the scheduling of agricultural
work or the maintenance of irrigation. More specifically, the assembly was
also responsible for coordinating social interaction between its members and
this task also applied to the obligation of introducing and changing the gen-
eral regulations and norms within the communities.307 Though the regulations
applied to all aspects of social and economic life, they also dictated the condi-
tions under which the communal forestland was to be utilized by the members
of the respective communities. Hence, one of the major tasks of the assembly
was:308
307Casari and Plott (2003) point out that in every community in the Italian part of the Alps,
both the usage of the community commons and the formal enforcement procedure was
codified by the assemblies in a special legal document, the so called “carte di regola”. Fur-
ther, one should note that Viazzo (1989, p.24) alludes to the fact that the forms of political
decision making are surprisingly constant in mountain communities both in the Alps as
well as in the Himalayas. Furthermore, Eggertsson (1992) describes similar institutions to
have existed in medieval Iceland. In addition, McKean (1992) identifies similar problems,
adaptions and procedures for land management of common property on the north slope
of Mount Fuji in Japan.
308This statement draws on Viazzo (1989, p.25) and refers to the duties of village assemblies in
the Alpine area in general and not to the specific case of the Fersina Valley. Yet as in this
context there were not many differences between the German communities in the Fersina
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“[...] to counteract any individual attempt at reckless exploitation
[of the community pastures]”.
Furthermore, the assembly did not only stabilize collective ownership through
the posting of rules, but also by exercising its power to influence private own-
ership within the valley by supervising and blocking the transfer of land to
persons from outside the community.309 In the Fersina Valley, the monitoring
of the compliance with the regulation was carried out by the giunta, which
consisted of two local officials that were elected by the assembly for a one year
term. The role of its two members can best be described as the one of two
mayors who also had to carry out police duties.
Over the following pages I will expose two arguments to explain how the lo-
cal self-administration in the German communities of the Fersina Valley man-
aged to influence their members in a way that allowed for the stabilisation
of collective ownership. To gain a better grasp of the processes that led to
the stabilization of collective property in the Fersina Valley, I consider it also
important to understand the general characteristics of social relations in prein-
dustrial societies. Here it is especially the high level of mutual dependence be-
tween the members of a social community which can be identified to stabilise
social behaviour and property rights. While self-sustaining economies are of-
ten reduced to a union of individuals who organize their living by relying on
self-sufficient production, I consider it more important to stress the absence
Valley and other mountain communities, I take the statement to hold in general.
309According to Viazzo (1989, p.24), who refers to two contributions of Burns (1963) and
Rhoades and Thompson (1975), the communal prohibition of transferring private prop-
erty to outsiders is needed to limit the inflow of strangers into the group, and this stabi-
lizes collective ownership by establishing a “closed social frontier” or a “closed corporate
community” in the sense of Wolf (1986). It is also believed that the constraints on the
free exchange of private property between members of the same community can increase
the cohesion within a social group. This has also been described by Dahlman (1980) with
respect to the scattering of agricultural plots in the open field system in medieval Eng-
land. Dahlman (1980) argues that limiting exchange of property between group members
prevented the concentration of individual property and simultaneously reduced the bar-
gaining power of the individuals within the group. As fields were scattered, it remained
impossible for the farmers to misuse their position to bargain for a higher share of the joint
surplus. In the case of the Fersina Valley, the limitations on the transferability of private
ownership can be interpreted as a safeguard that prevented the community from the op-
portunistic behaviour of its members. I have explained this argument in the first part of
this dissertation in more detail.
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of markets. This is because the absence of product, insurance, service or any
other form of market influences the setup of social relations as a whole.310 This
is also one of the basic fundamentals of the substantivist position in anthropol-
ogy, as represented by Polanyi (1944), Polanyi et al. (1957b), Dalton (1971), or
Sahlins (2004). It is Sahlins (2004, pp.185-186) who - with respect to the social
relations in peasant societies - states that
“[...] we find no socially distinct “economy” or “government,”
merely social groups and relations with multiple functions, which
we distinguish as economic, political, and so forth.”
This notion of the close interconnection between the social and economic di-
mension of life in peasant groups is also close to the findings of Tönnies (1963),
who defines peasant societies as resembling Gemeinschaften or communities
rather than Gesellschaften or societies.311 Yet it is exactly the close intercon-
310The absence of markets for goods and services can also be interpreted in the light of
Williamson (1975, 1985), who points to the problems of market exchange in interactions
that involve a small number of people. Hence, the replacement of the market by a system
of mutual dependencies to organize social interaction can be interpreted as a way to reduce
the negative consequences of market exchange without a sufficient degree of competition
in small scale communities. This has also been noted by Posner (1980, p.33) in the context
of individual landownership in kinship groups. Accordingly, the aim to reduce transac-
tion costs may also explain why, instead of relying on the price mechanism, custom and
reciprocal exchange are used as a coordination device in small scale communities.
311Here, the basic assumption is that in “Gemeinschaften”, on account of the close relation-
ships between social and economic interactions, the economic system can hardly be dis-
persed from the structure of the respective society, while in market societies the social and
the economic aspect can be analyzed independent of each other. This is the case since in
market societies, it is anonymous exchange which plays the dominant role in securing sur-
vival. Note that there is also a difference between the position taken in this chapter and
position of Polanyi et al. (1957b), Dalton (1971), and Sahlins (2004). While the substantivist
position considers social constraints to exogenously determine economic outcomes, this
chapter argues for an even closer connection between “social” and “economic variables”
by emphasizing that both social norms and constraints may also be determined by eco-
nomic necessities that emerge on account of environmental constraints. Interestingly, the
view of close social and economic interactions can be related to the findings of Santos et al.
(2008), who, by assuming that social ties follow a scale-free distribution, show that coop-
eration in public good games can be fostered between members of a group in spite of the
absence of social punishment or reputation effects. This is the case since the expectation of
individuals, who participate in different numbers of differently sized public good games,
contributing a fixed amount irrespective of the number of games they participate in, the
amount contributed will stabilize the setup, since any contribution will be interpreted as a
sign of cooperation.
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nection between the members of a pre-industrial peasant community that is
fostered by the absence of any formal means to insure against sickness, crop
failure or fire, which stabilises collective ownership (and the provision of other
public goods) in the Fersina Valley.
First of all, this is because individuals who have no command of formally in-
suring against crop failure, sickness, aging, or fire, need to hark back to social
connections to find a substitution for the more formal means.312 In this con-
text it may be easier to understand the present argument if one interprets the
interdependence between the community members as an implicit agreement
between the community members which takes the form of a social contract. Let
us assume that this social contract implicitly defines the official and inofficial
rights and liabilities of every community member in social and economic life.
Hence the dimensions of such a contract might include to assist a neighbor to
bring in the harvest, to contribute to the maintenance of the community’s irri-
gation system, to help fighting fires, or to perform medical assistance. Finally,
such a social contract may also include the obligation to stick to the community
rules and abstain from the overexploitation of the collectively owned pastures.
Yet in groups with such a high level of mutual dependence, a violation in any
dimension of the social contract can effectively be punished by the commu-
nity. This implies that such a system will stabilize itself on account of several
reasons.313
First of all, Posner (1980, pp.6-7) argues that the lack of privacy in small scale
groups that goes hand in hand with the close contact between the community
members reduces crime rates on account of the comprehensive and continuous
monitoring by the other group members. This will also reduce information
costs. Furthermore, Posner (1980, pp.10-12) also emphasizes that the continu-
ous interaction between the individuals at various levels of social life serves to
reduce information asymmetries and therefore contributes to the functioning
312For a detailed description of the mutual dependencies in the settlements of the Fersina Val-
ley, see Sellan (1979, pp.46-48 and p.58)
313As the other dimensions of the social contract can also be interpreted as club goods, the
threat of free-riding was also present in this context. I therefore take the following argu-
ments to hold for the prevention of these problems also.
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of informal insurance mechanisms in kinship groups.314
Yet even further, it is the fact that in small scale communities every com-
munity member will be dependent on the help of others, which stabilises the
agreement. This is because deflecting from the social contract in one dimension
will not only lead to a one dimensional punishment by the direct counterpart
of the (social) transaction. Rather, such behaviour will most likely result in
a multidimensional punishment of all group members. Furthermore, social
punishment will not be limited to the dimension of the social contact where
the violation has taken place, but also in all other dimensions of the implicit
agreement.315 With respect to the maintenance of collective ownership of the
pasture areas in the Fersina Valley, this implies that inhabitants who choose to
break the social contract in one dimension by individually overstraining the
pastures know that they will be punished not only with respect to the use of
the pastures but in a multidimensional way that might, owing to the circum-
stances, eventually lead to their exclusion from the social network.316 This was
314For a similar argument see Arcand (1996) who hints at several ways how linguistic homo-
geneity will influence economic outcomes positively i.e. by reducing asymmetric informa-
tion in share cropping contracts.
315Posner (1980, p.47) also emphasizes a positive side-effect of the mutual interdependence
in closely-knit groups on the reduction of individual free-riding or other forms of oppor-
tunistic behaviour. As every community member has the opportunity to rely on the help
of others in bad times, the “incentives” to behave opportunistically by enriching oneself at
the expense of others may also be reduced. Furthermore, the present idea, though heavily
drawing on personal relationships rather than on impersonal reputation effects, closely re-
sembles the mechanism that has been described by Greif (1989) with respect to impersonal
and one dimensional exchange in the case of the Maghribi traders. The positive effect of
sanctioning and punishment on the stabilization of collective ownership arrangements has
also been studied in experimental settings. Here, as one of the first contributions, Yam-
agishi (1986) has shown that - in spite of the non-trivial costs - selective punishment has
strong effects on human behaviour in laboratory experiments. Yet these effects appear to be
even stronger, as Ostrom et al. (1994) pointed out, as soon as communication between the
parties is allowed. Furthermore, Fehr and Gächter (2000) show that this will also hold true
if the participants of the experiment are unable to gain a reputation and the experiment has
a known and finite horizon. Finally, the effects of individual and selective sanctioning on
individual cooperation in the context of common property regimes have been studied by
Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
316In the case of the Fersina Valley, this threat will obviously be a paper tiger since due to the
shortage of manpower, it cannot be in the interest of the community to lose any members.
Still, social punishment in various aspects of the social agreement should be sufficient to
bring about stability. A detailed account of constraints on social interaction and of social
pressure at the village level can be found in the memoirs of Matthäus Nicolussi. He hereby
190
4 The Hidden Frontier
also noted by Olson (1965a, p.2), who pointed out that individuals will only act
in their common interest in small group settings and under the presence of co-
ercion.317
Note that there is also a problem with the present explanation of the stabili-
sation of collective ownership (and the provision of the other club goods). As
monitoring and punishment by the group members is costly, this will also in-
duce a free-rider problem, though at an another level. Since the whole group
will benefit from the monitoring and sanctioning efforts of the other group
members, every rational actor will have an incentive to avoid the expenses
of such actions and start to free-ride. But how is it possible to explain the
avoidance of this second free-rider problem? It is Ostrom (1990, pp.94-98) who
highlights several cases in which the present problem was prevented by the
low costs of monitoring in small scale societies. Yet the best explanation with
respect to the case of the Fersina Valley has been emphasized by Posner (1980),
who emphasises that the effects of reduced privacy in small scale communities
render it extremely cheap and easy to monitor and sanction certain community
members for their infringements.318
Finally, there is also another, equally important way to think about the stabi-
lization of collective ownership in social organizations. This argument can be
inferred from Schlicht (1998), who looks at the psychological factors of human
behaviour. Here, the argument runs as follows: it is not the fear of social pun-
ishment that “motivates” group members to stick to the social agreement, but
shares his memories of growing up in the linguistic enclave of Lusern - which is another
Middle High German linguistic enclave that is close to the Fersina Valley - and describes
several incidents that fit well to the theoretical considerations of this chapter (Nicolussi,
1998).
317 Yet the term “coercion” is often wrongly perceived to exclusively relate to the enforcement
of some external authority such as the state, and not - as in the present case - by the com-
munity members themselves.
318More recently than the works of Posner (1980) or the substantivist position in anthropol-
ogy, several contributions on the economics of networks and on the analysis of parochialist
behaviour have emphasized similar aspects. Likewise, these approaches analyze the exis-
tence of small scale minority groups, which choose to engage in costly behaviour by limit-
ing contact with outgroup members. Here, Bowles and Gintis (2004) analyze the benefits
of networks with respect to ingroup altruism and the reduction of asymmetric informa-
tion, and further refer to the existence of social punishment and the options of trust and
exclusion in ethnic networks.
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the individual perception of the own role in the community.319 Without going
further into the details of the psychological foundations of human behaviour,
the mutual dependencies in the Fersina Valley can also be understood as a net-
work of mutually accepted entitlements and obligations that lead to a general
acceptance of norms and regulations in the group.320 Any violation of the in-
dividually perceived entitlements and obligations, which in this context can be
understood as the “commitment” to assist other members from the community
and the “right” to receive assistance from the others, is likely to be punished
severely by a form of moralistic aggression, which, according to Schlicht (1998,
p.30-31)
“is irrational in the sense that it would require each of the parties
to engage in actions that worsen their position, but it is precisely
this [...] disposition to act aggressively in non-normal cases that
sustains smooth transactions in the normal case.”
In spite of the different foundations of behaviour, both arguments come to
the same conclusion: it is the aspects of membership in small groups that in-
fluences individual behaviour. This happens either through the influence of
external constraints such as social punishment or due to the psychological de-
319See Leibenstein (1960), Nelson and Winter (1982), Kubon-Gilke (1997) as well as Schlicht
(1998) for a detailed description of the behavioural implications that may arise out of role
perception in firms or other social organizations. Furthermore, see Giles and Johnson
(1981) as well as in a more general context Gumperz (1982) for the interaction between
linguistic variables and individual behaviour.
320Schlicht (1998, p.24), by pointing out the importance of non incentive and preference based
causes of human behaviour, hereby explains that “[e]ntitlements are rights, as perceived by
the individuals. They are not, however, abstract legal rights. Rather they denote the sub-
jectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them.
Obligations are the counterpart of entitlements, they refer to claims by others that are
subjectively accepted by the individual, and go along with a motivational disposition to
respect these claims. Both entitlements and obligations are brought about by a set of estab-
lished rules. They derive from regularities perceived in the past and in the group, and they
bring about norms and customs.” Another way to analyze this sort of behaviour would be
to look at the behavioural effects of commitment that builds the foundation of obedience
and authority. Apparently, as Milgram (1963) has demonstrated, psychological commit-
ment can induce someone to obey an authority and carry out tasks that run clearly against
his own will and therefore reduce utility. Since I have explained these arguments in more
detail in another part of this dissertation, I abstain from going deeper into the topic here.
For a comprehensive discussion of the topic, see Schlicht (1998, Chapter 8).
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terminants that stem from the perception of group membership.321
The next section will point out how the need to stabilize collective ownership
shaped economic and social behaviour and added to the linguistic segregation
in the case of the Fersina Valley.322
4.4.3 The Economic Roots of Linguistic Segregation in the
Fersina Valley
One of the interesting aspects of the economic life in the Fersina Valley is that
until the shift from subsistence to commercial agricultural production and the
increased opportunity to engage in industrial wage labour and tourism in the
20th century, the agropastoralist production mode stayed roughly unchanged.
This makes it possible to interpret the emergence of different social institu-
tions as a means to prevent the negative effects of the hostile environment.
This section will explain how the aim to stabilize collective ownership and
satisfy the required amount of labour has contributed to create cohesive and
self-contained social groups. Here the adoption of a special inheritance scheme
and high levels of endogamous marriages can be identified to stabilize the use
of the minority idiom in cases where transaction costs and low population
numbers prohibit taking care of economic problems through the division of
labour.
4.4.3.1 Social Ostracism, Group Homogeneity and Inheritance
Yet before I start to expose the present argument on minority language survival
in more detail, it is necessary to make one more comment on the problems of
agricultural production in the Fersina Valley. As section 4.4.1.3 has stressed,
321As I consider both interpretations of the stabilization of collective ownership equally im-
portant, and as I further believe that - on account of the close interaction between both
foundations of behaviour - it will not be possible to separate the influencing factors, I will
not analyse this issue in more detail. This allows the reader to build his opinion on the
present arguments independently.
322Note that the same factors that have been identified to stabilize collective ownership can
also used to describe the stabilization of other forms of club goods provision, such as fire-
fighting or medical assistance.
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agricultural production in the Fersina Valley was heavily influenced by the
recurrent commuting of the workers between production facilities at differ-
ent levels of altitude. This, in addition to the highly labour intensive mode
of production, increased the required amount of manpower. Therefore one
might wonder why the communities did not seek to encourage the moving
in of outsiders, but discouraged this process by prohibiting the sale of private
farmland to people from outside the communities instead. Here I believe that
meeting the demand for manpower by allowing outgroup members to join
the village community or use the pastures would have destroyed the homo-
geneity of the group and prohibited the effective maintenance of the “social
agreement” through applying social punishment. The considerations behind
this statement may be better understood if one keeps in mind that individuals
from outside the village sector would likely have ties to other social networks,
and hence these individuals would not be dependent on their communities.
As a consequence, it would have been much harder to punish them should
they have misbehaved. This implies that in order to be accepted in the group,
one must at the same time be dependent on the help of other group members,
since it is this individual dependency which guarantees the other group mem-
bers that the new member will comply with the social contract.323 To satisfy
the requirement of providing a sufficient amount of reliable workers that de-
pend on the community, it was necessary for the communities to make sure
that the descendants stay with their groups and limit permanent emigration.
It is finally possible to return to the specific case of the Fersina Valley. The
previously stated explanation of the constraints to maintain the social cohe-
sion in a group by limiting the inflow of members not dependent on the group
323Though it appears that this had not been a big issue in the Fersina Valley, this consideration
might further explain why in some pre-industrial societies the interaction with members
from other communities had been restrained by ingroup policy or social custom. If an
ingroup member was to be identified as having established social ties with the members of
other social communities, this might be perceived as an attempt to become less dependent
on the group, with the aim to escape from the social agreement, or eventually planning to
leave the community permanently. This would go hand in hand with the notion of value
homophily extensively described by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) and to the second order
effects of dealing with people that do not conform with the social norm or do not have
desirable traits that put them in good standing with the group as described by Sugden
(1986).
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implies that the German communities in the Fersina Valley had to find an alter-
native way to deal with the chronic shortage of manpower over the summer.
According to Sellan (1979, p.49), the communities met the requirement to have
a sufficiently high number of workers embedded in the community by em-
ploying children and members of the extended family. Yet such a form of in-
ternally satisfying the required amount of manpower made it necessary to tie a
sufficiently large proportion of the offspring in every generation to the group.
This is not an easy task in a social environment that offers little more than a
life full of hard work and deprivation. The communities in the Fersina Valley
solved this problem with the help of a special inheritance scheme. Further-
more, I consider that the prohibition to sell private farmland to people form
outside the respective villages can be identified as effectively constraining the
mobility of the offspring.
The connection between the adoption of a certain inheritance scheme and
the identified problems of economic production can be interpreted as follows.
First of all it is interesting to note that in the respective part of the Italian Alps,
there exist two different laws of succession. While the so called “Trent model”
is most commonly established among the Italian population, the “Tyrolean
model” is more popular among the Germans. In the Trent model, the prop-
erty is distributed in an equal fashion among all heirs, without distinguishing
in terms of gender or age. In the Tyrolean inheritance scheme on the other
hand, all of the property is awarded to the eldest son of the family; the other
successors are either forced to secure their living by marrying into other farms
or they must leave the community to find a job elsewhere. With the reason-
ing of the previous sections in mind it is straightforward to note that either of
the two inheritance schemes would have caused severe problems in a setting
similar to the one of the Fersina Valley. The use of the Tyrolean model would
create the problem of forcing the major part of the offspring in every genera-
tion to leave the valley and therefore labour requirements could not be met by
falling back on the use of the “internal labour force”. However there are also
some problems with the use of the Trent model. In a situation that is character-
ized by a shortage of arable land in general and private farmland and housing
space in particular, an inheritance scheme that partitioned the parental estate
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in an equal fashion among all heirs would decrease the amount of farmland
individually owned by the families in each community.
Hence, a special inheritance scheme that merged both extreme positions was
adopted in the Fersina Valley (Sellan, 1979, p.52).324 The parental real estate
was distributed among all male heirs, whereas the female heirs were excluded.
Often, unmarried female heirs remained on the parental estate as workers. If
they married, they received a dowry or an usus-fructus right to a certain field,
orchard, or pasture (Sellan, 1979, p.52). Only in case of a testator not having
any male successors, would the daughters gain ownership of the parental es-
tate.
This inheritance scheme can be interpreted as a means to satisfy the need of
creating a homogeneous workforce and limit the fragmentation of individually
owned farmland. The handing down of real estate to all male successors effec-
tively constraint the social mobility of the offspring. This met the requirement
of having a higher number of reliable production units at hand.325 Still, I also
suggest that the economic problems not only shaped the inheritance scheme
but also influenced other “cultural factors” such as the number of celibates in
a community and the choice of spouses.326
4.4.3.2 Production Costs and the Choice of Spouses
In the Fersina Valley the choice of spouse is directly affected by the two eco-
nomic problems of maintaining collective ownership and reducing the short-
324Viazzo (1983) as well as Cole and Wolf (1999, Chapter 8) emphasize that this inheritance
form is commonly found in mountain environments.
325Note that the splitting of the parental estates among all male heirs serves, to strengthen
cohesion at the family level by forcing the family members to interact closely with each
other. A similar aspect has also been emphasized by Dahlman (1980) in the context of the
medieval open field system. Furthermore, providing every heir with a small amount of
wealth rather than giving it to the oldest son is likely to avoid dispute among the commu-
nity and adds to the cohesion of the family and the whole group. The present ideas on
the inheritance schemes suggest that one of the major objectives of farmers in the Fersina
Valley was to maximize the chances of the family’s and community’s survival rather than
maximizing the survival of the “family property”. This special form of an objective func-
tion in the mountain areas has also been highlighted by Viazzo (1989).
326Concerning the community of Florutz I refer to Sellan (1979, pp.56-57) who states that the
share of celibates was close to 40% of an age group in the 1970s.
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age of manpower. Therefore it also interacts with the consequences of the in-
heritance scheme I have described in the previous subsection and can be iden-
tified as a major determinant of minority language survival.
In pre-industrial societies the choice of spouse is often influenced by eco-
nomic considerations such as the aim to increase the amount of privately
owned farmland. This holds also true with respect to the German communi-
ties in the Fersina Valley. Here it is the overall costs of agricultural production
that stem from the vertical segmentation of private property which limits the
sphere potential marriage partners can stem from to one’s village community.
This is because a farmer who views the choice of spouse from the viewpoint of
economic profit will take into account that the value of private farmland (and
therefore the value of the spouse) does not only depend on size, the steep-
ness of the hillside, the quality of soil, or the degree of insolation. More likely
the respective value of a marriage also depends also on the geographical loca-
tion of the respective area. As up to the beginning of the 20th century, there
was almost no infrastructure in the valley, a simultaneous processing of fields
at different locations in the valley would have been hardly feasible. As pro-
duction costs were already high due to the necessity to commute between the
pastures and fields at different levels of altitude in the village sector, this lim-
ited the perimeter of search for a partner to one’s village. Since the bad in-
frastructure would have rendered it extremely costly to farm land located in
different parts of the valley, the value of land in one of the other communi-
ties was greatly decreased. This contributed to the linguistic segmentation of
the German communities on account of the following considerations. Though
the dominant inheritance scheme in the Fersina Valley often excluded women
from the inheritance of the parental real estate, there still existed the incen-
tive to increase the amount of private farmland by marrying someone from
the local community. Since women often received an usus-fructus right or the
whole parental estate in case of being the only heir, there existed the incentive
for a farmer to increase his private property by marrying someone from his
village. As a consequence, this marriage would increase his property without
increasing the production costs to a great extent. To pick a spouse from one of
the other communities in the valley would be less preferable since this would
197
4 The Hidden Frontier
obviously increase production costs.
Note that Viazzo (1989) confirms the influence of this mechanism on minor-
ity language conservation, though he draws his insights from his study on the
Walser community Alagna in the Western part of the Italian Alps. In this con-
text, Viazzo (1989, p.76) states that in those families where at least one parent
did not stem from the village, the children did not learn the German - Walser
dialect.327 Hence,
“[a] detailed analysis of language transmission patterns demon-
strates, in fact, that the rise in the number of mixed marriages [...]
has been by far the single most important determinant of the de-
cline of the Walser dialect [...]”.
The presented theoretical considerations therefore suggest that on average
the number of marriages between inhabitants of the same community will be
higher than the number of marriages between inhabitants of different village
communities. Further, taking into account the geographic conditions in the
valley, my hypothesis suggests that the number of marriages between the Ital-
ian and the German inhabitants will be quite low. This is the case since the
Fersina Torrent effectively divides the valley and therefore the higher amount
of production costs will be make it less likely that an Italian will marry some-
one from the German settlements and vice versa. Though the Fersina Tor-
rent did not prohibit the trading between the different linguistic groups, it
still imposed high costs on daily production in different parts of the valley.
Concerning the persistence of the German dialect in the Fersina Valley, the
considerations in this section can be summarized as follows: When people
predominantly choose their partners from the same village sector or from a
linguistically homogeneous area, this will increase the probability of two part-
ners sharing the same language. Yet in the present framework, having two
parents stemming from the same community and sharing the same language
increases the probability of sticking with the minority idiom in two ways: first,
as both parents are native speakers of the minority dialect, the language used
in child education is the minority dialect. Second, when both parents stem
327For a more detailed description see also Viazzo (1983).
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from the same community, the property and other immobile assets they will
pass on will be situated in the same geographical area. This will further con-
strain the mobility of the offspring. The child will be more likely to stay in the
community and hence choose a spouse from the same community.
Sellan (1979, pp.53-55) describes the behaviour of the German population
regarding the choice of spouse in the Fersina Valley. According to her study,
spouses had not been chosen on account of emotional rationales, but merely
on account of economic considerations. This conviction shows itself in the
popular opinion that a female cousin who inherits the parental property is the
best possible match for a male from the same community (Sellan, 1979, p.54).
Furthermore, it is not only the two prospective marriage partners who decide if
they will marry or not, but it is also the families who co-determine the decision
by carefully evaluating the economic benefits and the general necessities of a
marriage.328 Therefore marrying a cousin or another member of the extended
family is widely regarded as a good choice as long as the partners stem from
the same village community.329
The described influence of environmental constraints on economic produc-
tion and the respective adjustment of social behaviour can be deduced from
analyzing the marital behaviour of the German population in the Fersina Val-
ley. Table 4, by drawing on the register of marriages from the community of
Pergine, depicts the different levels of endogamous marriages in the German
part of the Fersina Valley for the years 1584-1977.330 The table separately illus-
trates the number of marriages of males/females with women/men from the
328Since both families have known and worked with each other for generations, this may have
reduced transaction costs by decreasing information asymmetries and increasing social co-
hesion. Furthermore, Pettener et al. (1994, pp.137-139) figure out that the level of inbreed-
ing is twice as high in the German settlements in comparison to the Italian villages.
329Sellan (1979, p.54) states that, as of 1979, close to 15% of the marriages in the German lan-
guage group of the Fersina Valley had been closed between cousins of first or second de-
gree. Yet it should also be noted that marriages between cousins mostly occur in those
cases, when the cousins live in the same neighbourhood.
330In a different study, Pettener et al. (1994, Tabella 1 on p.134) also analyze the marital be-
haviour of the inhabitants of the Fersina Valley, focusing on the period from 1800 to 1914.
They hereby show that the levels for ethnically endogamous and geographically endoga-
mous marriages were considerably higher/lower for the German settlements in relation to
the Italian ones. However, since this study draws on the same data set, I do not report the
results here.
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different communities in relation to the total number of marriages between
males/females from that community. The table hereby distinguishes between
three different forms of endogamous behaviour.331:
• Levels of close endogamous behaviour denote marriages between part-
ners from the same village community.
• Levels of ethnically endogamous behaviour denote marriages between
partners from the German language group that stem from one of the
other three German settlements in the valley.
• Levels of geographically endogamous behaviour denote marriages be-
tween members of the German and Italian language group, whereas both
spouses stem from the settlements of the Fersina valley.
• Levels of marriages between members of the German communities and
spouses from outside the valley can only implicitly be denoted in the
table by separately summing up the levels for the different endogamous
marriages of males and females for every village community, and by sub-
sequently subtracting them from 100%.
Accordingly, the table denotes that 54% of all marriages that involved males
from Gereut took place between males and females from Gereut, while only
25.6% of these marriages were between a male from Gereut and a female from
the other German communities. In only 9% of the marriages that included a
male from Gereut, did the women stem from one of the Italian communities
in the valley. Furthermore, 61.9% of all marriages that involved females from
Florutz were between males and females from Florutz, while only 11.4% were
between a female from Florutz and a male from the other German commu-
331There are obviously some restrictions on the interpretation and comparison of different
shares of endogamous behaviour, since naturally these shares depend on the absolute num-
bers of marriages and inhabitants of the villages. However, in spite of the limitations, in
my eyes the results presented here give a good account of what had been called “The Hid-
den Frontier” by Cole and Wolf (1999) with respect to two communities in the Val di Non:
a almost complete segregation of two different ethnic groups in spite of frequent contact
and close proximity.
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Average shares of endogamous Average shares of endogamous
marriages marriages
male female
close ethnical geographical close ethnical geographical
Gereut 54.0 25.6 9.0 49.0 21.1 10.2
Eichleit 66.7 19.0 2.5 60.7 14.6 1.9
Florutz 70.1 13.5 5.2 61.9 11.4 12.1
Palai 77.0 9.2 4.2 59.6 11.4 9.2
Table 4.4: Percentages of endogamous marriages as the total share of marriages
in the valley 1584 - 1977 (calculations following Mirtes, 1996, p.216)
on basis of Motter (1978)
nities, while 12.1% of the marriages that involved females from Florutz were
with a male from the Italian communities in the valley.332
Taking the results of the other two communities into consideration it ap-
pears that the majority of both sexes chose partners from the same community
over the years. Within the settlements of Eichleit and Florutz almost 2/3 of the
males married women from the same community, while the 54% for Gereut is
comparatively low compared to the level of 77% in Palai. With respect to the
settlement of Gereut, this might partially be explained by its location both close
to the entrance of the valley and at comparatively low levels of altitude.333
With respect to the 77% of close endogamous marriages in Palai, its location
at the end of the valley, which also offers less favourable environmental con-
ditions, might have played a role.334 Yet, it appears that the levels of close
332This also implies that in 11.4% of the marriages that included a male from Gereut had been
between a male from Gereut the female was from outside the Fersina Valley. The respective
share of marriages including women from Florutz is 14.6%.
333This would have bestowed a higher level of prosperity one the community and rendered it
less important to increase the income by marrying someone from one’s own village sector.
334Note that Cole and Wolf (1999) have reported equally high levels of close endogamous be-
haviour within the German settlement St. Felix and the Italian community Tret in South
Tyrol. Although both communities are located only a few kilometres from each other, there
exist considerable levels of segregation between these communities. In the 19th century,
the levels of close endogamous marriages in St.Felix was 85.6 % for males and 80.1 % for
females. Further, the hidden frontier also manifested itself in the Italian settlement of Tret
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endogamous marriages are also higher for males than for females. Here, the
respective numbers for women are considerably lower, ranging between 49%
in Gereut and 61.9% in Florutz.335 This difference in the choice of marriage
partners between males and females can probably be explained by account-
ing for the fact that women will, due to the special form of their bequest, be
more mobile then males and therefore they will also be more likely to marry
someone from other parts of the valley.
So far, I have not mentioned that the presented theoretical considerations
on minority language survival in the Fersina Valley not only suggest that mar-
riages will take place less frequently between the German and the Italian settle-
ments, but also that marriages between partners of the different German com-
munities will take place less frequently than marriages between members of
the same village community. This is the third aspect of note. In spite of the fact
that the geographical distance between the German communities is not that
pronounced, the Germans appear to be reluctant to mix with members of the
other German communities. Hence for males the shares of ethnic endogamous
marriages range between 25.6% in Gereut and 9.2% in Palai, while for women
the shares are, with the exception of Palai, considerably lower. Once again,
both the geographic location and the form of bequest can be used to explain
both findings. As Palai is located at the end of the valley and at the other side
of the Fersina Torrent, the benefits of marrying someone from the other Ger-
man villages would be fairly low. In Gereut on the other hand, both the lower
number of Germans as well as its location at the entrance of the valley might
have bestowed a higher level of prosperity on the inhabitants, which made
them more independent of the need to find a person from the same village
community. Furthermore, women still appear to be more mobile than males
and this can also be traced back to the special form of bequest.336
with close endogamy levels of 73% for males and 82.6 % for females.
335Viazzo (1989, p.76), by referring to the studies of Hagaman et al. (1978) and Jacquard (1984),
notes that the studies of several geneticists on Alpine populations have demonstrated that
“[...]even high endogamy rates may not be sufficient to create the conditions of a genetic
isolate. Recent research has shown that small numbers of in - marrying spouses can be
responsible for a surprisingly high proportion of the gene pool.”.
336Note that the presence of high levels of close or ethnical endogamy in mountain communi-
ties is a common finding in anthropological literature on the Alpine area. In this context,
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Gereut Eichleit Florutz Palai
Gereut 54.0 9.8 14.3 1.4
Eichleit 13.0 66.7 4.7 1.3
Florutz 5.8 1.4 70.1 6.1
Palai 1.6 0.6 7.3 77.0
Table 4.5: Percentages of ethnically endogamous marriages for males from the
German part of the Fersina Valley 1584 - 1977 (calculations following
Mirtes, 1996, p.216) on basis of Motter (1978)
The levels of ethnically endogamous marriages that are depicted in table 4
can be classified even further. Table 5 depicts the marital behaviour of males
from the German villages in the Fersina valley with respect to the other Ger-
man communities. Once again, the numbers present the percentages of mar-
riages between males and females from the communities as a share of the total
number of marriages that included males from the German community.337 In
addition, figure 1 presents an schematic map of the Fersina valley and on ac-
count of this map and the shares presented in table 5, a more detailed examina-
tion of the presented ideas will be possible. Though the presented ideas in this
chapter have suggested that marriages will take place less frequently between
members of different German communities than marriages between members
from the same community, it also predicts another aspect; although it would
be costly to marry someone from a different village, it would be less costly to
marry someone from the community situated next to the one’s own.
it is Viazzo (1989, p.143) who - by referring to the contribution of Troger (1954, pp.57-60) -
states that “[...] in the period 1750-1850 proportions of endogamous marriages ranged from
75-90 per cent in high-altitude settlements to less than 40 per cent in the villages of the low
valley”. Yet in my eyes this statement confirms the present findings since it suggests that
environmental factors can lead to a lock-in effect in general. Though it is not my intention
to over-interpret the findings in this chapter, they might imply that the described processes
are not specific to situation in the Fersina Valley and could therefore also be used to explain
the linguistic and cultural stability in other settings.
337Of course the numbers on the “principal diagonal” are the same as the levels of close endog-
amous marriages that were depicted in table 4.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic Map of the Fersina Valley
Hence on account of the presented ideas one would suggest that males from
Palai would be more likely to marry to females from Florutz, while the same
should also hold true with respect to the marital behaviour of males from
Florutz. Here one would expect that males from Florutz would be more likely
to marry someone from Gereut or Palai instead of someone from Eichleit.338 It
appears that these predictions are roughly in line with the numbers depicted in
table 5. In 7.3% of all marriages that included a male from Palai, did the spouse
stem from Florutz, while the respective share for marriages with members
338This is because Gereut is located at lower levels of altitude, while Eichleit is situated at high
levels of altitude.
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from Gereut (1.6%) and Eichleit (0.6%) are considerably smaller. Regarding the
shares for males from Florutz, the findings also appear to be in line with the
predictions, though the difference is (as also expected) not as pronounced as in
Palai. While the frequencies of marriages with females from Gereut (5.8%) and
Palai (6.1%) were roughly the same, the distance to Eichleit also presents itself
in the data. Only in 1.4% of all marriages that included males from Florutz, did
the women stem from Eichleit. With respect to the other two communities, the
picture is similar. With respect to Eichleit, the spouse came from Gereut in 13%
of all marriages, while the numbers for Florutz (4.7%) and and Palai (1.3%) are
quite low. Finally, as already stated, it appears that males from Gereut were
most likely to choose someone from the other German communities, yet this
also holds only true with respect to Eichleit (9.8%) and Florutz (14.3%), while
females from Palai (1.4%) apparently were little in demand.339
Finally, let us return to table 4 and analyse the levels of geographically en-
dogamous marriages - that is, marriages that take place between members of
the four German and the Italian communities - in the Fersina Valley.340 As
expected, the numbers show - with the exception of the share of female mar-
riages in Florutz - that marriages between Germans and Italians were much
less frequent than marriages within the German language group and within
the communities themselves. Once again, the marital contact between both
language groups occurred most frequently within the village situated at the
entrance of the valley - Gereut. However, the data also show that contact and
marriages between members of the different linguistic groups - though only to
small extent - did occur. This might also explain some of the influences of the
Italian language on the German dialect in the Fersina Valley.
In addition to the findings depicted in Table 4, Pettener et al. (1994, Tabella
2 on p.135) provide further evidence on a “hidden frontier” between the lin-
guistic groups by analyzing the number of marriages between closely related
339As the findings for the marital behaviour of females do not offer any other specific insights,
I will not report them in this chapter.
340Unfortunately, I do not have the data to separately classify the marital behaviour of the
German population with respect to the Italian communities. Accordingly, table 4 reports
the joint numbers.
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spouses.341 In their analysis of isonymy that draws on computations of mar-
riages between homonymous partners, they reveal that the levels of marriages
between closely related partners range from 27% for Palai up to 51% in Eichleit,
while the levels for the Italian communities range between 10% in Serso and
25% in St. Orsola.342 Here Pettener et al. (1994, pp.137-139) not only confirm
a pronounced reluctance of both linguistic groups to mix with each other, but
they also confirm that segregation occurred not only with respect to the Ital-
ian population but also with respect to the other German villages.343 Though
mutual segregation does not seem as pronounced with respect to the members
of the other German communities, it is still evident in their study. This seg-
regation among the German communities has also been confirmed by several
studies on the linguistic characteristics of the German dialect in the Fersina
Valley. Here, Rowley (1986, 1996, 2003) clearly emphasizes that there is not
one, but four distinct German dialects in the Fersina Valley, which correspond
to the four different German communities: Gereut, Eichleit, Florutz and Palai.
341For a more detailed description of the theory on measuring genetic similarity by the usage
of surnames, see the studies of Crow and Mange (1982), Lasker (1977) as well as Lasker
and Kaplan (1985). Further, the evidence corresponds well to several historical accounts
that describe the emergence of conflicts between the German communities on the use of
the mountain pastures.
342Unfortunately, neither can Pettener et al. (1994) nor can I provide any satisfying explanation
for the fact that the levels of marriages between closely related partners had been lowest in
Palai and highest in Eichleit.
343Camelli and Schiaffino (1980, p.679) basically confirm the present findings. Yet they also
point out several potential problems of employing the register of marriages. Their concerns
mainly revolve around the quality of the data that might be affected in a similar fashion
as the quality of the population data. Furthermore, both authors address h the problem
that part of the marriages between one spouse from the valley with someone from outside
the valley (which are only implicitly displayed in the summary of table 4) might not be
included in the data. If the marriage was performed in a parish neither belonging to the
Fersina Valley nor to Pergine, then the total number of marriages would be underestimated
and the percentages displayed below would overstate the levels of endogamy. For a more
detailed description of the problem and potential solutions like the comparison with mat-
rimonial registers from settlements close to the Fersina Valley, see Camelli and Schiaffino
(1980, p.682).
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4.5 Conclusion
My contribution analyzed the factors that stabilized minority language use in
the upland region of the Fersina Valley in the Italian Alps. Here I showed
that environmental factors played an important role in shaping economic pro-
duction by influencing institutional arrangements and social behaviour. In the
course of this chapter, I argued that the aim to avoid production costs in ad-
dition to the necessity to maintain a homogeneous group contributed to the
emergence of the “hidden frontier” and played a dominant role in exacerbat-
ing marriages between and within the ethnic groups. Though I do not believe
that human development is only contingent on external factors, I still believe
that this form of environmental determinism explains why one does not ob-
serve effects of similar magnitude for societies being exposed to less extreme
conditions. The reason for this might simply be that harsh impulses create
a disproportionately high response from the social and economic institutions
mankind has created.
I further stated that the described process is not unique to the Fersina Val-
ley. Once again the proposed considerations may also serve to explain the
persistence of other linguistic minorities that live under extreme environmen-
tal conditions. Hence, it might be interesting to find out how this process of
conservation might have influenced the situation of the German community of
Lusern or the one of the Walser community of Alagna that has been described
by Viazzo (1989). Further, this may also hold true for the Ladin minority in the
central Alps or the Romansh speakers in Switzerland, but it may also apply to
the Gaelic minority on the Outer Hebrids or in the Scottish Highlands. Here,
the theory would suggest that the absence of markets made it necessary to
maintain common-pool resources such as fishing grounds or pastures and fur-
ther created a high level of mutual dependence between the members which
secured linguistic survival. However, to confirm this it would be necessary to
look deeper into the economic history of the respective regions.
It should also be addressed that there are several factors concerning the
situation in the Fersina Valley I have not analyzed explicitly in this contri-
bution. For instance, the chapter did not analyze whether the enforcement
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of the community borders in the valley did interfere with the state jurisdic-
tion, and how the respective problems had been solved and affected property
rights regimes.344 However, in my eyes these facts would likely complicate the
present analysis, while not adding any deeper insights into the mechanisms
that have been described in this chapter. It should be emphasized once more
that the processes that have been described in this chapter should be under-
stood as a mechanism which counteracts assimilation pressures, rather than
a means of totally preventing linguistic assimilation. Accordingly I believe
that the economic factors described above might have contributed to slowing
down assimilation, working against the lures of joining and participating in a
more prosperous society. This seems to be confirmed by research in linguis-
tics, which analyzes the “purity” of the German dialect in the village commu-
nities. As Rowley (2008) states, several Italian and Tyrolean borrowings can
be found when analyzing the German dialect, supposing that members of the
German communities could not fully escape the influence of either the High-
German or the Italian language groups.345 Furthermore, the present chapter
has explained the survival of the linguistic minority in the Fersina Valley by
exclusively looking at the environmental factors of the mountain environment.
But, as important as the external constraints appear to be, such a pure form of
environmental determinism can apparently not account for various other de-
terminants such as cultural factors. Though I believe that this approach is -
on account of the close connection between economic production and envi-
ronmental constraints - justified, it would still be interesting to analyze the
reciprocal relationship between cultural and economic factors. I also want to
note that in my eyes neither the survival of the German dialect nor the mu-
tual discrimination of the German and the Italian language groups had been
rooted in exogenous preferences of the inhabitants for their mother tongue.
344Yet, historical evidence seems to suggest that most of the local administration in the valley
had been autonomous from the higher state authorities.
345Remember that the trading activities of the German salesmen mostly took place in the closed
German language area, and this obviously had an influence through the adoption of sev-
eral loanwords and linguistic borrowings. These relations finally left their mark on the
Mòcheni dialect, by both leading to the inclusion and consolidation of the consciousness of
belonging to the German ethnicity.
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Rather, I believe that negative feeling against the other language groups, as
well as other forms of “discrimination”, emerged on account of the century
long separation of both groups. Furthermore, on account of the close social
relations between the members of the respective communities, one might also
be tempted to conclude that an unequal distribution within the communities
might be more detrimental to language survival than the incentives coming
from the unequal distribution of wealth between the communities, since this
might have weakened the social ties and the mutual dependencies within the
group.
Finally, I want to stress that in contrast to the popular notion of Alpine
mountain communities constituting enclosed communities with limited eco-
nomic contact to other groups, the communities of the Fersina Valley had been
open to trade with other groups. As I have stressed above, it seems that the
seasonal overpopulation of the Fersina Valley and other high mountain com-
munities has forced members of the communities to temporally leave their set-
tlements to work abroad. This appears to have contributed to the opening of
the economy, while the village community itself remained virtually unaffected
by external influences.346
Since the end of the 1960s, the effects of modern life have also found their
way into the Fersina Valley. The number of people engaging in wage labour
in the nearby cities of Trent and Pergine has continuously been increasing, and
tourism also seems to have contributed its share to the presence of product and
insurance markets in the valley. This leads to fewer people being dependent
on agricultural production, which makes the century old institutions redun-
dant. Though the respective institutions are not in place anymore, the German
dialect seems to be well preserved by being extensively documented and fos-
tered due to political and communal efforts. Here, both the increased contact
and cooperation with the other linguistic enclaves in the Alps and with Ger-
mans in South Tyrol, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany also contribute their
share to the survival of the German dialect in the Fersina Valley.
346Similar claims have been made by Viazzo (1989, pp.142-143).
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Figure 4.2: Steepness of the hillside in the German part of the Fersina Valley
In the German part of the Fersina Valley, even very steep mountain mead-
ows - as this one close to the community of Eichleit - are used for agricultural
production. In spite of the rocky ground and its steepness - the meadow had
been mowed recently.
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Figure 4.3: View of Florutz from the Italian part of the Fersina Valley
This picture shows a part of the community of Florutz. The picture was
taken from the Italian side of the Fersina Valley. It appears that there are only
few areas of land to be used for agricultural production. Furthermore, the pic-
ture gives a fairly good account of the fast increasing steepness of the hillside.
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Figure 4.4: View of the Italian side from the German part of the Fersina Valley
The Italian side of the Fersina Valley shows a comparatively high amount
of land that is suitable for agricultural production. In contrast to figure 2 and
3, the picture also shows that the steepness of the hillside is less pronounced
here.
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Figure 4.5: Signpost in front of the church in Florutz - Mitterpèrg
The signpost gives a short history on the history of the church in
Florutz/Mitterpèrg. The signpost is written in three different languages.
On the left side the history of the church is described in the Middle High
German dialect while the other two columns state the history in Italian and
High German.
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This dissertation has provided an analysis of property rights from an economic
perspective. Each of its three chapters focused on a different aspect of property
rights research ranging from an examination of the factors that influences their
formation, to the causes of institutional change and the various consequences
that can be expected to emerge from the changes in the structure of property
rights. Although each of the three chapters has provided its own concluding
remarks, I still consider it important to summarise the view presented in this
thesis once again. However, this will be done in a very compact way.
In my eyes, there are especially three aspects that need to be emphasised
again.
1. Although property rights and institutions apparently have the power to
increase either the overall level or just various aspects of efficiency in
a group or society, unfortunately the impact of property rights are not
limited to this aspect. Rather, it appears that property rights can and will
serve various other aspects of social and economic life and hence one has
to accept that property rights may also be designed to oppress efficiency.
Apparently this has to be kept in mind before a more detailed analysis
of the true determinants of property rights formation and institutional
change can be carried successfully.
2. Property rights constitute much more than simple constraints on be-
haviour that limit rational actors in their economic activities. Property
rights influence individual perception, define hierarchies in social inter-
action and are important determinants in influencing human behaviour
by defining reference groups. Hence, any attempt that seeks to reduce
property rights to their purely instrumental aspects and consequences,
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misses out on the opportunity to use the useful aspects of property rights
analysis to their full extent. This implies that property rights constitute
an important means to explain human behaviour beyond the level of
“basic economic parameters” such as exogenous preferences, incentive
structures or the maximisation of utility. In contrast, it is the additional
focus on the psychological roots and consequences of ownership and
property rights which contributes to a deeper understanding of human
behaviour.
3. While the analysis of institutional arrangements and property rights is
too often wedged into ready-made schemes, any such advancement is
not likely to successfully uncover all of the problems and phenomena
that are related to ownership and property rights. It appears that the
eclectic dimensions of property rights research are far too complex to be
captured within a fixed framework that draws on normative prejudices
on the nature of ownership.
Based on James Joyce one might be tempted to conclude that it is a ’rocky road
to Dublin’. As the current state of property rights research is certainly not the
end of this road, I hope that the present thoughts will make the journey more
pleasant.
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